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Sharing healthcare information—including electronic health/medical records (EHRs/EMRs)—among
healthcare information systems is necessary for improving the quality of healthcare. However, facilitating
data exchange increases privacy threats—due to easier copying and dissemination of healthcare
information.
We propose a solution that provides privacy protection for patients’ EHRs/EMRs disseminated among
different authorized healthcare information systems. Our solution builds upon the existing construct named
an Active Data Bundle (ADB). In the proposed solution, ADBs keep EHRs/EMRs as sensitive data; include
metadata describing sensitive data and prescribing their use; and encompass a policy enforcement engine
(called a virtual machine or VM), which controls and manages how its active bundle behaves. The VM
enforces ADB’s data integrity and ADB’s privacy policies (specified as a part of metadata).
We first modify the existing design and implementation of the ADB scheme, known as Active Bundles
using Trusted Third Party (ABTTP). ABTTP uses ADBs and trusted third parties (TTPs). The latter
maintain and provide to ADBs trust values of visited hosts, as well as hash values and decryption keys. Our
modification, named Active Data Bundles with Trusted Third Party (ADB-TTP), is only a starting point for
significant enhancements and improvements to the ADB scheme proposed by us. They include: (i) using
nested VMs in ADB-TTP instead of using single VM in ABTTP, (ii) adding new phases to the ADB
lifecycle including ADB auditing and ADB Termination; and (iii) using the eXtensible Access Control
Markup Language (XACML) to specify the privacy policies and to enforce them.
We also develop a new ADB scheme implementation, known as Active Data Bundles with Multi-Agent
System (ADB-MAS). ADB-MAS implements active data bundles as mobile intelligent agents, which
eliminate the need for using TTPs.
In order to test the effectiveness of different ADB schemes and evaluate their use in healthcare
applications, we use a real-life healthcare scenario for dissemination of EHRs in healthcare information
systems. We evaluate both ADB-TTP and ADB-MAS using separate testbeds implemented with Java
Standard Edition (JDK 1.8) and Java Agent Development Framework (JADE), respectively.
We run consistent experiments on both testbeds to evaluate and compare performance for both solutions
(the experiments are "consistent" as much as possible in the context of separate testbed implementations).

The evaluation criteria for ADB-TTP and ADB-MAS include rates of data reduction, data disclosure, and
successful/unsuccessful data delivery. Our evaluation shows that ADBs are able to protect patient
EHRs//EMRs during their dissemination among healthcare providers. The quantitative results show that
under different circumstances either ADB-TTP or ADB-MAS is a better protector of data (via so called
“evaporation” or “apoptosis” of the most sensitive data). The qualitative conclusions are that ADB-MAS
outperforms ADB-TTP in protection of privacy of healthcare data (EHRs/EMRs) because ADB-MAS
performs a priori trust verification of destination hosts (to which EHRs/EMRs are delivered by ADBs).
Our results demonstrate that ADB-MAS, our new implementations of the ADB scheme, improve the
privacy and efficiency of processing of patients’ data in healthcare information systems. In the broader area
of computing technology, ADB-MAS can be used to prevent privacy violations, including stealing and
leaking of sensitive data in diverse distributed computing applications areas, including Internet of Things,
Cloud Computing, Opportunistic Resource Utilization Networks (Oppnets), and distributed database
systems.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“Historically, privacy was almost implicit, because it was hard to
find and gather information. But in the digital world, whether it's
digital cameras or satellites or just what you click on, we need to
have more explicit rules - not just for governments but for private
companies.”

~Bill Gates

1.1. Overview of the Dissertation
Assuring patient privacy in healthcare information systems is very important, especially in the context
of Federal and other requirements for sharing electronic health/medical records (EHRs/EMRs). This sharing
is necessary for improving the quality of healthcare and reducing the cost of healthcare services.
We present a solution building upon the existing construct named an Active Data Bundle (ADB) that
can provide privacy protection for patients’ EHRs/EMRs disseminated among different authorized
healthcare information systems. As proposed, ADBs keep EHRs/EMRs as sensitive data; include metadata
describing sensitive data and prescribing their use; and encompass a policy enforcement engine (called a
virtual machine or VM), which controls and manages how the active data bundle behaves. The VM assures
ADB’s data integrity and enforces its privacy policies specified as a part of metadata.
We first modify the existing solution implementing the ADB scheme, known as Active Bundles using
a Trusted Third Party (ABTTP), into the new modified solution known as Active Bundles with Trusted
Third Party (ADB-TTP). Then, we design a new ADB-based solution, known as Active Data Bundles
with Multi-Agent System (ADB-MAS), which implements ADBs as mobile intelligent agents. Providing
ADB protection capabilities to mobile intelligent agents turns them into secure mobile intelligent agents.
“In reverse,” providing mobile intelligent agent capabilities to ADBs, facilitates ADB construction as well
as replaces a designated trusted third party or TTP (used in ADB-TTP) with ADBs based on mobile
intelligent agents (used in ADB-MAS).
The ADB-MAS protects patient’s EHRs/EMRs not only by encryption, but also by authenticating and
authorizing a destination host, and enforcing ADB privacy policies before delivering patients’ EHRs/EMRs
to the destination host.
A precise problem statement and research hypothesis for this Dissertation are given in Section 1.8—
after the required technical terms are defined.
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1.2. Background for Healthcare Information Systems (HISes)
Health Information Systems (HISes) manage and control patients’ healthcare data and their processing (such
as capturing, storing, updating, and sharing) to increase the quality of healthcare services [MCMP10].

1.2.1. Introduction to HISes
Users of HISes include patients and healthcare providers. Examples of healthcare providers include:
physicians, nurses, dentists, pharmacists, lab workers, and healthcare researchers; as well as organizations
employing them (hospitals, clinics, medical labs, medical research institutes, etc.).1
HISes use a wide range of tools and applications provided by Health Information Technology (HIT).
HIT applications process, store, retrieve, share, and use healthcare information for communication and
decision making [MCMP10, HeIT16].
HIS systems include EHR systems. Many different EHR systems—such as Veterans Health Information
Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA) [SBMD12]—are provided by vendors and used by the
American healthcare providers. Many healthcare providers or health insurance companies provide their
own EHR systems. Some EHR systems are web services that allow different users to communicate and
exchange data over the Internet.

1.2.2. Healthcare Data in HISes
The kinds of HIS data considered by us are:
1) Electronic Health/Medical Records (EHRs/EMRs), which are an account of patients’ long-term
health history, containing doctor visit summaries, diagnoses, prognoses, laboratory and radiology
tests, treatment descriptions, etc. [Houg07, Mosb09, Mitr06]. EHRs/EMRs can be processed,
stored, retrieved, used and shared among HISes for communication and decision-making
[MCMP10].
Since the end of the last century, these records are undergoing a transformation from physical
paper-based folders to digital EMRs and EHRs.
Notice the difference between EMRs and EHRs. EMRs are legal records for patients that are created
in a single healthcare provider facility (like a hospital or a clinic), while EHRs are the summaries

1

Authorized health insurance workers and state or federal government workers are examples of people are not classified by us as direct HIS users,
though they may be authorized to demand some HIS output from HIS users.
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of EMRs for a given patient that are collected by authorized healthcare providers from more than
one healthcare provider visited by the patient[GaDa06].
2) Personal Health Records (PHRs) are similar to EHRs in the sense that they are also patients’
healthcare information summaries collected from multiple healthcare providers. However, they are
different in the sense that they are being initiated, maintained, managed, and controlled by patients
themselves, not by healthcare providers [Mosb09]. Most of the patients access their PHRs (which
are linked to their EHRs in their healthcare provider systems) using programs provided by their
health providers, employers, or healthcare insurance companies [ZNTW11].
3) Electronic Prescriptions (used in Electronic Prescribing or E-Prescribing or eRx) allow a
prescriber to electronically prepare and send a prescription directly to a pharmacy, improving
accuracy and security of the prescription process. An electronic prescription can include sensitive
data (e.g., the name of medications, patient’s age, and address), as well as non-sensitive data
required in a prescription (e.g., the name of the prescriber and her address).
This thesis discusses explicitly only EHRs, but we believe that its findings apply to EMRs, PHRs, and
eRx’s as well. To save space and avoid awkward phrases, we will use the term “EHR” while in the vast
majority of cases we mean “EHR, EMR, PHR, or eRx.”
Healthcare providers create, read, update, and may delete2 some (but not all) copies of a given EHR for
a given patient.3 A patient should have the right to read his EHR (or its part), but no right to modify it except
being allowed to change such personal information like address and contact information. On the other hand,
a physician should have the right to read a patient’s EHR and append new information to it but no right to
modify the personal information of the patient (like address and contact information).

1.2.3. Motivation for Electronic Health Records (EHRs)
As of 2015, up to 17% of American hospitals or their clinical units did not meet the requirements for
using and interconnecting basic EHRs [HPSP16]. This is a significant progress when compared with 88%
in 2009 and 41% in 2013 [JDCD09, RwMH13, ADKF15, HPSP16]. Full adoption of EHRs and their
efficient exchange among healthcare providers is expected to reduce the annual American healthcare
expenditures by $81 billion (3.4% of the annual 2008 bill of $2,399 billions [MiTu09, USHE18]).

2
3

All EHRs copies should never be deleted; even when a patient dies, his EHR(s) still remains useful, e.g., for medical or public health research.
A single patient may have many EHRs, for example, EHRs created in institutions that do not exchange or merge EHRs of their patients. However,
to simplify our discussion, in the remainder of this work we assume that each patient has a single EHR.
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EHR adoption is an important part of the improvement of the current HISes and development of future
HISes. More specifically, using electronically interchangeable EHRs is a critical part of the improvement
of the current HISes and development of future HISes. It is expected to help in achieving the following
goals [GaDa06, HPSP16]:
1) Improving safety, quality, and efficiency of patient care;
2) Reducing the cost of healthcare;
3) Enriching the health-services research and public health monitoring [Hall10];
4) Speeding up clinical communication and monitoring;
5) Reducing the number of errors in patients’ records;
6) Assisting doctors in diagnosis and treatment.

1.2.4. Ownership and Owner Duties in HISes
The ownership of healthcare data, like the ownership of any property, should represent the state or fact
of exclusive legal rights and control over the property [Hall10, AHDE11].
According to American Medical Association (AMA), healthcare providers own patients’ healthcare
data collected by them [Hall10]. The ownership of EHRs is a central issue in healthcare because medical
information has a commercial value [PHIS13].
We define a legal guardian for an EHR as a person or institution that has the legal authority (and the
corresponding duty) to care for the patient’s EHR regarding issuing permissions for creating, reading,
updating, and deleting copies of the EHR.
Duties of ownership or guardianship include protecting the privacy of EHRs. This is consistent with
the federal and state privacy laws, including the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) [HIPA96], which guarantee the protection of patients’ privacy through the control of sharing their
healthcare information among healthcare providers. HIPAA distinguishes list of the “individually
identifiable health information” named Protected Health Information (PHI) as shown in Figure 1.1.

4

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)

Names (patient, healthcare provider)
Addresses
Geographic subdivisions
All elements of dates related to the individual (dates of
birth, marriage, death, etc.)
Telephone numbers
Facsimile numbers
Driver’s license numbers
Electronic mail addresses
Social security numbers
Medical record numbers
Health plan beneficiary numbers
Account numbers, certificate/license numbers
Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers
Device identifiers and serial numbers
Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs)
Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers
Biometric identifiers
Full face photographic images and any comparable images

Figure 1.1. HIPAA Protected Health Information (PHI).

Eighteen PHI attributes are not just associated with a patient, but identify her [PHIn15, OIHS15]. Under
HIPAA requirements, healthcare providers must remove these “identifiers” from healthcare records that
are prepared to share with other healthcare providers or other authorized parties [MaSV12, MHVT15].
Due to a legal vagueness, neither the so-called (not quite real) ownership nor the guardianship gives
the patients or the healthcare providers the complete control over patients’ EHRs. A patient—who might
think that she is the owner of her EHR—actually cannot exercise full ownership rights over her EHR at all.
For example, she needs to follow her healthcare provider policies in order to obtain a copy of her EHR or
to have it transferred to another party. On the other hand, the patient’s healthcare provider does not own
(and completely control) her EHR but is only her EHR’s guardian. For example, the healthcare provider
needs a patient’s permission to share or use her EHR for special uses that are not included in the privacy
policy statement signed by her (which is typically required by a healthcare provider before providing a
healthcare service).

1.2.5. The Meaningful Use and Health Information Exchange
In 2009, the U.S. Congress authorized $30 billion in incentive payments through Medicare and
Medicaid to encourage eligible professionals and hospitals to adopt EHRs. The authorization was a part of
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the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH), which in turn was a
part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) [ARRA09].)
The Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has divided the objectives of the so-called
meaningful use of EHRs for eligible healthcare providers into three stages [MeUs13, MeUD13]: (i) data
capture and sharing; (ii) advanced clinical processes; and (iii) improved outcomes [MeUD13].
In Stage 1 (data capture and sharing), the only one relevant for this work, requires satisfying a subset of
15 core criteria and 10 menu criteria. Healthcare providers must meet all core criteria, which include
entering the basic patient data, enabling e-prescribing (eRx), implementing the clinical decision support,
and protecting the privacy of electronic health information. Healthcare providers must also select and meet
5 out of the 10 menu criteria, which include providing timely electronic access to patients’ health
information, checking the drug formulary, and summarizing the care record for each transition of care
referrals [JABJ11, MeUs13, AEMK12].
The meaningful use of EHRs is inspired by the four major abilities of qualified EHR, which are: (i)
providing clinical decision support; (ii) supporting physician order entry; (iii) capturing and querying
information relevant to health care quality; and (iv) exchanging electronic health information, and
integrating such information with other resources [ARRA09].
To achieve all qualified EHR abilities, ARRA legislated the creation of Health Information Exchanges
(HIEs). HIEs are organizations for exchange of electronic health information among all heterogeneous
HISes used by hospitals and clinics in all states [WHIE13, JADJ11]. HIEs operate on the basis of agreedupon operational agreements among the healthcare providers. ARRA requires that HISes support HIEs.
Currently, there are three forms of HIEs [WHIE13]:
1) Directed Exchanges: to send and receive electronic healthcare information among healthcare
providers to support ongoing care.
2) Query-based Exchanges: to request (or provide) patient’s healthcare information from (or to) other
healthcare providers to support an unplanned care (such as visiting an emergency room), i.e., not a
scheduled care.
3) Consumer Mediated Exchanges: to control and manage the use of patient’s healthcare information
by the patient himself.
The National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics in the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services proposed a strategy to build a National Health Information Infrastructure (NHII) [NCVH01,
STKK05, HHFM10], emphasizing the use of EHRs and interconnection of healthcare providers. The NHII
plans is consistent with the HIE goals defined by HITECH. While both documents show awareness of
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shortcomings in the current HISes, HITECH is the only legal obligation or economic stimulus for improving
this situation [MiTU09, JDCD09].

1.2.6. Multiple EHR Versions and Multi-guardianship in HISes
EHR dissemination can occur among numerous parties including the patient, and the guardians of her
EHRs such as multiple healthcare providers, health insurance companies, and government entities.

Figure 1.2. An EHR dissemination example (cf. [SaLi11]).

Figure 1.2 shows an example for an EHR dissemination among different parties. The patient is
considered the owner of her EHR. The Hospital is the main guardian (Guardian 1) for the patient’s EHR is
Hospital. Hospital might send a copy of the patient’s EHR to other guardians. For example, Clinic
(Guardian 2) receives from Hospital a copy of the patient’s EHR before, during, or after her visit. As shown,
the patient’s EHR can be disseminated to and updated by multiple guardians, which increases the risk of its
disclosure to unauthorized parties. Due to this dissemination and updating, multiple EHR versions can stem
from a single “initial” EHR.
Even without EHR dissemination, multiple versions of an EHR can exist for a single patient, within
domains of different owners and guardians. For example, multiple versions of EHR are generated when the
EHR creator does not know that an EHR already exists for the same patient, or when the EHR creator is
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unable to obtain a copy of an existing EHR (e.g., for a patient visiting a Clinic that has no EHR exchange
agreement with Hospital).
As mentioned earlier in Footnote 3, to simplify our discussion, in the remainder of this work we assume
that each patient has a single EHR.
An EHR updated by multiple entities may have multiple guardians, that is, its different portions (down
to individual records) have different guardians. This happens, for example, when an EHR for a given patient
is disseminated among guardians, and a receiving guardian already has another EHR (independently
created) for the same patient. The receiving guardian updates its own EHR (so far fully under its
guardianship) with information from the EHR received from the sending guardian. Information used for
the update was created by the guardian of the received EHR, so now the EHR has two guardians, each with
a partial guardianship of the updated EHR.
Multi-guardian EHRs can overlap; we say that two EHRs overlap when both include at least one record
with the same guardian. In our example, after the update of the EHR by the receiving guardian, EHRs of
the receiving guardian and the sending guardian overlap—because the updated EHR of the receiving
guardian includes all (not just one) records owned by the same (sending) guardian.
There are a few issues related to multiple versions and multi-guardianship of EHRs. First, the vagueness
of EHR ownership rights and limitations of federal and state privacy regulations give a strong reason for
EHR guardians to isolate and avoid sharing their EHRs [Hall10, JDCD09]. Second, a guardian lacks tools
to protect a patient’s privacy rights for arbitrary EHR fragments (down to the single record level). Third,
given a set of guardians for a patient’s EHR, a rational attacker will attack the guardian with the laxest
privacy policies (of course, EHRs obtained from different guardians might differ).

1.2.7. Privacy and Confidentiality in HISes
We define privacy as “the right of an entity, acting on its own behalf, to determine the degree to which
it will interact with its environment, including the degree to which the entity is willing to share information
about itself with others” [Shir00]. User privacy is a user’s right to protect and control her data. As a special
case, patient privacy refers to the patients’ rights to protect and control their healthcare-related data. Patients
determine when, how and which portions of their health information are disclosed or disseminated [BaCl96,
Radi11].
User confidentiality is the right of a user to keep his healthcare or medical information private unless
the user gives her permission to disclose a part or the whole of this information to another party. Hence,
user privacy contains user confidentiality. Patient confidentiality is a special case of user confidentiality
[BaCl96, Ency11], when the user is a patient.
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1.3. Motivation for Privacy in HISes
Sharing EHRs among HISes is necessary for improving the quality of healthcare. However, data
exchanges have an unwelcome side effect of increasing threats to data privacy due to easier data copying
and dissemination, not only via HISes but also via different online services (such as social networks, egovernment and e-business services, and cloud computing). Hence, assuring patient privacy is not only
critical but more and more important. Indeed, ensuring the privacy of health information has become one
of the core objectives of a meaningful use of EHRs [MeUs13, WHIE13].

1.4. Using XML for Representing EHR and XACML for Representing and Processing Data Access
This section discusses the use of XML [ExML17] to represent EHRs, and the use of XACML
[ExAc13] to represent and process the data.

1.4.1. Using XML for Representing EHR
EHRs should be written as a clear and standard structure readable for both humans and machines
[SVEM15]. EHRs can be represented as a multiple sets of health information. Each such set includes a
group of attribute-value pairs (attribute name with its value) and is called an EHR record. Some of the
attributes and their values are considered sensitive since they allow identification of users (patients or
healthcare providers).
We use Extensible Markup Language (XML) [ExML17] to write EHRs. Figure 1.3 shows an example
EHR with many records, using the XML template proposed by us.
EHRs includes three EHR records of information, each record includs a number of attributes with their
values (textual, numerical, or mixed):
1) Personal information includes the following attributes: the patient identification number (PID),
name, birth date, address, and other information that helps a healthcare provider, e.g., to identify or
contact the patient.
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<?xml version="1.0"?>
<ehr id="BH13325600">
<personalInfo>
<patientId > PI-33181CRA </patientId>
<name> Smith, Fred </name>
<birthdate > 07/01/1962 </birthdate>
<driverL> S350-000-4434 </driverL>
<p_email> fsmith@domain.net </p_email>
<gender> Male </gender>
<address> 166 Horton Ave </address>
<city> Kalamazoo </city>
<state> Michigan </state>
<postCode> 49008 </postCode>
<homePhone> 333-333-3333 </homePhone>
<workPhone> 555-555-5555 </workPhone>
<status> Active </status>
<physician> Lakani, Ashok </physician>
</personalInfo>
<healthInfo>
<summaryOVisit>
Mr. Smith is 53 years-old MALE who is complaining about his breathing
for the last month. During his sleep, he feels difficulty in breathing.
He also noticed that he has been going to the bathroom frequently,
esp. at night. Currently, he urinates 3-4 times a night.
He is not aware of any particular weight loss, but he feels thirsty much
of the time.
</summaryOVisit>
<diagnosis>
Recently been diagnosed with inflammation in both knees </diagnosis>
<physicianNotes >
The patient has heart illness, diabetes, and hypertension
</physicianNotes>
<labResults>
Glucose
H107 74-100
mg/dL,
Ca
10.1 8.6-10.2 mg/dL,
BUN
17
8-23
mg/dL,
Creatinine 0.9 0.8-1.3
mg/dL,
HGB
L7.0* 14.0-18.0 mg/dL,
HCT L21.1
42.0-52.0
41 %
</labResults>
<medicationInfo>
Lipitor 20 MG Oral Tablet,
Theophylline 100 MG Tablet,
Plavix 300 MG Oral Tablet;
</medicationInfo>
<accountInfo>
Active since 08/22/2008, referred by Dr. Jeff Peterson
</accountInfo>
</healthInfo>
<billingInfo>
<name> Smith, Fred </name>
<birthdate> 07/01/1962 </birthdate>
<sSN> 888-888-8888</sSN>
<healthInsPolicyNo> JXE2346620 </healthInsPolicyNo>
<paymentType> CCard </paymentType>
<cardNumber> 0000-0000-0000-0000 </cardNumber>
<address> 166 Horton Ave </address>
<city> Kalamazoo </city>
<state> Michigan </state>
<postalCode> 49008 </postalCode>
<homePhone> 269-333-3333 </homePhone>
</billingInfo>
</ehr>

Figure 1.3. An example EHR using the proposed XML template.

2) Healthcare information includes attributes describing the patient’s health conditions, and facts
found out by a healthcare provider, for example, a diagnosis, a summary of office visits, and
laboratory results.
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3) Billing information includes the following attributes: name, birthdate, Social Security Number
(SSN), health insurance policy number, billing address, payment type, and other information that
might be required for a healthcare provider’s financial or billing services.
Note that some information is redundantly included in more than one set of information (e.g., name
and birth date).

1.4.2. Using XACML for Representing and Processing a Data Access Request
The eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [ExML17] is a standard policy language
(implemented in XML [BrIn03, ExAc13]). XACML allows for flexible and fine-grained policy
specifications. We use it for specifying and evaluating privacy policies. XACML is also an architecture
and a processing model for evaluating access requests w.r.t. the policies.
XACML follows one of the two widely known access control policy models (dealing with the description
and evaluation of access control policies), namely, the Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)
[SVEM15]. In the ABAC, attributes (associated with user names, actions, or resources) are an input into a
decision process, which determines whether a given user name (with given attribute values) may access a
given resource in a given way. For example, if the requester is a doctor, then she will be able to access (read
and write) patient’s health records. On the other hand, she will not be able to access patient’s billing
information such as patient’s payments or credit card information.4
XACML defines constructs known as Request and Response (which might be viewed as “activities”),
as well as PolicySet (a “structure”, not an activity). Request (an access request) is used to get the
authorization decisions for accessing specific resources included in the request. The response is used to
return the request contents’ evaluation results to the requester.
The XACML format specifies Request and Response using an XML format. The XACML uses elements
and attributes to describe the contexts of the request and the response. Elements (or subelements) describe
the data that they contain. Elements/subelements can contain subelements and attributes.
Elements/subelements are delimited by start (‘<’) and end (‘>’) tags. Required elements/subelements are
written in a non-italic bold underlined font, while the optional ones are written in a non-italic bold font. For
example, in Figure 1.5. AttributeValue is a required subelement while Attributes is an optional subelement.
In turn, an attribute is placed within an element and gives a characteristic for this element. Required

4

The other model, Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [SVEM15], assigns different access control roles names to users. Each role is associated
with a permission for a user playing this role to access specific resources in specific ways such as an administrator, manager, nurse, or doctor.
Users might be assigned multiple roles [SVEM15], for example, one person could have assigned the roles of a manager and an administrator.
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attributes are written in an italic bold underlined font, while the optional attributes with just in an italic bold
font. In Figure 1.5, the Attributes subelement includes Category as a required attribute and Xml:Id as an
optional attribute.
PolicySet is used to decide if Response for a given Request should be positive (permit) or negative
(deny), and combine the results of request contents’ evaluation for a set of rules included in PolicySet.
Appendix A shows the tables listing XACML elements/subelements and attributes for
Request/Response and PolicySet.

Figure 1.4. Data flow for processing a data access Request in the XACML architecture: (a) for
permit response and (b) for deny response [ExAc13, PRNN14].

The basic components in the XACML architecture, shown in Figure 1.4, are: Policy Enforcement Point
(PEP), Context Handler, Policy Decision Point (PDP), Policy Administration Point (PAP), and Policy
Information Point (PIP).
The data flow among these components for permit response and deny response includes the following
steps (cf. Figure 1.4):
1) In Clinic EHR System (CES), Dr. Jones orders to submit an access request to Hospital EHR System
(HES) to read Mr. Smith’s EHR. The access request states the plan to access (through its assigned
subjects) specific resources to perform specific actions. Examples of subjects include a doctor (Dr. Jones
in this case) or a nurse. Examples of resources include a patient’s healthcare information record or a
patient’s personal information record. Examples of actions include reading or writing.
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2) The request is received by the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) in the HES. The PEP creates a request
(in a non-XACML native format, which is like a query specifying the values of attributes of subjects,
resources, and actions to be matched.
3) The PEP sends the request to the Context Handler.
4) The Context Handler converts the PEP requests from its native format to the XACML format.
5) The Context Handler sends the request to the Policy Decision Point (PDP).
6) The PDP identifies the applicable policies, evaluates them, and makes a decision as follows:
6a) The PDP gets from the Policy Administration Point (PAP) the policies (written in XACML) that are
applicable to this request (i.e., policies specifying access conditions for the requested data).
6b) The PDP retrieves additional records satisfying the Request from the Policy Information Point (PIP).
The PIP acts as a source that provides PDP with records from underlying resources—such as
databases and web services.
6c) Using the applicable policies5 from applicable PolicySets, the PDP evaluates the request to either
permit or deny, which determines whether or not an access is granted to Dr. Jones. The PDP forms
its Response in XACML.
7) The PDP sends Response to the Context Handler (permit in Fig. 1.4a, and deny in Fig. 1.4b).
8) The Context Handler translates the response from the XACML format to the native response format.
9) The Context Handler sends the native response to the PEP.
10) If access is permitted, the PEP executes Dr. Jones’ access to the requested data as shown in Figure 1.4a.
Otherwise, the PEP denies Dr. Jones’ access to the requested data as shown in Figure 1.4b.

1.4.2.1. Details on XACML Access Request Representation
An XACML access request states the host’s plan to access (through its assigned subjects) specific
resources to perform a specific an action. Each XACML access request (cf. Figure 1.5) includes the
XACML Header and the Request element. The access request includes two required attributes
(ReturnPolicyIdList and CombinedDecision) and three optional subelements (RequestDefaults,
MultiRequests, and Attributes). Recall that required components are underlined.

5

Policies include rules. For each applicable policy, all applicable rules are evaluated.
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Figure 1.5. The structure of XACML access request [ExAc13].

The ReturnPolicyIdList attribute (either true or false) is used to request from the PDP a list of all
policies applicable for the given Request. The CombinedDecision attribute (true or false) is used to request
that the PDP combines multiple decisions into a single decision.
The RequestDefaults subelement includes default values for the request, such as XPath version for the
Xpath expression. Xpath expression is a primitive type shows the XPath expression selected over the XML
in a Content subelement, for example “urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:data-type:xpathExpression”.
vvvvvv
The MultiRequests subelement contains a list of requests; it used when the requester sends a multi
requests to the PDP.
The Attributes subelement provides information about attributes of the request. It includes two attributes
(Category and Xml:id) and two subelements (Attribute and Content). The required Category attribute
specifies the name of the category to which the attribute belongs (e.g., access-subject, resource, and action).
The optional Xml:id attribute specifies a unique identifier for the set of allowable values for the
Attributes subelement.
The required Attribute subelement describes the attribute that belongs to the specific required Category
selected in the request. For example, if the selected Category is resource, then the attribute’s subelements
give more information about this resource such as its id and its value. Attribute includes three attributes
(AttributeId, Issuer, and IncludeInResult) and one subelement (AttributeValue). The required AttributeId
specifies the attribute identifier,6 the optional Issuer attribute specifies the source of the request (name of

6

XACML reserves a numbers of predefined identifiers for all attributes (cf. [ExAc13]).
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the requester), and the optional IncludeInResult attribute (either true or false) specifies whether to include
this attribute in the decision result provided by PDP. So, if the IncludeInResult attribute value is “false”,
then the result includes the Attribute subelement.
The required AttributeValue subelement specifies the attribute value. It includes the required DataType
attribute that indicates the data type7 for the attribute value.
The optional Content subelement provides additional sources that provide additional attributes.

1.4.2.2. Details on XACML Response Representation
Each XACML access response (cf. Figure 1.6), sent by PDP to PEP after evaluating a policy set for a
given Request [ExAc13]. Access response includes the XACML Header and the Response element. The
Response element includes the required subelement Result that specifies the authorization decision made
by PDP.
In turn, the Result subelement includes the required subelement Decision and five optional subelements:
Status, Obligations, AssociatedAdvice, Attributes, and PolicyIdentifierList8. The Decision subelement
specifies the value of the authorization decision (i.e., permit or deny) 9. The other optional subelements
definitions are omitted since they are out of our scope, for more information cf. [ExAc13].

Figure 1.6. The structure of XACML access response [ExAc13].

7
8
9

XACML reserves a number of DataTypes for all attribute’ values (cf. [ExAc13]).
Definitions of these optional subelements can be found in [ExAc13].
As mentioned before, there are two more effects (Indeterminate, and NotApplicable) not considered in the simulation.
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1.4.2.3. Details on XACML Policy Set Representation
The XACML policy set structure (cf. Figure 1.7), includes the XACML Header and the PolicySet
element. The XACML Header includes an optional text information about the policy.
The XACML PolicySet element includes four attributes (PolicySetId, Version, PolicyCombiningAlgId,
and MaxDelegationDepth), and a set of subelements (including Description, Target, Policy, PolicyIssuer,
and PolicySetCombinerParameters). Again, required components are underlined in the figure.

Figure 1.7. The XACML policy set structure [ExAc13].
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The required PolicySetId attribute specifies the identifier of the PolicySet, the required Version attribute
indicates its version, the required PolicyCombiningAlgId attribute specifies the identifier of the policycombining algorithm (which is a standard algorithm for combining decisions obtained from
multiple policies of a PolicySet10), and the optional MaxDelegationDepth attribute limits the depth of
delegation11 that is authorized by the PolicySet. The optional Description subelement provides textual
information about this PolicySet. The required Target subelement specifies the resources to which this
PolicySet applies.12
Due to its complexity, the optional Policy subelement is described in the separate subsection below.
The optional PolicyIssuer subelement specifies the issuer of the PolicySet which refers to a name or an
URL of the policy provider (e.g., institute or hospital). The optional PolicySetCombinerParameters
subelement specifies a sequence of elements called CombinerParameter (which are used by the combining
algorithm) that are associated with a particular PolicySet subelement within the PolicySet element. Note
that the PolicySet element may include more than one policy (a single policy is shown in Figure 1.7).

1.4.2.3.1. XACML Policy Representation.
The Policy subelement includes a set of attributes (PolicyId, Version, RuleCombiningAlgId, and
MaxDelegationDepth) and a set of subelements (including Description, Target, Rule, PolicyIssuer, and
AdviceExpressions). Again, required components are underlined.
The required PolicyId attribute specifies the identifier of this Policy, the required Version attribute
indicates the version number of this Policy, the required RuleCombiningAlgId attribute specifies the
identifier of the rule-combining algorithm (for combining decisions obtained from multiple rules of a
Policy), and the optional MaxDelegationDepth attribute limits the depth of delegation that is authorized by
the PolicySet.
A Target in Policy is applicable to this Policy only13, and—analogously to Target in PolicySet14—
specifies the set of resources to which the policy applies, as declared by the writer of the policy (discussed
next).

10

11
12

13

14

More specifically, each combining algorithm defines a procedure for arriving at an authorization decision given the set of individual per-policy
results of evaluation of a set of policies. Some examples of standard combining algorithms are: Deny-overrides, Permit-overrides, Only-oneapplicable (only for policies), and First-applicable (cf. [ExAc13]).
If A delegates to B, and then B delegates to C, the depth of delegation is 2.
Most policy writers do not use Target for PolicySet, and exclude it by adding an empty target subelement; instead, they specify separate targets
for individual policies included within the policy set.
Target identifies the set of resources that the parent element is intended to evaluate. The Target subelement appears as a subelement in PolicySet
(applicable to all rules in all policies), Policy (applicable to all rules in this single policy), and may appear as a subelement of Rule (applicable
for a single rule within a single policy).
The Target of a PolicySet or Policy may be declared by the writer of the PolicySet or Policy, or it may be calculated from the target elements of
the PolicySet, Policy, and Rule elements [ExAc13].
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1.4.2.3.2. Rule Representation and Evaluation
Each Rule subelement for an applicable Policy is evaluated for obtaining an access decision for the
specified resource [BrIn03, ExAc13]. Rule includes two required attributes (RuleId and Effect) and five
optional subelements (Description, Target, Condition, ObligationExpressions, and AdviceExpressions).
Again, required components are underlined.
The RuleId attribute specifies the Rule identifier, and the Effect attribute specifies the effect of the Rule
(either permit or deny)15.
Before describing Target and Condition subelements of Rule in more detail, we briefly state functions
of all five subelements here. The optional Description subelement provides a textual description of the
Rule. The optional Target subelement is analogous to Targets in Policy and in PolicySet, but it applies to a
single rule (not a policy or a whole policy set). The optional Condition subelement specifies an expression
(or predicate) that must be satisfied in order for the Rule to grant its Effect value. The optional
ObligationExpressions subelement specifies set of obligations expressions (for example, email or name;
which identified by ObligationId attribute which not shown in Figure 1.7) that must be evaluated by
the PDP in conjunction with the enforcement of a PEP decision. ObligationExpressions includes set of
subelements which are beyond our scope (cf. [ExAc13] for more details). The optional AdviceExpressions
subelement specifies a piece of information (for example, name or email) which is provided by the PDP to
the PEP with the data access decision.
Target in Rule in More Detail. The Target subelement includes the optional AnyOf subelement, which
specifies one or more attributes that should match the attributes listed in the access Request. If AnyOf is
missing, then Target must match all attributes listed in the access Request. The AnyOf subelement includes
the required AllOf subelement that specifies the conjunctive sequence of zero AllOf or more Match
subelements (which, therefore, are optional).
The optional Match subelement includes one required attribute (MatchId) and three required
subelements (AttributeValue, AttributeDesignator, and AttributeSelector). The MatchId attribute specifies
the matching function used for the matching evaluation. (Matching evaluation, by PEP, involves matching
attribute value in AttributeValue with attribute value in AttributeDesignator or AttributeSelector).
The required AttributeValue subelement within Match specifies the attribute value, which is the first
argument for the matching process. It includes the required DataType attribute specifying the data type for
the attribute value.

15

There are two more effects, Indeterminate and NotApplicable, which are not needed in our scenarios and simulation.
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The required AttributeDesignator subelement specifies the second argument for the matching process.
It describes one or more values for the Attributes subelement in the access Request. AttributeDesignator
includes four required attributes (Category, AttributeId, DataType, and MustBePresent) and one optional
attribute (Issuer). The Category attribute specifies the category (kind of resource, such as access-subject,
resources, and action) for AttributeDesignator. The AttributeId attribute identifies the attribute for
AttributeDesignator, and the DataType attribute specifies the data type for the value of the attribute. The
MustBePresent attribute (either true or false) determines whether AttributeDesignator returns (as a result)
an empty bag16 (if true) or returns Indeterminate (if false). The Issuer attribute specifies the issuer of
the designator attribute (AttributeDesignator).
The required AttributeSelector subelement is used to identify one or more attribute values for
the Content subelement included in the access Request. It includes four required attributes (Category, Path,
DataType, and MustBePresent) and one optional attribute (ContextSelectorId). The path includes an XPath
expression to be evaluated against the specified XML content. The ContextSelectorId refers to
the attribute in the Request context in the category given by the Category attribute. The other optional
remaining attributes (Category, DataType, and MustBePresent) are discussed previously.
Condition in Rule in More Detail. The Condition subelement includes one required Expression
subelement (not shown in Fig. 6.6. for a reason to be explained in a moment). Expression can be substituted
by one subelement from the Expression Element Substitution Group, which includes the following
subelements:

Apply,

AttributeSelector,

AttributeValue,

Function,

VariableReference,

and

AttributeDesignator. We use the Apply subelement as the substitution for the Expression subelement, as
shown in Figure 1.6. Apply includes one required attribute (FunctionId) and two optional subelements
(Description and Expression). The FunctionId attribute specifies the identifier of the function to be applied
to the indicated arguments. Description and Expression are as defined above. Note that we also substituted
the Expression by AttributeValue.
Target and Condition Evaluation in Rule. We need to explain how the Target and Condition subelements
in Rule are evaluated to produce a proper response to an access Request.
Target evaluation involves two cases:
1) If the Target subelement in Rule is empty, then Target evaluation (by PDP) produces “Match;”
2) Otherwise (i.e., if Target in Rule is not empty), then Target includes one or more AnyOf subelements.
There are two subcases here:

16

In XACML, a bag refers to a collection of values, where all values are of a single data type.
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a) If all AnyOf (including its AllOf) values are matched by attributes values in the access Request,
then the Target evaluation (by PDP) produces “Match;”
b) Otherwise (i.e., when any of the AnyOf values does not match the corresponding value in the
access Request), Target evaluation (by PDP) produces “No match.”
“Match” or “No match” produced by Target evaluation results in the PEP making the “permit” or
“deny” (respectively) response to the Request; that is, the PEP allows or prohibits (respectively) to access
the resources specified in the access request.
Evaluation of the Condition subelement in Rule also involves two cases:
1) If Condition is absent (not included in Rule), evaluation of Condition returns “True;
2) Otherwise (i.e., if Condition is present), Condition includes one or more Apply subelements. There
are two subcases here:
a) If the function in the Apply subelement (identified by FunctionId attribute, with its arguments
identified by Attribute Value) is satisfied, then evaluation of Condition returns “True;”
b) Otherwise (i.e., if the function in the Apply subelement is not satisfied), evaluation of Condition
returns “False.”
“True” or “False” produced by Condition evaluation results in the PEP making the “Permit” or “Deny”
(respectively) response to the Request; that is, the PEP allows or prohibits (respectively) to access the
resources specified in the access request.

1.5. The Active Data Bundle (ADB) Scheme and Implementations
The active data bundle (ADB) scheme uses active data bundles to protect data from unauthorized
disclosure during their dissemination among different parties. In this section, we discuss the ADB structure
and operations, as well as ADB scheme implementations.

1.5.1. ADB Basic Structure
An active data bundle (ADB) (a.k.a. AB or Active Bundle) [BeLi09] is a software construct bundling
together three components (cf. Figure 1.8):
1) Sensitive data representing a digital content that needs to be protected from unauthorized access,
including privacy violations, data leaks, unauthorized dissemination, etc.
2) Metadata, containing information describing sensitive data and prescribing their use, such as access
and privacy policies for the sensitive data.
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3) Virtual machine (VM) controlling and managing how the ADB encompassing it behaves. VM is
the component that makes its ADB active because it is implemented via executable mobile code
and responsible for performing all ADB operations. The essential tasks of the VM are assurance of
ADB data integrity, and enforcement of the privacy policies and data dissemination rules specified
by ADB metadata for ADB data [BeLi09, BenO10].

Sensitive data
Metadata
Virtual machine (VM)

Figure 1.8. The basic structure of an Active Data Bundle (ADB).

The use of the term “virtual machine (VM)” in the ADB context is different than in the operating
systems and related areas.17 We use this term for ADB since VM in ADB still exhibits general
characteristics of a VM—esp. enabling mobility, flexibility, and compatibility [SmNa05, ViMa15]. In this
context, VM refers to executable mobile code included within an ADB and responsible for performing all
ADB operations (during so called ADB enabling, described later).

1.5.2. ADB Hosts and ADB Lifecycle
Any ADB can be transmitted from its origination host to its destination host via a sequence of
intermediate hosts (optionally using a secure transmission for even more bulletproof privacy and security).
The intermediate and destination hosts are collectively known as visited hosts (VHs).
ADB lifecycle includes three phases: ADB creation, ADB dissemination, and ADB enabling [BeLi09].
Any ADB lifecycle phase may require ADB reduction and/or ADB termination [BeLi09]. ADB

17

A system VM (a.k.a. a hardware VM) enables access to a complete system platform—including its operating system, the underlying hardware,
networking resources, input/output devices, and GUI [ViMa15]. A process VM (a.k.a. an application VM) provides user applications with a highlevel abstraction through a high-level programming language. In its various implementations, it delivers replication, emulation, and facilitates
performance optimization [SmNa05, ViMa15].
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reduction involves a partial ADB destruction, which occurs if only a part of sensitive ADB data are
threatened.
ADB termination always involves a complete ADB destruction. We distinguish: (a) a triggered ADB
termination, which occurs before a given ADB completes its data-delivery task, in response to a threat that
all sensitive data in this ADB will be disclosed by the attack materializing this threat; and (b) a pre-planned
ADB termination, which occurs at the end of the ADB enabling phase performed on the last host visited by
the given ADB while executing it multi-destination data dissemination job.18

1.5.3. Partial or Complete ADB Destruction via Evaporation and Apoptosis
A partial ADB destruction occurs via the mechanism of evaporation (an analogy to a phenomenon in
physics). An evaporating ADB destroys only a part of its data, namely the hottest data. The hottest data
are identified by having data-sensitivity level exceeding the clearance level that a potential threat possesses.
The complete ADB destruction occurs via apoptosis (an analogy to a cell-biology phenomenon). The
apoptosizing ADB self-destroys completely (destroying its data, metadata, and VM), irretrievably, and in
a privacy-preserving and secure manner.
As an example, suppose that a given ADB has sensitive data with Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret
data-sensitivity levels. If there is a threat posed by an entity (a person, an application, etc.) with the
Confidential clearance, then all Secret and Top Secret data are the “hottest” data (”hotter” than Confidential
data), and they evaporate. If there is another threat, this time posed by an entity with the Restricted clearance
(which below the Confidential level), then ADB apoptosizes.

1.5.4. More Details of ADB Lifecycle and Operations
As mentioned, the ADB lifecycle encompasses three phases: ADB creation, ADB dissemination, ADB
enabling. During each phase, the ADB audit subsystems (included in VM) record all ADB activities, and
store them in audit files.
Below, we briefly describe lifecycle phases.

1.5.4.1. ADB Creation
In this phase, a given ADB is created at the origination host either automatically or interactively with

18

We allow for multi-destination ADB dissemination, in which a single ADB visits and delivers data to multiple destination hosts.
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the help of a user-friendly ADB Creator (ADBC) software. With an assistance from ADBC, ADB is going
through a sequence of actions to assure confidentiality and integrity of the ADB sensitive data during the
planned ADB dissemination.
During ADB creation, the ADB is going through a sequence of actions to assure privacy and integrity
of the ADB sensitive data during the subsequent ADB dissemination. The ADBC software uses data
encryption and hashing techniques multiple times to protect the privacy and integrity of ADB components
(sensitive data, metadata, and VM). In particular, to protect privacy of sensitive ADB data, ADBC encloses
in the ADB metadata privacy policies as specified by the data owner or data guardian at the originating
host.
The ADBC software bundles all ADB components together in an inseparable (atomic) way. Finally, it
sends the keys and hash values to a trusted third party (TTP). The ADB is now ready for sending to the
destination host.

1.5.4.2. ADB Dissemination
The ADBC software transmits the newly created ADB to its destination host, possibly via a sequence
of intermediate forwarding hosts using a secure transmission [BeLi09, BenO10].

1.5.4.3. ADB Enabling
When an ADB reaches its destination, the ADB enabling process starts. ADB enabling comprises five
groups of activities: ADB Authentication, ADB Authorization, ADB Integrity Verification, ADB Policy
Enforcement, and ADB Audit.
During ADB authentication and authorization, the ADB VM verifies whether the destination host is
authenticated and authorized to access the ADB data, and gets the VH trust value.
The trust value is subsequently used to determine which sensitive data can be disclosed to this VH.
Also, the VM checks the integrity of ADB data. Finally, during ADB policy enforcement, the VM enforces
the privacy policies included in metadata, and discloses to the VH only these portions of ADB data that the
VH is authorized to see.

1.5.5. The ABTTP – An Implementation of the ADB Scheme
The very first implementation of the ADB scheme, called Active Bundles using a Trusted Third Party
(ABTTP), combines active data bundles (originally called active bundles or ABs) with trusted third parties
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(TTPs). ABTTP was developed in the context of mobile agent framework using Java Platform Development
Framework (JADE) [BenO10].
The ABTTP architecture using JADE includes four containers:
1) Directory Facilitator (DF) is the main container and includes agent registry services.
2) Client Application is the first container where the ADB is created.
3) AB Destination (ABD) is the second container that receives ADB (the destination host). ADB is
enabled in the ABD.
4) AB Services is the third container. It includes three agents (i) Security Services Agent (SSA), (ii)
Trust Evaluation Agent (TEA), and (iii) Audit Services Agents (ASA). Those agents together
support ADB during its enabling process in the ABD.
During ADB creation, an AB Creator (in Client Application) creates an ADB, i.e., it bundles sensitive
data, metadata (with privacy policies), and VM. ADB gets two pairs of public/private keys from SSA. The
first pair of keys is used for asymmetric encryption of ADB and the second pair of keys is used for signing
ADB data. ADB sends a request to SSA to store the ADB enabling information (including ADB name, its
decryption keys, and the trust value for a host provided by TEA).
The AB Creator computes a hash value for its sensitive data, and signs them using signature keys that
are available only to the owner using the AB Creator (in Client Application). Finally, AB Creator encrypts
ADB.
Then ADB is sent by the Client Application to the destination host (i.e., ADB is disseminated from the
Client Application to the ABD).
After arriving at the destination host (h), the ADB starts enabling itself. The ADB VM requests SSA for
the enabling information. The SSA requests the TEA to send the trust value of the destination hosts. TEA
sends the trust value of destination hosts to the SSA, then SSA sends enabling information to ADB VM.
After receiving the identity-related information from SSA, the VM checks whether the trust value of the
destination host is sufficient. If the trust value of the destination host is insufficient, then VM apoptosizes
the entire ADB (i.e., sensitive data, metadata, and VM itself). Otherwise VM checks the integrity of ADB
sensitive data as follows. It computes the hash value for ADB sensitive data and compares it with the signed
hash value. If the two hashes are not identical (integrity of ADB sensitive data has been violated), the VM
apoptosizes the entire ADB. Otherwise (i.e., both hashes are identical), the VM uses the decryption key
included in enabling information to decrypt ADB sensitive data. Next, the VM enforces privacy policies
(included in metadata) for sensitive data. Note that specific privacy policies are not implemented in the
ABTTP; their existence is only simulated.
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The VM now delivers ADB data to the destination host. Finally, the VM collects all audit data (recorded
during ADB enabling) and sends them to the ASA in ADB Services. (Note that in ABTTP audit data are
collected and recorded only during ADB enabling). The audit data includes the ADB name, the destination
host identifier, and the names of the audited events.

1.6. Agents, Intelligent and Mobile Agents, and Their Use in HISes
An agent (comes from a Latin word “agree”, means to do) is computer software that has the ability to
act without any direct supervision from a human or an entity including another agent [RuNo10, JeWo98].
An agent performs actions within its environment depending on its own knowledge. This knowledge (which
can be expressed as rules) was either previously fed to the agent, or it was acquired (learned) by the agent
through interactions with the environment (in intelligent agent systems).
An agent encapsulates its state and controls this state using designated methods. [JeWo98]. These
methods let its agent to select actions (performed via agent’s actuators) on the basis of its current precepts
that are obtained by the agent’s sensors from the environment.
Figure 1.9 shows a basic model of a simple agent, known as a reflex agent. A reflex agent is a simple
agent (or a limited-intelligence agent) acting according to rules that match precept conditions and the
current state of the agent [RuNo10], to decide what actions the agent should perform.

Figure 1.9. The basic reflex agent model (cf. [RuNo10]).
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An agent is considered autonomous if it can act without any guidance from a human user or any external
entity (including any other agent).
An agent is proactive when it selects and performs (via an actuator) an action or a set of actions based
on its external precepts that are sensed by its sensors observing its environment. A proactive agent has the
ability to make suggestions to another entity, including a human user. Examples of proactive agents are
shopping bots searching the Internet and suggesting the best deals to users.
An intelligent agent (or software applications using them) can have a few other properties [JeWo98].
First, an agent is responsive if it reacts to the changes in its environment and user needs by acting via its
actuators to affect changes in the environment. Second, an agent is adaptive when it knows or can find out
its users’ preferences and act in ways accommodating them.
Data resources that an agent searches for in its environment might be distributed in unexpected (random
or not) ways. Therefore, an agent that is mobile has higher chances of finding needed data resources. In
other words, mobile agents are more capable of dealing with variable data precept density than for static
ones.
In general, mobile agents have the following advantages:
1) Mobile agents can optimize the bandwidth of connections and balance the computation load
[JeWo98].
2) Mobile agents can move to remote locations with needed resources, and access them locally (in the
new locations) to accomplish tasks on behalf of their originators [LaOs99, BenO10].
3) Mobile agents can execute asynchronously and autonomously [BenO10].
4) Mobile agents can support decentralization, scalability, and peer-to-peer computing models
[VRCC06].
Complexity and diversity of communication and other resources are characteristics of HISes. Currently,
HISes use distributed and shared healthcare information to support and manage patients’ health care
[ShRe15]. Consequently, using mobile intelligent agents is a promising solution for addressing the
challenges of developing HISes.
There are several reasons considered by researchers to use mobile intelligent agent technology in HISes
including:
1) Mobile intelligent agents facilitate providing Electronic Health (e-health) services via the Internet
for both stationary and mobile users (patients and healthcare providers alike) [More06, BePo09,
ShRe15].
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2) Mobile intelligent agents solve many HIS issues (such as problems with user interfaces, scheduling,
policy enforcement, and planning) by means of their intelligent (deliberative, flexible, and learning)
behavior [More06].
3) Mobile intelligent agents provide distributed problem-solving approach, in which agents cooperate
via MAS to solve a complex problem via solving subproblems [More06, BePo09] (divide and
conquer).
Some of the advantages of mobile intelligent agent systems can be further enhanced through an
integration of ADBs into agent-based systems. We believe that providing protection, verification and policy
enforcement capabilities offered by ADBs to mobile intelligent agents can turn them into secure mobile
intelligent agents. “In reverse,” by providing mobile intelligent agent capabilities to ADBs, we can facilitate
ADB construction as well as replace a designated TTP with an ADB based on a mobile intelligent agent.
We are aware that mobile intelligent agent systems have disadvantages, such as high development costs
and privacy and security issues [VRCC06, Pari02]. We expect that the higher costs will be well worth it
especially in environments that consume high demand for continuous open connection such as healthcare
applications. We also expect that integration of the ADB technology (mentioned above) will allow us to
reduce or eliminate privacy and security issues.

1.7. Agent-Based Model and Multi-Agents Systems
In the last decade, mobile agents moved from research laboratories to industrial applications [Naga12,
NeMo03]. In particular, mobile agents are fundamental parts of two important technologies, named AgentBased Model (ABM) and Multi-Agent System (MAS).

1.7.1. Agent-Based Model
Agent-Based Model (ABM) is a computational model for simulating activities of agents. ABM focuses
on the behavior of agents while they interact with other entities or parties (including other agents) within
their environment.
Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) 19 states an abstract architecture and specifications
for agent and ABM. Figure 1.10 shows all components of ABM. ABM includes two main components:
the agent and the agent platform. Mobility allows an agent to move among agent platforms, i.e., in its
environment [JaKa09].
19

FIPA is an IEEE body for developing and setting computer software standards for heterogeneous and interacting agents and agent-based systems
[FIPA2016].
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Agent Platform is an extensible framework (software/hardware) and the exemplary computational
environment in which agents operate and interact with the platform components.

Figure 1.10. FIPA Agent-Based Model (ABM) Architecture.

There are two main platforms in agent models:
1) Home Platform (Origination host): the platform where an agent originates or creates. The home
platform includes the following components:
a) Agent Management System: is an agent that provides white pages services and resource
management services [FIPA16]. White pages are authority services that provide naming
services and store information regarding addresses and identifiers of all agents in the ABM
[WeTr07].
b)

Directory Facilitator: is an agent that provides yellow pages services. Yellow pages are
distributed and hierarchical directory services that provide locations of all agents and
services in the ABM. Yellow pages respond to requests (include keyword query) received
from other agents or platforms in the ABM. Each agent should register with yellow pages
before moving to perform its tasks [BMKC99].

c) Message Transport System: Also called agent communication channel (ACC) that provides
communication services to all agents and platforms in the ABM. Agents can communicate
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using Agent Communication Language (ACL). ACL supports the sharing of messages
among agents or platforms of ABM. Also, it defines the semantics of message content and
its communication context [Posl07].
2) Host Platform (Destination host): is the computational environment that an agent can migrate and
perform its tasks. Host platform also refers to the intermediate platform that able to host an agent
when it moves among multiple platforms including the home platform and host platform (i.e., in a
network) [JaKa09]. The host platform includes a message transport system, which provides
communication services for a moving agent in the host platforms.
A single-host (or destination) agent model refers to an agent moves from home platform to only one
host platform, while multi-host agent model refers to the agent that moves among different host
platforms.

1.7.2. Multi-Agents System
MAS contains multiple interacting intelligent agents, parties, or subsystems that collaborate by sharing
knowledge, methods, or resources in order to solve a difficult computational problem [Muas15]. In other
words, MAS focuses on solving complex problems using multiple agents [AgBM15].
MAS follows the architecture and specifications of FIPA. MAS can be implemented using ABM20.

1.8. Problem Statement and Research Hypothesis
In this section, we present our problem statement and research hypothesis.

1.8.1. Problem Statement
The proposed research addresses the following problem:
Protecting privacy is considered one of the critical problems in HISes. The aim of the proposed
research is to protect patients’ privacy through protecting their EHRs during EHR dissemination
among numerous parties including multiple healthcare providers, health insurance companies, and
government entities.

20

Some of ABM platforms like (Swarm, Starlogo, Netlogo, Mason, Cormas, and Repast) provide built-in method to develop agents and support
with graphical interface.
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1.8.2. Research Hypothesis
The research hypothesis for the dissertation is:
Agent-based implementation of active data bundles can provide effective and efficient
privacy protection for EHRs disseminated in HISes, based on enforcement of privacy
policies specified for EHRs.

1.9. Outline of the Proposed Solution: Active Data Bundles with Multi-Agent System (ADB-MAS)
We proposed using Active Data Bundles with Multi-Agents Systems (ADB-MAS), which implements
active data bundles as mobile intelligent agents that eliminate the need for using TTPs. ADB-MAS is
developed using Java Platform Development Framework (JADE) [Emer16].
The ADB-MAS architecture includes four components:
1) Home Platform is the originating host that includes patients’ EHRs. The Home platform includes
two main components, Home Health Information System (HHIS) and Home Health Information
System Database (HHIS-DB). The latter includes patients’ EHRs and their Privacy Policy (PP)
rules.
In turn, HHIS includes four components: [
a) Access Processing (AP) verifies and processes requests from other healthcare providers. Also,
it obtains both patient data and PP rules from HHIS-DB.
b) Agent Creation (AC) creates all agents within ADB-MAS. AC creates four types of ADB
agents (in this order, as described in detail below):
i)

Trust-verification Agent (TvA) maintains and provides trust values for all hosts that can be
destinations for EHR dissemination. TvA is requested by SdA for the trust value of a
destination host DH when SdA decides whether to visit DH or not (the latter occurs if DH
is too dangerous to be visited by SdA).

ii) Data-audit Agent (DaA) collects audit data from all agents in the ADB-MAS. Audit data
records all actions performed by agents during ADB Agent Creation and ADB Agent
Enabling.
iii) Sensitive-data Agent (SdA) includes an ADB, which carries encrypted data (EHR and PP
rules), and VM. Instead of using single VM in ADB, we propose to use nested VM. Nested
VM includes two VMs, external VM (eVM) and Internal VM (iVM). The iVM runs inside
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eVM. The eVM responsible for authentication and authorization, and an iVM responsible
for data integrity and policy enforcement.
iv) ADB-enabling Agent (EnA) includes the enabling record (ER). ER includes decryption
keys and hash values that will be required for enabling SdA on the destination host.
c) Agent Registration (AR) is responsible for agents’ registration. Each agent must register to
become active in ADB-MAS.
d) Agent Scheduling (AS) is responsible for agent’s scheduling. Each agent in ADB-MAS must
be scheduled after registration. AS creates and maintains agent task list (ATL) specifying all
tasks for each agent in ADB-MAS. ATL is updated by AS; a task is removed from ATL by any
of the four agents when the task is completed.
2) Trust Broker Information Overlay Network (TBION) is the network that manages trust (actually,
reputation, that is, “second-hand trust”) for all hosts that can become destinations for EHR
dissemination.
3) Destination Platform includes the Destination Health Information System (DHIS) and Destination
Health Information System Database (DHIS-DB).
During ADB agent creation (in the Home platform), HHIS receives an access request from DHIS (in
the Destination Platform) asking for a patient’s EHR. HHIS authenticates the access request. If the request
is not authentic, HHIS sends rejection notification to the DHIS. Otherwise (i.e., the request is authenticated),
HHIS processes the request and retrieves patient’s EHR from local HHIS-DB.
HHIS creates TvA and DaA. Then, HHIS sends TvA to TBION to collect DHIS’ trust value (DHISTV). When TvA reaches the TBION, TvA performs authentication verification activity. Authentication
activity required that the TBION provides the correct identifier to prove its identity. If this verification
activity fails, then TvA terminates.
TvA retrieves DHIS-TV and returns with it to HHIS. TvA provides DHIS-TV to AC, and then TvA
terminates.
HHIS enforces a part of the patient’s PP rules for EHR, namely it uses these PP rules that evaporate
(remove) these patient’s EHR record(s) for which DHIS-TV is insufficient (is below the required trust
threshold).
HHIS generates two private encryption/decryption key pairs (this is in contrast to ABTTP, described
in Subsection 1.5.4.1, which uses only one key pair for encryption, and another for signing). HHIS encrypts
the patient’s EHR and PP rules using the first asymmetric encryption key, and computes the first hash value
for both EHR and PP rules (jointly). Next, HHIS bundles EHR, PP rules (metadata) and iVM to build an
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ADB. Then, HHIS encrypts the whole ADB using the second asymmetric encryption key, and computes
the second hash value for the whole ADB. Finally, HHIS attaches eVM to the ADB. Note that the patient’s
EHR and PP rules are protected with double encryption.21
HHIS puts the encrypted ADB into SdA and puts ER into EnA. HHIS sends EnA to an arbitrary host,
and sends SdA to DHIS.
When EnA reaches the arbitrary host, the EnA performs two verification activities: authentication and
authorization. Authentication activities required that the arbitrary host provides the correct identifier (or
credential) to prove its identity. Authorization activities required that HHIS provides the authorization code
(ACd) to EnA. The ACd includes the decryption key for the EnA’s application data. If at least one of these
two verification activities fails, then EnA terminates. Otherwise, the HHIS sends DaA to the arbitrary host.
The DaA authenticates and authorizes the arbitrary host without difficulty because the arbitrary host is
authenticated and authorized by EnA.
When SdA reaches DHIS, the ADB agent enabling starts. In this process ADB performs three
verification activities: authentication, authorization, and integrity verification. Authentication activities
required that the DHIS provides the correct identifiers (or credentials) to prove its identity. Authorization
activities required that EnA provides the ER to SdA. Integrity verification activities required that some
information included in ER.
If at least one of these three verification activities fails then ADB apoptosizes, and SdA and EnA
terminate. Otherwise ADB enforces PP rules, which results in disclosing to DHIS only these data which
DHIS is authorized to see. Then, ADB apoptosizes, and EnA and SdA terminate.
During ADB agent creation and ADB agent enabling, DaA collects audit data from TvA, EnA, and
SdA. When ADB agent enabling is finished, DaA moves to HHIS, and provides all collected audit data to
EHR guardian at HHIS. Then, DaA terminates.

1.10. Scope, Limitations, and Delimitations of the Proposed Research
This section discusses the scope, the limitations, and the delimitations of the proposed research. The
scope of research defines the domain of the study. The limitations of research identify matters or concerns
considered by us to be beyond the scope of research. The delimitations of research refer to the new
characteristics that arise from the limitations of the study, and they result from researcher choices or

21

Multiple encryption (a.k.a. cascade encryption) is encrypting an already encrypted message/text using the same or different encryption algorithm
[Muen16].
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decisions during the study execution. In the delimitations, we should pronounce characteristics that study
does not cover and explain the decisions we made to exclude or adjust them, for example, irrelevant to the
objectives of the study or too complicated to establish.

1.10.1. Scope of Proposed Research
The scope of the proposed research is limited as follows:
1) We focus on the management and control user privacy during by protecting EHR dissemination
among different authorized EHR users.
2) We discuss explicitly generic healthcare data including EHRs/EMRs, PHRs, and eRx. Other kinds
of healthcare data are outside of the scope of this research.
3) We design and implement two simulations: ADB-TTP (where ADBs are acted as objects) and
ADB-MAS (where ADBs act as intelligent mobile agent) to study the behavior of ADB during its
lifecycle (i.e., from ADB creation through ADB dissemination to ADB enabling).
4) We used privacy policies for controlling the sensitive data included in the EHR. Other policies are
outside of the scope of this research.

1.10.2. Limitations of the Proposed Research
We are aware of the following limitations of this research:
1) The proposed solution has gained interest of a local healthcare provider [PeCo11]. However, we could
not find an opportunity to apply the solution in a real healthcare facility. Instead, we design and run
simulations to show the effectiveness and efficiency of our solution.
2) In general, EHR dissemination can be multi-hop (with a single EHR sent from the originating host to a
destination host through many intermediate nodes), and multi-destination (with a single EHR visiting
many destination hosts). Without affecting the generality of our solution, we explicitly consider only
single-hop, and single-destination EHR disseminations, in which each EHR is sent directly (without
passing through any intermediate nodes) from the originating host to a single destination host.
3) Security is discussed only to the degree that it is needed in our solution for providing privacy protection.
4) The proposed solution uses a key management infrastructure (without defining its own).
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1.10.3. Delimitations of the Proposed Research
In the following we list our delimitations:
1) We did not adapt a specific EHR format or style due to copyrights on the EHR formats. Instead, we
propose a generic EHR structure that reflects the most common health information and attributes
included in EHRs in different HISes. Hence, our hypothetical EHR format can be easily adapted for
any specific EHR format requirements.
2) We do not use a specific implementation for XACML. Instead, we simulate the enterprise-java-xacml
implementation.
3) We do not use automated trust negotiation (ATN) [Wins03, Gali10] for our solutions because ATN is
too complex with a lot of communication for exchanging information and credentials between
negotiating parties.

1.11. Dissertation Organization
Chapter Two presents related work on protecting privacy of healthcare data. Chapter Three describes
the research methodology. Chapter Four enhances the ABTTP scheme and proposes a modified solution
named Active Data Bundles with Trusted Third Party (ADB-TTP). Chapter Five introduces a completely
new solution named Active Data Bundles with Multi-Agent System (ADB-MAS). Chapter Six describes a
performance study via testbeds; it presents testbed scenarios, design of the testbeds, and results of the
experiments run for ADB-TTP and ADB-MAS. Chapter Seven presents concluding remarks.
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CHAPTER 2

RELATED WORK ON PROTECTING PRIVACY
OF HEALTHCARE DATA

“Is there anyone so wise as to learn by the experience of
others?”
~Voltaire

2.1. Introduction
As any organizations protecting privacy of data, healthcare providers and other organizations with
strong connections to healthcare, such as health insurance or health-related government agencies, use
diverse techniques to protect their data while disseminating them or providing access to them. Most of these
organizations prevent unauthorized data disclosures using data encryption techniques [WERR07], data
masking techniques, and data de-Identification.

2.2. Protecting Privacy of Healthcare Data using Data Encryption
Using encryption algorithms and encryption keys, data encryption techniques convert an original
plaintext to a ciphertext, practically impossible to decipher by an unauthorized party. Data decryption is
the reverse process of the converting a ciphertext back to the original plaintext using decryption algorithms
and decryption keys [WERR07].
Bhattacharya et al. [BGA06] propose the Privacy Broker middleware architecture for enforcing the
legal requirements of privacy that relate to health data. The middleware uses Enterprise Privacy
Authorization Language (EPAL), an XML-based language, to specify privacy policies.
Privacy Broker includes a program running on a trusted coprocessor (IBM 4758 programmable secure
coprocessor) that encrypts data with a private key, stores them in a database on behalf of a requester, and
signs them with the same private key. Later, when Privacy Broker retrieves information from the database
on behalf of a requester, it uses the same program with the same private key to decrypt data.
The decryption key and capability certificates are stored in a secure program called Sentry. To give a
requester access to data stored in a database, Sentry must: (i) evaluate if the request is “worthy of being
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honored” (the notion of “worthy of being honored” is not explained in this paper); (ii) if the request is
“worthy of being honored,” determine data to be released to the requester; and (iii) deliver these data for
the requester. Now, data access is done through the Capability Certificate subsystem.
Capability Certificate subsystem knows how to: (i) authenticate the requester for accessing given data,
and (ii) identify privacy policies to be executed and fetched the required data. Only after authorization and
identification; results are given to the requester. The capability certificates may be temporarily transferred
(delegated) to a user other than the originally certified user in case the latter is absent.
To detect possible privacy abuses, Privacy Broker records all queries in a query log.
Akinyele et al. [ALGP10] claim that their mechanism provides self-protecting EMRs inside and outside
of the hospital environment via attribute-based encryption (ABE). ABE facilitates granular role-based and
content-based access control for EMRs. The hospital initially specifies the record access policies
(describing the sensitivity of data and identities of authorized parties), then encrypts and stores these
policies in a Continuity of Care Record (CCR).22
CCR can be kept at the provider’s server (at a hospital), exported to a trusted cloud (e.g., Google
Health), or transferred to a patient’s mobile device. The authors propose a Python-based policy engine to
automatically evaluate and determine record access policies based on: (i) a set of policies (specified by the
hospital or patient); (ii) the identity and the nature of EMR’s author (hospital or clinic); (iii) the tags
associated with the EMR, for example: Lab Result, Oncology; and (iv) the text of the record.
The ABE master control generates decryption keys. The keys may correspond to user roles (long-term
keys), or can be generated to access portions of EMR records (short-term keys). A patient can use a
prototype mobile browser (iHealthEMR) in his mobile phone to access his CCRs obtained from the hospital:
download the encrypted CCRs from the hospital into his mobile device, decrypt the CCRs, and upload his
CCRs to Google Health (either in plaintext or in ciphertext). The patient can also change his record access
policy.
We strongly disagree with the authors’ claim that they make EHRs self-protecting. In fact, their
mechanism provides only protection of EHRs by external components, not self-protection of EHRs (by
internal parts of the EHR mechanism). The minimal requirements for self-protection—not satisfied by this
solution—include: (i) the policy engine inseparable from both data and metadata (with policies); and (ii)
the self-protecting EHR being able to protect itself from the host executing its policy engine.
Benaloh et al. [BCHL09] propose an encryption system for protecting patient privacy called Patient
Controlled Encryption (PCE). Using PCE, a patient controls the access to his EMR, and can share
information from the EMR with other healthcare providers. PCE assumes that EMRs have a hierarchical
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CCR is an emerging XML-based standard for representing and protecting EMRs.
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structure that allows each record to be accessed separately. The design of the system depends on a set of
subkeys for records generated from the original decryption key for the whole EMR. To guarantee accesses
to specific EMR records, the patient distributes the appropriate subkeys to appropriate healthcare providers
(allowing them to access appropriate records within the patient’s EMR). The PCE automatically supports
update accesses for the authorized healthcare personnel, and allows patients to perform a search for a
particular record in EMR without disclosing any information to the server.
Venkatasubramanian and Gupta [VeGu08] present a prototype for a secure, robust, and real-time
Pervasive Health Monitoring System (PHMS) named AYUSHMAN. In the prototype, encryption and
decryption keys are generated using patients’ physiological values such as electrocardiogram (EKG)
signals. The medical devices compose a patient’s Body Area Network (BAN) collect the data, encrypt them
using these keys, and send them to caregivers. An EKG-based Key Agreement (EKA) is used to generate
identical encryption and decryption keys in two communicating entities based on the same EKG time series
[VeBG08]. The authors claim that the key generation process using physiological values as keying
parameters for key generation is secure, without compromising the autonomy, efficiency or availability of
the system. They also indicate that this approach eliminates the need for a separate key-generation
subsystem (not a subsystem but a relatively simple program generates keys in AYUSHMAN).

2.3. Protecting Privacy of Healthcare Data using Data Masking
In this dissertation data masking is understood as statistical data masking, synonymous with statistical
disclosure limitation [DuSt09]; this excludes techniques such as steganography. Data masking techniques
transform an original dataset into the corresponding masked dataset that makes invisible the most sensitive
pieces of the original dataset, while sustaining the overall data integrity in the statistical sense [DuSt09].
The statistical analysis results for a dataset with masked data should be identical to the analogous statistical
analysis results for the original dataset. Hence, data masking techniques can secure individuals’ records
while simultaneously providing useful data for research via statistical analysis [MoLi10, Feim09, Forr09,
Netw09].
There are two categories of (statistical) data masking techniques: (i) perturbative techniques, in which
the masked dataset includes data from the original dataset that are (statistically) modified or changed to
mask sensitive information in various ways—such as adding random noise, data resampling, data
aggregation, data swapping (shuffling), data compression, or data rounding; and (ii) non-perturbative
techniques, in which the masked dataset suppresses or removes some of the data from the original datasets,
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while leaving other values unchanged; the non-perturbative techniques include data top-coding, local
suppression, global recoding, data generalization, and data sampling [DuSt09, ViTa11, ViTM11, DoFe09].
For example [Mura14], given the original dataset (an ordered sequence) <100, 75, 89, 92, 46>, the
corresponding masked dataset produced by a perturbative technique could be <94, 72, 87, 93, 67> (note
that the i-th element of the masked dataset is a perturbed i-th element of the original dataset), and a masked
dataset produced by a non-perturbative technique could be <-, 75, 89, 92, ->, where the dash (“-“) indicates
a suppressed data element. In both examples only the first and the last data items were considered sensitive
and masked, which is typical for data masking.
Statistical data masking methods can be evaluated by using measures named data utility and data
disclosure risk. Data utility represents the degree of matching between the results of statistical analysis
performed on original data and statistical analysis performed on the masked data [MuSa06]. A data
disclosure risk represents the danger that an attacker can disclose sensitive data [MuSa06].
Each data masking technique manages the tradeoff between data utility it provides and its data disclosure
risk. Acceptable data masking should assure an acceptably low disclosure risk, and an acceptably high data
utility (cf. [DuSt09, ZhDL10]). Optimal data masking should prevent data disclosures, and provide data
utility as high as for the original data. Maintaining a high data utility with a low data disclosure risk is
highly unlikely, given the current state of the art in (statistical) data masking [ZhDL10].
Motiwalla and Li [MoLi13] propose a prototype system for protecting privacy of patients’ EHRs using
data masking for EHRs shared with external organizations for research and analysis. The system uses
multiple data masking techniques including data swapping, noise-based perturbation, microaggregation (a
statistical disclosure control technique of numerical microdata23) generalization, and suppression. The
system was tested on several large datasets provided by New Hampshire Department of Health and Human
Services. The results for various masking techniques are evaluated according to their disclosure risks and
“data quality.” The authors did not define the data quality and how is related to data utility.
Zhou et al. [ZhDL10] propose a data masking method using a special case of matrix masking based on
spatial smoothing techniques. The spatial smoothing (in image processing) removed the high-level
frequencies and enhanced the low frequencies by averaging the selected frequency point with its neighbor’s
frequencies. The spatial smoothing controls the form of masking which represented by the shape of the
smoothing weight function, and the degree of masking (from no masking to high masking) represented by
smoothness parameters. Matrix masking works on original n x p data matrix Z with n cases and p variables
where the cases represent the form of masking and variables represent degree of masking. Note that the
degree of masking increases with the degree of smoothness. It transforms Z to a masked data matrix Z*=
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A web Hypertext Application Technology Working Group specification written in HTML used to nest metadata within existing content on web
pages.
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AZB+C, where A is a matrix that operates on n cases, B is a matrix that operates on p variables, and C is a
matrix that adds “masking” noise. The method allows to control the form of masking through smoothing
weight function and to control the degree of masking24 through a smoothness parameter value. The authors
suggest that data utility and disclosure risk are functions of the form and the degree of masking. The
simulation study results show that the proposed masking method can assure low data disclosure risk and
high data utility.
Muralidar and Sarathy [MuSa06] propose data shuffling to mask confidential numerical data using
conditional distribution. A conditional distribution is a probability distribution that shows
the probability for a randomly selected item in an interested sub-population. The procedure provides an
acceptable data utility and disclosure risk compared with other data swapping methods for perturbative data
masking. However, the procedure fails to provide acceptable data utility and data disclosure risk for nonperturbative data masking, i.e., when the user prefers to remove some of the original values of the
confidential information (in the original data) from the masked dataset.
Other proposed techniques related to masking include: (i) an access control mechanism based on data
masking to protect user information uploaded to a cloud environment [WuLL12], and (ii)
microaggregation for preventing disclosure of an individual’s information [VaGT09].

2.4. Protecting Privacy of Healthcare Data using Data De-Identification
De-identification is a process of removing personal identifiers from the original data to reduce privacy
risks for individuals, and thereby allow for the use of the de-identified data for comparative effectiveness
studies, policy assessment, life sciences research, and other endeavors [HHSO15].
De-identification includes anonymization and pseudonymization [IHED14]. Data anonymization
produces data which cannot be linked back (or re-Identified) to the original records (i.e., anonymization is
one-way de-Identification where there is no need to identify the removed data to the original records)
[Nels15, IHED14]. Re-identification refers to the process by which anonymized data record is linked back
to its true original record [Nels15, HHSO15]. The re-Identification may require a third parties to perform
this process [IHED14]. That is, data anonymization methods try to lower the probability of linking
individual identity to a record in a dataset [ElRM15].
Even though de-Identification is used to remove linkages among patient’s sensitive information and
her identity, it cannot assure anonymity of the patient. A patient’s identity can often be disclosed using
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statistical re-identification25, which combines multiple attributes of the patient to find out her identity—
while none of the attributes used alone would suffice to reveal the patient’s identity [MaSV12]. For
example, the three attributes DateOfBirth, Gender, and Zip suffice to identify 87% of the U.S. Citizens
[Swee02].
Pseudonymization replaces the identifying data (such as names) with “artificial” pseudonyms, and stores
safely the mappings from pseudonyms to identifying data (so that it is accessible only to authorized parties)
[IHED14]. Pseudonymization allows data to be linked to the same person across multiple data set or
information without revealing the identity of the person. An example of pseudonymization is the use of an
alias when that person is admitted to a hospital.
In contrast to anonymization (which is intended to be irreversible), pseudonymization is used when there
is a need for easy re-identification (by authorized parties) [IHED14].
Two of the commercial programs to achieve de-Identification of healthcare data are Safe Harbor
(anonymization) and Expert Determination (pseudonymization) [HHSO15].
We believe that EHRs, as defined in this dissertation, include most of the attributes defined by the
HIPAA regulations for Protected Health Information (PHI). As we mentioned (cf. Subsection 1.2.4) PHI
is the list of “individually identifiable health information” that must be removed from healthcare records
prepared for sharing with other healthcare providers or parties. This can be done with de-Identification
methods.
Kho et al. [KhCJ15] propose a software application named Distributed Common Identity for the
Integration of Regional Health Data (DCIFIRHD), which is able to create secure and privacy-preserving
linkages for EHR data across multiple healthcare provider sites in Chicago. The application cleans,
processes, and de-identifies patients’ identifiers included in EHRs. To keep linkages critical for research
while minimizing the re-identification risk, it uses the SHA-512 cryptographic hash function26 to generate
seeded hash code depending on the use of five patient identifier fields (First Name, Last Name, Date of
Birth, SSN, and Gender). The application aggregates 7 million clinical records from six healthcare providers
in Chicago. It reduces the duplication of clinical records across all participating healthcare providers with
the assurance of patients’ privacy and security.
Mabotuwana et al. [MHVT15] propose a framework for healthcare data processing that extracts PHI
identifiers from data structures of Health Level 7 (HL7)27 messages, de-identifies them, and reconstructs
HL7 messages. The framework maintains re-identification mapping mechanism that is used by a secure
mechanism for re-identification. The authors developed their own HL7 parser to have the needed control
25

Re-identification can utilize all available data, including off-line data and data from third parties.
SHA-512, developed by the National Security Agency, is recommended by HIPAA.
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HL7 is a set of international standards defining structures for transmitting health and administrative data among software applications, used by
healthcare providers. HL7 focuses on the application layer (Layer 7) in the ISO OSI model [MHVT15].
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for parsing HL7 data fields. The framework uses the PHL Extractor module with a set of rules to extract
PHI identifiers from HL7 data fields, and saves the result in a file. Next, the framework passes this file to
the HL7 Pseudonymize module to pseudonymize all identifiers in the file (including names, addresses, zip
codes, phone numbers, dates, and text). Finally, the HL7 Reconstructor module creates an HL7 message,
by “stitching together” pieces of de-identified data. The authors tested the application on a limited set of
HL7 messages from a single hospital for one day.
Martisez et al. [MaSV12] propose a framework for semantically-based anonymization of structured
medical data in EHRs. The proposed framework first manages the (non-numerical) clinical terms in the
clinical data using semantically-coherent methods (including comparison, aggregation, and sorting).
Second, the framework uses Structural Disclosure Control (SDC) methods (such as recording,
microaggregation, and resampling) to anonymize health data included in patient’s EHRs. Anonymization
algorithms are supported by examples. Real data (from licensed hospitals in California) are used for testing
the algorithms. Testing results are evaluated by comparison of anonymization methods to SDC and showed
that the best method is the microaggregation method followed by the recoding method. Also, the results are
compared w.r.t. information loss against the classic non-semantic anonymization approaches. The proposed
framework improves the degree of semantic preservation for all used anonymization algorithms improves
the utility of the anonymized data (from the semantic perspective).
Mohammed et al. [MFHL09] propose LKC-privacy, a privacy-aware information-sharing model for
healthcare applications, supported by anonymization algorithms. The model was applied to healthcare
information sharing in the Hong Kong Red Cross Blood Transfusion Service (BTS). The LKC-privacy
model is used to overcome the loss of data quality due to data anonymization of high-dimensional relational
data. The model uses an anonymization algorithm called privacy-aware information sharing (PAIS), which
maximizes preserved information needed for classification analysis and minimizes distortions introduced
by use of anonymized data (rather than the original data) for general data analysis. PAIS maintains utility
for a wide range of anonymized data that meet the LKC-privacy requirements. It also provides high
scalability for large data sets. The LKC- privacy model retains more information than the k-anonymity28
model, and provides the flexibility to adjust privacy requirements according to system assumptions.
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The concept of k-anonymity was introduced and formulated by Sweeney [Swee02]. The k-anonymity is a property of anonymized data. A release
of dataset is said to have the k-anonymity property if the information for each entity contained in the released dataset cannot be distinguished
from at least k-1 entities whose information also appear in the released dataset [Kanon16, MFHL09].
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2.5. Protecting Privacy of Healthcare Data with Active Data Bundles
Salih and Lilien [SaLi11] propose a solution that provides protection for the patients’ EMRs/EHRs
disseminated among different authorized HISes. It is based on active data bundles (ADBs) described in
Section 1.5. In the proposed solution, ADBs encapsulate EHRs/EMRs as their sensitive data; include
metadata with information describing sensitive data and prescribing their use (including privacy policies)
and encompass a virtual machine (VM), which controls and manages how the active data bundle
encompassing the VM behaves.
Salih et al. [SaBL11] propose an enhancement for the solution from Ref. [SaLi11]. The enhanced
solution provides privacy protection for patients’ EHRs/EMRs disseminated among different authorized
HISes. The proposed solution enhances an earlier implementation of the ADB scheme, known as Active
Bundles using a Trusted Third Party (ABTTP) [BenO10]. 29 ABTTP uses ADBs and trusted third parties
(TTP). The latter maintain and provide to ADBs trust levels of visited hosts, hash values, and decryption
keys. The ADB structure enhancements include: (i) using nested VMs in ADB-TTP instead of using single
VM in ABTTP scheme, and (ii) adding controlled Self-termination to the ADB. The same solution is used
to protect privacy of users (patients and healthcare providers) in healthcare cloud computing [SaLi15].

2.6. Using Mobile Agents/Multi-Agents in HISes
Vieira-Marques et al. [VRCC06] propose a Virtual Electronic Patient Record (VEPR) to securely
integrate distributed medical information, using security-enhanced mobile agents. VEPR uses
asynchronous and autonomous mobile agents that collect clinical documents from multiple departmental
information systems (DISes). Clinical documents are mostly document references; a reference includes
patient ID, DIS ID, author ID, type of document, and location (URL) of the document. References can be
collected using direct access (involving mobile agents and DISes), Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP),
File Transfer Protocol (FTP), or a Web service (provided by an integrated DIS).
VEPR comprises three main modules:
1) Multi-Agent system for Integration of Data (MAID), which automatically retrieves actual
documents and their references from DISes. It also collaborates with the other two VEPR modules
to store and retrieve actual clinical documents or their references.

29

In this dissertation, this enhanced solution is called Active Data Bundles using a Trusted Third Party (ADB-TTP).
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2) Clinical central information Repository (CRep), which is a database used to store both actual
clinical documents as well as references to other clinical documents (that are collected by mobile
agents).
3) Visualization module (VIZ), which is a user interface for presenting patient information.
VEPR uses different sets of agents to handle its tasks:
1) Express Agents: They interact with users via the user interface (VIZ) for interactive document
retrieval. Upon a user’s request, an Express Agent retrieves the actual clinical documents (when
their references are available in CRep), and presents them to the user via the user interface (VIZ).
2) List Agents: They retrieve references of new clinical documents from designated DISes, and then
store them in the CRep. A List Agent exchanges XML messages with DISes and CRep to retrieve
and store references, and it keeps the CRep updated.
3) Balancer Agents: They retrieve the newly added references (of clinical documents) from the CRep,
and distribute these references among another set of agents called File Agents (to get actual clinical
documents from the referred DISes). Each Balancer Agent is assigned to one DIS (that is, each
Balancer Agent retrieves newly added references for only one DIS).
4) File Agents: They retrieve the actual clinical documents from patient’s directory in each DIS,
according to references received from the Balancer Agent for this DIS. Then, File Agents store
clinical documents in CRep. Each File Agent is associated with one Balancer Agent (that is, each
works for a single DIS).
VEPR accomplishes different security and privacy goals for mobile-agents [CVCF05]. The first goal
is to protect agent’s information and code while they move among different platforms in the network, and
the second goal is to ensure that the stored information is accessed only by an authorized user or agent. In
order to achieve both goals, the authors propose two cryptographic and one access control mechanisms as
follows:
1) Self-protecting scheme to protect mobile agents: the scheme uses a public decryption function
(carried by mobile agents) provided by a cryptographic service of the initial platform (that creates
agents and assigns agents to tasks). To protect an agent’s code, the agent re-encrypts the code each
time it reaches a new platform (instead of using only a one-time encryption). So, only the next
platform that the agent visits is able to access the agent’s code. (In addition, all platforms that the
agent visited till now have seen its code.)
2) Protecting retrieved medical information: to protect the integrity of agent’s information carried by
agents moving among known system’s platforms, the information is encrypted by the owner’s
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public key, and then a hash chain scheme is used (in each platform that the agent visits). Each
platform adds a signed structure that includes the hash of encrypted information, a hash of the
encrypted information from the previous platform, and the next platform name.
3) Role-based access control subsystem: to manage and control the access to a mobile agent’s
information (to satisfy the second goal), the agents use a basic role-based access control (RBAC)
supported by two modules. The first module is the authentication module to authenticate users and
agents. The second module is the RBAC module which enforces RBAC policies. Each institution
or domain includes role authority and role-enabling module. The role authority manages (global
and local) policies while the role-enabling module enforces these policies. That is, the role authority
provides role information to the role-enabling module that determines and enforces user’s roles.
After a user logs into the system of Institution A and makes a remote query to be sent to Institution B,
a mobile agent carrying the query arrives at Institution B. After passing local authentication of the local
platform, and local RBAC policies, the agent gets the query’s results, and returns them back to Institution A.
Authors extended and developed their research to include OpenEHR [VPFB14], which enhances
interoperability of different agent-based health data integration systems (for inter-institutional data).
Su and Wu [SuWu09] propose and implement a mobile Multi-Agent Distributed Information Platform
(MADIP) for pervasive healthcare monitoring. MADIP uses multiple intelligent agents to monitor patient’s
health conditions, and to alert healthcare providers about critical health conditions. Stationary and mobile
agents operate automatically in heterogeneous network environments. MADIP is implemented using Java
Agent Development Framework (JADE).
MADIP system is composed of the following six components, including four agents:
1) User Agent (stationary agent): the gateway to interface between MADIP and users (patients or
healthcare providers);
2) Resource Agent (stationary agent): the trusted mediator to dynamically access MADIP resources
(including agents);
3) Physician Agent (mobile agent): initiated by a physician (through a user agent), assigned to patients
to monitor their physical conditions ubiquitously; also, providing gathered data to Resource Agent
for further processing;
4) Diagnostic Agent (stationary agent): represents a data-analysis engine that can analyze a patient’s
health conditions, and indicate a sudden change in these conditions. Diagnostic Agent may receive
from Physician Agent patient health information for further analyses.
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5) Knowledge-based Data Server (stationary server) provides and records health information and
knowledge disseminated or shared among MADIP components. Knowledge-based Data Server
receives patient information from Resource Agent. Knowledge-based Data Server consists of two
information repositories: (i) User_Status repository, which is responsible for monitoring of
physiological patients’ data; and (ii) User_Profiles repository, which contains the up-to-date
electronic records for patients. Data in both repositories are stored or retrieved by Resource Agent.
6) External Services (stationary or mobile servers): consist of application-dependent hardware and
services, including mobile phones, e-mail services, and short message systems (SMS).
When a physician wants to check up health data for a patient through a mobile phone or PDA, she
orders User Agent to collect her up-to-date health data. User Agent assigns the order to Physician Agent
that sends a request to Resource Agent of the appropriate host to retrieve the health data. Resource Agent
checks if Physician Agent is allowed to access the requested data. If so, Resource Agent retrieves the
requested data from Knowledge-based Data Server, and passes them to Physician Agent. Otherwise,
Resource Agent declines the request. Then, Physician Agent delivers the retrieved data to User Agent,
which shows information to the physician through a graphical user interface (GUI). In the meantime, the
Resource Agent sends a copy of the patients’ health information to Knowledge-based Data Server for
updating patients’ status and profiles.
On a daily basis, patients’ health information is delivered by Physician Agent to Diagnostic Agent
(through User Agent and then Resource Agent). When Diagnostic Agent detects a critical health condition
of a patient, Diagnostic Agent immediately alerts the patient’s physician via a phone call or an email
message (i.e., via External Services).
The authors admit that security is not addressed in MADIP, and they indicate that they will improve
MADIP through the use of Java Agent Development Framework-Security (JADE-S) [Jade14] that is based
on Java Security Model [OJSM14]. JADE-S uses different security technologies, such as Java
Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS), Java Cryptography Extension (JCE), and Java Secure
Socket Extension (JSSE).
Bae and Kim [BaKi10] propose a model to eliminate leakage of personal information of a user by a
service. The model uses mobile agents to deliver a requested service to the user on behalf of a service
provider in a way that prevents disclosing personal information to the server. Then, after providing the
service to the user, the mobile agent self-destructs. The steps of interaction between a user’s personal space
(that contains the user’s personal information and the user’s privacy policy), and the service provider (that
includes service privacy policy and a mobile agent) are as follows:
1) The user sends a service request to the service provider.
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2) The service provider sends its privacy policy to the user.
3) The user compares his privacy policy and the privacy policy of the service provider. (The model
uses a set of attributes and values to assist this comparison process.) If the policies are not
compatible, the user is not allowed to accept the service. Otherwise (if they are compatible), the
user notifies the server that it is allowed to accept the service.
4) The service provider provides the requested service via a mobile agent. This means that the mobile
agent from the service provider moves to the user’s personal space, and uses the user’s personal
information to deliver the service to the user.
5) The mobile agent self-destructs to eliminate any possibility that the user’s personal information or
the provided service is used again. The authors do not refer to Active Bundles and do not use the
term “apoptosis.”
Rodríguez et al. [RFPV05] propose a framework named Simple Agent Library for Smart Ambient
(SALSA) designed to support the Ambient Intelligence (AmI) environments in hospital systems based on
autonomous agents. The SALSA architecture relies on instant messaging (IM) among users (agents) of the
framework and SALSA’s modules using XML messages.
A SALSA agent includes the following components: (i) the perception component, which gathers all
information (about users, agents, or from the environment sensors); this information comes through an IM
client (ii) the reasoning component (using a neural network for case-based reasoning30), which captures all
events generated by perceived information, and then governs the agent’s actions; and (iii) the action
component, which includes support for agent’s mobility, communications, and extensibility actions;
extensibility is supported via an abstract class named Action that can be implemented by a user to specify
any other action that the agent should perform.
SALSA consists of the following modules:
1) Agent Broker manages communication (through XML-based instant messages) among agents on
behalf of users and services.
2) SALSA Class Framework contains SALSA agents and proxies, and provides a set of classes that
implement SALSA agents and enable SALSA services. Each SALSA agent uses a proxy to
communicate with Agent Broker or agents using XML-based instant messages.
3) SALSA Services are a set of services that allows users to register agents (in Directory of Agents),
and initialize agents; both registration and initialization use XML messages.

30

Case-based reasoning (CBR) uses experience gained for old problems in order to understand and solve similar new problems [Cbre14].
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SALSA Class Framework raises privacy concerns. While it deals with sensitive information related to
the hospital employees (such as their locations and roles), it does not propose necessary privacy protection.
Tentori et al. [TeFR06] propose to extend SALSA with a customizable agent-based mechanism able to
adapt an application to satisfy its users’ privacy needs. Autonomous agents accommodate each user’s
privacy settings and demands. Then, the agents react accordingly to the different types of perceived
contextual information received from the environment (a hospital), and proactively make decisions on
behalf of users running the application. The authors identify and provide solutions for several system
requirements, such as a flexible common language, privacy-aware communication protocol, and
negotiation-based access control.

2.7. Chapter Conclusions
This chapter presented several approaches and methods for protecting the privacy of healthcare
information disseminated in HISes or among healthcare providers. We classified work related to protect
privacy into five categories: (i) using data encryption, (ii) using data masking, and (iii) using data deidentification, (iv) using active data bundles, and (v) using different systems and frameworks based on
agents or multi-agents.
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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

“If we knew what it was we were doing, it would not
be called research, would it?”
~Albert Einstein

3.1. Introduction
This chapter discusses the methodology of the dissertation research. Before we introduce our research
methodology, we recall few definitions related to the context of this chapter, including scientific research,
method, and methodology.
The term scientific research refers to the systematic actions performed by a researcher to investigate a
specified area. These actions include understanding theories, revising facts, and using applications and tools
in order to discover and gain new knowledge. The goal of scientific research is to reduce the uncertainty of
the knowledge that we have [BHOL08].
In the beginning, the researcher identifies a relatively broad area for his research (such as “Privacy in
Computing”) and performs a literature survey of the area. The researcher considers different problems in
this area. The researcher Identifies most interesting research problem.
The selected research problem “is a statement about an area of concern, a condition to be improved
upon, a difficulty to be eliminated, or a troubling question that exists in scholarly literature, in theory, or
in practice that points to the need for meaningful understanding and deliberate investigation” [Brym07].
The researcher identifies research methods used to solve the research problem. The research method
refers to a procedure that includes multiple processes choreographed in a logical and systematic way to
organize a problem-solving approach for the selected research problem. Our problem-solving approach
involves formulating a hypothesis, testing the hypothesis, interpreting and evaluating results, and stating
conclusions. (cf. [BHOL08]).
Research methodology [Meth16] refers to “the branch of knowledge that deals with method generally
or with the methods of a particular discipline or field of study.” The methodology does not define a direct
solution for the selected research problem. More importantly, the research methodology does not relate to
specific methods, instead, it offers the theoretical foundation for understanding which method (or body of
48

methods) could be applied to the specified research area [Meth16]. That is, research methodology is a guide
that states how the research is to be prepared and why we select or adapt specific methods and tools for this
research [McMu10].
There are different methodologies used in computing science such as [EHNS01]:
1) The formal methodology is a mathematically based technique used to specify, verify, and implement
systems or algorithms under development. The formal methodology is used widely in software and
hardware engineering to build software and hardware systems.
2) The experimental methodology is used to evaluate a new solution proposed for a problem by
questioning the system and its objectives and identifying its requirements.
3) The build methodology refers to constructing a complete system or a part of a system (hardware or
software) that shows the potential and the effectiveness of the proposed solution, and it suggests
new features and techniques that have not been included in the system before.
4) The process methodology is used to explain in details all processes that are used to accomplish
system’s tasks. The process methodology is used in software engineering and development, where
it provides directions to effective process management and periodic process evaluation for ongoing
software improvement.
5) The model methodology defines an abstract model for a real system that can be used to show the
validity and usability of the proposed solution. The model methodology presents a model to mimic
a real complex system which cannot be implemented in the real world due to the cost or accessibility
issues. This methodology most often relies on simulation.31
Most methodologies can be combined with other methodologies, for example in software development,
the formal methodology is combined with the build methodology to implement and embed a subsystem to
the main system.

3.2. Identifying Aim, Objectives, and Methods of Dissertation Research
Figure 3.1 shows the relationship between our research aim, objectives, and methods. First, the aim of
this dissertation research is protecting privacy and integrity of users in Healthcare Information Systems
(HISes), including patients and healthcare providers.

31

Simulation involves experiments based on a model, which represents the most relevant characteristics or behaviors (functions) of the modeled
system (cf. [EHNS01]).
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Given the simple, classical definition that “security = confidentiality + integrity + availability (CIA)”
[JVac13], a viable healthcare information system must provide users with an adequate level of
confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Our research two objectives are protecting privacy32 and integrity of healthcare information in HISes.
To address these objectives, we identified several methods such as Data Encryption, Data De-identification,
Data Anonymization, Privacy Policy Enforcement, Hashing Algorithms, Active Data Bundles (ADBs), and
Mobile Agents/Multi-agents.
Note that the area of HISes was new for us. So, we have spent a long time to gain knowledge about the
U.S. health industry and the related legislation, including the U.S. Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) [ARRA09, JABJ1], the Meaningful Use of EHR [MeUs13,
MeUD13], and the Health Information Exchanges (HIEs) [WHIE13, JABJ11].

Research Aim
Protect Users’ Privacy and Integrity in HISes

Objective 1

Objective 2

Privacy

Integrity

Methods
1)Data Encryption
2)Data Masking
3)Data De-identification
4)Privacy Policy Enforcement
5)Hashing Algorithms
6)Active Data Bundles (ADBs)
7)Mobile Agents/Multi-agents

Figure 3.1. Aim, objectives, and methods for the Dissertation research.

32

As we mentioned in Chapter One, user privacy contains user confidentiality.
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3.3. Methodologies for Adopting and Re-implementing the ADB Scheme
In this section, we discuss our research methodology used for adopting and reimplementing the ADB
Scheme, which is the most critical component of the proposed solution. We use three methodologies: the
experimental methodology, the build methodology, and the model methodology.
Adopting and reimplementing the ADB Scheme includes the steps described in the following
subsections.

3.3.1. Using Active Data Bundle (ADBs)
We propose using the Active Data Bundle (ADB) scheme [SaLB12] to protect privacy of users in HISes.
The ADB scheme is appropriate to address our research’s objectives for the following reasons:
1) ADBs combine multiple techniques (including encryption, integrity checks, and privacy policy
enforcement) to protect their sensitive data during dissemination to destination hosts.
2) ADBs support secure data migration in the distributed environment.
We evaluate the use of ADB scheme and its first implementation named Active Bundles using a Trusted
Third Party (ABTTP) [BenO10] for healthcare application. To describe the proposed solution in a more
realistic and easily comprehensible way, we use a real-life healthcare scenario33 for dissemination of EHRs
in HISes. It is inspired by a personal experience and studies identified in our literature review, and presented
in detail in Chapter Four.
It is consistent with real operations and actions that happen on a daily basis in healthcare facilities.
Also, it is consistent with our research aim and objectives, namely ADBs protect privacy and integrity of
patient’s healthcare information during their dissemination among different healthcare providers.
The value of scenarios in academic research is emphasized by Ramirez et al. [RMVK15], who state
that scenarios produce interesting research. Scenarios show conditions and boundaries of a system or a
model that the proposed approach is intended to address. Also, they give insights into procedures of the
system and examine other alternatives that might affect the future of the system.

33

According to the Oxford Dictionary, the scenario is “a postulated sequence or development of events” [Scen16]. Also it is defined as “a nearworld situation, a descriptive set of circumstances, a critical incident, even a partial life/story narrative. Scenarios usually contain human
actors, a storyline or plot (often incomplete), an invitation to solve a problem, demonstrate an acquired skill, explore an issue/concern, and/or
to speculate on alternative outcomes ”[Erri16].
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3.3.2. Enhancing and Developing ADB
We adopted the ABTTP and evaluated its use in healthcare applications. Our first development in this
research was adding new features and techniques to the adopted solution to address our research objectives
and to make the solution suitable for HISes. New enhancements include additional ADB verifications and
privacy policy enforcement activities. The modified solution is named Active Data Bundles with Trusted
Third Party (ADB-TTP). We present this enhanced solution in a context of a healthcare scenario. The ADBTTP is discussed in Chapter Four
Our second development was improving ADBs by implementing them as agent-based objects (or
mobile agents); this became our new solution named the Active Data Bundles with Multi-Agent System
(ADB-MAS). We believe that adopting the current verification and policy enforcement activities that ADBs
offer can transform an agent-based object implementing an ADB into a secure agent object, known as the
ADB agent. The ADB agent, along with other multi-agent objects used in our solution, protects sensitive
data against access by unauthorized entities during ADB dissemination. The ADB-MAS is discussed in
Chapter Five.

3.3.3. Validating ADB-TTP and ADB-MAS
Our solution has gained interest of local healthcare providers [PeCo11]. However, deployment of the
proposed solution in the field is not possible before a costly and long full-scale development, which is out
of our reach. We validated our proposed solution by designing and executing two emulation/simulation
experiments, one for the ADB-TTP and another for the ADB-MAS. In both experiments we used the same
healthcare scenario in order to allow for comparison of the outcomes for the two simulated systems.

3.3.4. Emulating and Simulating Proposed Solutions
In our experiments we partially emulate34 and partially simulate35 operations of both ADB-TTP and
ADB-MAS. We used Java Standard Edition to implement the ADB-TTP testbed, and we used Java
Platform Development Framework (JADE) to implement the ADB-MAS testbed. Chapter Six presents the

34

Emulation is “a system that behaves exactly like something else, and adheres to all of the rules of the system being emulated. It is effectively a
complete replication of another system, right down to being binary compatible with the emulated system's inputs and outputs, but operating in
a different environment to the environment of the original emulated system” [WhSE17].

35

Simulation is “a system that behaves similar to something else, but is implemented in an entirely different way. It provides the basic behavior
of a system, but may not necessarily adhere to all of the rules of the system being simulated” [WhSE17].
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evaluation of both these ADB-based solutions. The code of both testbeds is developed using the Eclipse
Integrated Development Environment (IDE).

3.4. Chapter Conclusions
This chapter discussed our dissertation research methodologies used for this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 4

THE MODIFIED SOLUTION: ACTIVE DATA BUNDLES
WITH TRUSTED THIRD PARTY (ADB-TTP)
“The difficulty lies not so much in developing new ideas as in
escaping from old ones.”
~John M. Keynes

4.1. Introduction
Assuring patient privacy in HIS is becoming more and more important especially in the context of
requirements for sharing healthcare information. This sharing is needed for improving the quality of
healthcare and reducing the cost of healthcare services.
This chapter presents the Active Data Bundle with Trusted Third Party (ADB-TTP) scheme for
protecting privacy of patients’ EHRs in health information systems (HISes). ADB-TTP is an enhancement
of the former solution known as Active Bundle Using Trusted Third Party (ABTTP) [BenO10]. We present
our solution in the context of healthcare scenario for dissemination of EHRs in HISes.
The chapter includes the following sections: Section 4.2 introduces the high-level healthcare scenario
for dissemination of a patient’s EHR from one to another healthcare provider in HISes. Section 4.3 discusses
the structure of the ADB-TTP, and Section 4.4 describes its operations. Section 4.5 presents a healthcare
scenario using the proposed solution. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.

4.2. The High-Level Healthcare Scenario: Dissemination of EHRs on HISes
Figure 4.1 shows a basic scenario for a patient visiting a clinic for the first time (a new admission),
while his most up-to-date EHR is located in a general hospital that she usually visits (cf. [SaLi11]).
The clinic includes Clinic EHR System (CES), and the hospital includes Hospital EHR System (HES).
Note that the clinic and the hospital are assumed to be secure and trusted sites, and CES and HES are
assumed to be secure and trusted hosts.
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Figure 4.1. Information flow for a patient visiting the Clinic for the first time, with
the patient’s EHR located in the Hospital (cf. [SaLi11]).
The basic scenario includes the following steps:
S1) Steps 1-6 at the Clinic EHR System (CES):
1) The CES sends a local request to its database (CES-DB) asking for C-EHR—the local patient’s
EHR,
2) The CES-DB receives the CES request,
3) The CES-DB searches for C-EHR and finds no such record,
4) CES-DB notifies CES that it failed to find C-EHR in CES-DB (this is a new patient in the clinic),
5) The CES receives information that there is no C-EHR for the patient,
6) The CES sends a request for the patient’s H-EHR, that is, the patient’s EHR stored in the Hospital
EHR System (HES).
S2) Steps 7-13 at the Hospital EHR System (HES):
7) The HES receives the request from the CES,
8) The HES sends a local request to its database HES-DB,
9) The HES-DB receives the HES request,
10) The HES-DB searches for the patient’s H-EHR, finds it, and retrieves it,
11) The HES-DB sends the patient’s H-EHR to HES,
12) The HES receives the patient’s H-EHR,
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13) The HES sends patient’s H-EHR to the CES,
S3) Steps 14-37 at the CES:
14) The CES receives the patient’s H-EHR,
15) The CES sends patient’s H-EHR to CES-DB,
16) The CES-DB receives the H-EHR, and modifies it into the patient’s C-EHR,
17) The CES-DB sends patient’s C-EHR to CES,
18) The CES receives the patient’s C-EHR,
19) The CES sends the C-EHR to a clinic’s physician meeting the patient,
20) The physician receives and reviews patient’s C-EHR,
21) The physician meets the patient in her office in the clinic for diagnosing, the physician requests
tests from a clinic laboratory and the X-Ray department.
22) New request is received in the clinic laboratory and
23) New request is received in the X-Ray department,
24) The lab test results are sent to the CES-DB,
25) The X-Ray results are sent to the CES-DB,
26) The CES-DB periodically (e.g., once a day) updates patients’ C-EHRs with the results accumulated
since the last update,
27) The CES-DB sends the updated patient’s C-EHR to CES,
28) The CES receives the patient’s C-EHR,
29) The CES notifies the physician about the patient’s test results and makes them available as a part
of the patient’s C-EHR in the CES-DB.
30) The physician accesses the updated patient’s C-EHR (with integrated new lab and X-Ray results)
in the CES-DB to review them, and makes her decision about the patient’s case; for example, she
finds that the patient must see a surgeon in the hospital.
31) The physician gives this information to a nurse (not shown in Figure 4.1) who schedules an
appointment for the patient with a surgeon, and includes this information in a message to CES,
asking CES to update the patient’s C-EHR,
32) The CES receives the patient’s C-EHR (including the surgeon’s appointment information),
33) The CES sends the patient’s C-EHR to CES-DB,
34) The CES-DB receives C-EHR,
35) The CES-DB saves the patient’s C-EHR,
36) The CES-DB sends the updated patient’s C-EHR to the CES,
37) The CES receives the patient’s C-EHR,
38) The CES sends the patient’s C-EHR to the HES.
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S4) Steps 39-41 at the HES:
39) The HES receives the patient’s C-EHR and forwards it to the HES-DB,
40) The HES-DB receives the patient’s CES,
41) The HES-DB updates the patient’s H-EHR in the HES-DB,
The patients’ EHR in the above scenario can be protected by using ADB-TTP. Both the HES and the
CES can send and receive ADBs, which contain patient EHRs (C-EHR or H-EHR).

4.3. Structure of ADB-TTP
This section discusses the structure (static representation) of proposed solution ADB-TTP. We believe
that it is important to give a brief of our enhancements to the adapted solution (i.e., ABTTP), then we
discuss the use of the ADB-TTP for protecting the privacy in HISes by presenting a scenario in HISes. The
proposed enhancements in the ADB-TTP include: (i) using nested VMs in ADB-TTP instead of using single
VM in ABTTP scheme, and (ii) adding ADB auditing and ADB Termination phases to the ADB lifecycle.

4.3.1. ADB Structure
As we mentioned in Section 1.5, the ADB structure consists of three components: Sensitive data (which
include the patient’s EHR), metadata (which include privacy policies, PPs36), and the VM which assures
the ADB integrity, enforces PPs, and disseminates patient’s EHR to the VH [BenO10, SaLB12].
Instead of using single VM in ADB, we propose to use nested VM. Nested VM includes two VMs,
external VM (eVM) and Internal VM (iVM). The eVM authenticates and authorizes the VH, and an iVM
checks the data integrity and enforces PPs. The reason behind using two VMs is to distinguish between
VMs’ functionalities before and after authorizing VH. More details regarding eVM and iVM are discussed
next in ADB operations. Figure 4.2 shows the modified structure of the ADB.

36

Privacy policies (PPs) include privacy rules of a patient or a healthcare provider (or both), which are created by the healthcare.
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Nested VM

Sensitive data
Metadata
Internal VM (iVM)
External VM (eVM)

Figure 4.2. The modified structure of an Active Data Bundle (ADB).

4.4. Operations of ADB-TTP
The ADB-TTP uses ADBs to protect its sensitive data from unauthorized disclosure during their
dissemination from the Originating Host (OH) to the Destination Host (DH). The OH includes Originating
Host System (OHS), and DH includes Destination Host System (DHS). Operations of ADB-TTP refer to the
dynamic representation of ADB-TTP. These operations are employed in the OHS, Trusted Third Party
(TTP) and DHS during ADB lifecycle (i.e., from ADB creation through ADB dissemination to ADB
enabling) [BenO10].
The original description of ADB lifecycle (a.k.a. AB lifecycle, available in Ref. [BenO10])
encompasses three phases: ADB creation, ADB dissemination, and ADB enabling. We introduce two more
phases to the ADB lifecycle: ADB auditing and ADB termination as fourth and fifth phases respectively as
discussed below and shown in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3. The simulation scenario: Hospital, Clinic, TTP, and a disseminated ADB.

Figure 4.3 shows interactions among parties in our scenario. They include the following numbering
steps:
1) DHS Access Request: The DHS (in DH) sends an access request (including DHS credentials) to the
OHS in (OH) asking for accessing user’s sensitive data.
2) ADB Creation: The OHS receives the DHS access request and starts the ADB creation process:
2a) Creating ADB: The DHS creates an ADB by collecting and encrypting both sensitive data and
metadata (PPs) from OHS database (OHS DB) and adding a VM;
2b) Saving Enabling Record: The OHS sends the enabling record (ER) to the TTP for saving it
there. ER includes ADB decryption keys, hash values, and the ADB trust value threshold
(ADB-TVT);
2c) Saving OHS-Audit File: During ADB creation, The OHS records audit data of all ADB
activities in an OHS-Audit File and stores it in the OHS;
3) ADB Dissemination: The OHS disseminates the ADB to the DHS.
4) ADB Enabling: The DHS receives ADB in the DH, and starts the ADB enabling process:
4a) ADB Authenticates DHS: The ADB asks the DHS for its identifiers/credentials. The DHS
provides its identifiers/credentials. The ADB checks them and authenticates DHS. The ADB
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provides the DHS with the identifiers of the ADB and the TTP (ADB-ID and TTP-ID), and
computes on the fly the ADB hash value;
4b) DHS Asks TTP for AC: The DHS asks the TTP for authorization code (AC), which is a data
structure created by the TTP including only a part of ER data, which comes in two varieties: a
positive AC and a negative AC.37 The positive AC includes the DHS trust value (DHS-TV),
ADB-TVT, and the decryption key for the ADB. The negative AC includes only arbitrary code
(it does not include either the DHS-TV or the ADB-TVT or the decryption key for the ADB).
The AC is used to authorize DHS—when it is a “positive AC,” or deny authorization of DHS
—when it is a negative AC.
4c) TTP Sends AC to ADB: The TTP sends the AC to ADB at the DHS;
4d) ADB Authorizes DHS: The ADB recognizes the AC as either positive or negative. If AC is
positive, then ADB authorizes the DHS. Otherwise, ADB apoptosizes (not shown in Figure
4.3);
4e) ADB Asks TTP for IVI: The ADB asks the TTP for integrity verification information (IVI). IVI
includes a hash value for the ADB sensitive data and metadata. Note that step 4b and 4e cannot
be combined (to reduce message overhead) because each step, a request is sent to TTP to
provide information for specific verification;
4f) TTP Sends IVI to ADB: The TTP sends the IVI to ADB at the DHS. Note that step 4c and 4f
cannot be combined because each step TTP provides information to ADB in CES to support
specific ADB decision;
4g) Data Integrity Check: The ADB receives the IVI and checks the integrity of its sensitive data
and metadata. The ADB computes the hash value of its data. Then, the ADB compares the
computed and the received hash values (included in the IVI). If both hash values are identical,
the integrity check succeeds. Otherwise, ADB apoptosizes (not shown in Figure 4.3);

37

We do not want to risk all 5 pieces of ER information by sending it to ADB in one step, so instead we send only AC, a subset of ER information
(either 3 information pieces or an arbitrary code. ER information pieces—for the positive AC and the negative AC, resp.).
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4h) Data Reduction: The ADB enforces its privacy policies by deleting from the sensitive data all
records with the required trust value above the trust value of the visited host (DHS).
4i) Data Disclosure: The ADB discloses to the DHS all, part, or none of its sensitive data as
dictated by enforcement of the ADB privacy policies.
4j) Saving ADB-Audit File: While performing Steps 1-4i, ADB records information about its
enabling and pending termination (see the next step). In this step, the ADB sends the audit file
to the TTP.
5) ADB Termination: The ADB terminates itself.

4.4.1. ADB Creation
In the ADB creation phase, an ADB is created at the originating host either automatically, or
interactively with the help of ADB Creator software in DHS. Figure 4.4 shows steps of the ADB creation
phase, the ADB Creator software performs the following steps:
1) Collect sensitive data and metadata and build ADB: A user of the ADB Creator is assisted in
collecting the sensitive data to be protected by the ADB; then the ADB Creator software adds ADB
metadata (PPs), optionally with the user’s input, to the ADB.
2) Generate ADB encryption/decryption keys: The ADB Creator automatically generates two
asymmetric encryption/decryption key pair for the ADB.
3) Encrypt sensitive data and metadata: The ADB Creator encrypts both sensitive data and metadata
(but not the iVM) to protect their confidentiality using the first encryption key.
4) Compute a hash value for sensitive data and metadata: The ADB Creator computes a hash value
for sensitive data and metadata (jointly); it is used to protect their integrity.38
5) Bundle ADB components and encrypt ADB: The ADB Creator software bundles all ADB
components, encapsulating the sensitive data, its metadata, and its iVM; then ADB Creator encrypts
the whole ADB using the second encryption key.
(Note that the iVM is not encrypted in Step 3 above so that the iVM is decrypted when the whole
ADB is decrypted with the second decryption key. As shown below in ADB Enabling, after being
decrypted with the second encryption key, the iVM can be executed in the VH, while the ADB
sensitive data and metadata are still protected via the first encryption.)

38

Hash functions (e.g., MD5) may produce collisions. For some hashing algorithms (e.g., SHA1 and SHA2 from the Secure Hash Algorithm
family), the probability of collisions is infinitesimally small. SHA3 (a.k.a. Keccak) from the same family is considered a collision-resistant
hashing algorithm, i.e., it is hard to find two different inputs that hash to the same output [BDPA13, CPBT12].
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6) Compute ADB hash value: ADB Creator computes the second hash value, this time for the
encapsulated all ADB components; it is used to protect the integrity of all ADB components. (Note
that hash is calculated over an encrypted ADB.)
7) Add eVM to ADB: The ADB Creator adds to the ADB the ADB eVM. The eVM authenticates the
VH identity and then authorizes the VH access to the ADB.
(When VH executes eVM during ADB Enabling, it can provide: (i) the identifier ADB-ID of the
ADB; (ii) the identifier TTP-ID of the ADB designated TTP; and (iii) the hash value of the ADB
that was calculated during ADB enabling on the authorized VH.39 The eVM can calculate on the
fly the hash value of the ADB40).
Note that the eVM would be able to receive the ADB trust value threshold (ADB-TVT) from TTP
since metadata still protected by encryption.
The eVM has yet another important capability: it is able to apoptosize its ADB. It is used in this
way in cases when an ADB apoptosis is required; such cases occur in Steps 1a-i, 2e-i, and 2f-ii in
ADB enabling below.
We assume that eVM and iVM are components of a Nested VM included in ADB. A control flow
obfuscation41 methods can be used to protect the Nested VM (or its components) from attacks trying
to access its code; these methods increase the difficulty of reverse engineering binary programs
[BaEm13].
8) Send ADB enabling record to TTP: The ADB Creator sends to the designated TTP42 an ADB
enabling record consisting of the two private decryption keys (from Step 2) and the two hash values
(from Steps 4 and 6), and the ADB-TVT.

39

40
41

42

The first step of the ADB eVM execution is to authenticate the VH identity by requesting the VH to provide multiple unique IDs from the set of
IDs, for example: the Patient Identification (PID) number, the National Provider Identifier (NPI), and the EHR Certification Identification
(EHRC-ID). We assume that only an authorized VH will be able to provide such identifiers and continue the ADB eVM execution. Since an
unauthorized VH will not be able to provide all identifiers, the ADB eVM will perform apoptosis of the entire ADB.
These activities are a part of the ADB Enabling phase, which assures the TTP that VH request was sent for a legitimate ADB.
The proposed ADB eVM consists of a code area (including instructions for functions or methods) and a data area (including variables and
information about TTP, VH, the required trust threshold for VH, etc.). By using control flow obfuscation [BenO10, BaEm13], some of the
instructions are removed from the code area and hidden (including junk bytes) in the data area (e.g.., in the stack) as ordinary variables. This is
done to make eVM syntactically different while assuring semantic identity. At the time of eVM execution, the code instructions are reconstructed.
Recall that only an authentic VH, that is, VH that can provide multiple unique IDs is able to execute eVM. If VH is unauthentic, eVM will
apoptosize its ADB (including itself).
The communication ADB, ADB Creator, TTP, and VH is appropriately secured using message authentication code (MAC). MAC is a
piece of information used to authenticate a message and prove its integrity when it sends between two parties (a sender and a receiver). The
sender uses MAC algorithm to compute MAC code, and then combines the code with the message and sends it to the receiver. The receiver
receives the message and processes it using the same MAC Algorithm to compute MAC code. If both MAC codes are identical, then the message
is authentic and it is not compromised. Otherwise, the message is compromised.
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1 Collect sensitive data and
metadata and build ADB
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Send ADB enabling
record to TTP

End ADB Enabling

Figure 4.4. ADB creation steps.
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An ADB created in Steps 1-8 is ready to be disseminated to one or more destination hosts; for ease of
explanation, we consider only the single destination host here.
It should be emphasized that:
i)

Encryptions used in the above ADB creation sequence are only a supplemental privacy protection
mechanism for sensitive data and metadata included in an ADB. (The ADB Authentication
Activities, the ADB Authorization Activities, the ADB Integrity Verifications Activities, and the ADB
Policy Enforcements Activities, described below, are the primary protection mechanism.)

ii) Currently, the iVM within an ADB is protected using encryption. Other methods to protect VM
include code obfuscation and homomorphic encryption43 [BenO10, LiDe03].

4.4.2. ADB Dissemination
The ADB Creator send the ADB to the destination host or visited host (VH44). An ADB can be
transferred from the OH to VH via a sequence of the intermediate host using a secure transmission.

4.4.3. ADB Enabling
ADB enabling starts when the ADB reaches the VH. ADB enabling comprises four group of activities:
the ADB authentication activities, the ADB Authorization Activities, the ADB Integrity Verifications
Activities, and the ADB Policy Enforcement Activities. Figure 4.5 shows the ADB enabling phase where
each group of activates connected to the next group of activates:
1)

If ADB authentication activities of VH failed, then eVM apoptosizes the entire ADB and then
ADB enabling is ended. Otherwise (i.e., ADB authentication activities succeeded), ADB starts its
authorization activities.

2) If ADB authorization activities of VH failed, then eVM apoptosizes the entire ADB and ADB
enabling is ended. Otherwise, ADB starts its integrity verifications activities.
3) If ADB integrity verifications activities of ADB failed, then eVM apoptosizes the entire ADB and
ADB enabling is ended. Otherwise, ADB starts it Policy Enforcement Activities.

43

44

Homomorphic encryption (cf. [HoEn13]) is a form of encryption which allows specific types of computations to be carried out on encrypted
arguments and obtain an encrypted result which—if decrypted—matches the (plaintext) result of the same computations performed on the
plaintext arguments. For example, adding encrypted 2 to encrypted 5 results in encrypted 7; decryption of “encrypted 7” gives plaintext 7, which
equals to the (plaintext) result 7 of adding plaintext 2 plus plaintext 5.
Visited host can be any host such as the destination host, an authorized host, an unauthorized host, an intermediate host, or a malicious host. For
simplicity, we refer to each one of them as a visited host (VH).
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4) In ADB policy enforcement activities, the iVM enforces the ADB privacy policies and discloses
the remaining of ADB data to the VH.

Start ADB Enabling

1) ADB Authentication Activities
failed
succeeded

2) ADB Authorization Activities
(Plus Whole ADB Integrity Check)
failed
succeeded

3) ADB Data Integrity Verification Activities
failed

succeeded

4) ADB Policy Enforcement Activities

eVM/iVM Apoptosizes ADB

Disclose Data to VH

End ADB Enabling
Figure 4.5. ADB enabling steps: ADB authentication activities, ADB authorization
activities, ADB integrity verification activities, and ADB policy enforcement activities.

Each group of ADB activities is described and supported by a separated figure as follows:
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1) The ADB Authentication Activities
a) ADB eVM initiates VH authentication: The authentication activities are initiated by the VH that
wants to access sensitive data of the ADB. The ADB eVM asks the VH to provide multiple
credentials such as patient identification (PID), national provider identification (NPI), and
EHR certification identification (EHRC-ID). The eVM compare these values with its protected
values included in its security information. The security information includes unique identifiers
retrieved from VH access request such as User Identification Number (UID) to support
authentication during ADB enabling activities. 45
The eVM produces one of the following authentication results (cf. Figure 4.6):
i) If the VH authentication by the eVM fails, then the ADB eVM apoptosizes the entire
ADB, Then ADB enabling is ended;
ii) Otherwise, if the VH authentication by the eVM succeeds, i.e., the eVM authenticates the
VH identity, (then eVM performs the ADB Authorization Activities as described next.)
In Figure 4.6, we refer to the main activity in a double line box with bold text and the subactivity
in single line box with italic text (we continue to do so for coming figures).
Note that there are two starts and two ends in Figure 4.6. Two starts: Start ADB Enabling refers
to the beginning of ADB enabling, and Start ADB Authentication refers to the initiation of ADB
authentication. Two ends: End ADB Enabling (with bold line rounded rectangle) refers to the
end of the ADB enabling phase, while End ADB Authentication refers to the end of the
authentication process, and then ADB enabling continues to the next group of activities (ADB
Authorization Activities).

45

We consider moving the security information to metadata for more protection during the dissemination of ADB, however this adjustment
required to propose special and secure method to access or retrieve a part of data from a dual encrypted data (note that metadata and data are
encrypted two times). We also consider using information hiding technique (such as steganography) to hide (conceal) this security information
within the encrypted ADB during ADB creation. Then, during ADB authentication activities, we can use extraction method to extract the security
information from encrypted ADB. Such adjustment will be considered in our future work.
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Start ADB Enabling

Start ADB Authentication

a) eVM initiates VH authentication

eVM checks VH identifiers
failed
succeeded

eVM apoptosizes ADB

eVM authenticates VH

End ADB Enabling

End ADB Authentication

Figure 4.6. ADB authentication activities.

2) The ADB Authorization Activities
a) The ADB eVM provides VH with ADB identifiers: After granting the authentication of VH, the
eVM provides the VH with the identifiers of the ADB and the ADB designated TTP (ADB-ID
and TTP-ID), and computes on the fly the ADB hash value (cf. Figure 4.7).
b) The VH sends authorization request (AR) to TTP: The VH sends to the designated TTP
identified by TTP-ID a request asking for the authorization code (AC) to access the ADB; the
request includes ADB-ID, the VH identifier VH-ID, and the ADB hash value (calculated in
previous Step 2a).
c) The TTP verifies VH request and sends the authorization code (AC) to the VH: The TTP
performs the following verifications:
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i) The TTP verifies whether the record identified by <ADB-ID, VH-ID> is in the TTP
database.46
ii) The TTP retrieves the VH trust level, and checks if it above (or equal to) the required
ADB-TVT (provided by ADB Creator during ADB creation).
iii) The TTP verifies the ADB hash value received in the VH authorization request, that is, it
checks if it matches the ADB hash value that the TTP received from ADB Creator in Step
8 of ADB creation. This verifies the integrity of the whole encrypted ADB, including its
iVM.
If all verifications succeed, the TTP is confident that the VH authorization request is related to
a valid (genuine) ADB. Next, the TTP prepares the positive AC (which includes the VHTV,
ADB-TVT, and the second private decryption key for the ADB).
Otherwise, if at least one of verifications fails, then the TTP prepares the negative AC to the
VH (it includes neither VHTV, nor ADB-TVT, nor the second private decryption key for the
ADB).
Finally, the TTP sends the prepared positive or negative AC to the VH.
d) The VH forwards the AC 47 to the ADB eVM.
e) The ADB eVM checks the AC:
i) If the verification of the AC is negative, the eVM apoptosizes the entire ADB. Then ADB
enabling is ended;
ii) If the verification of the AC is positive, the eVM checks VHTV as shown in next step.
f) The ADB eVM checks the VH trust value: ADB eVM checks VHTV (included in the positive
AC) as follows
i) If the VHTV is Sufficient, (i.e., the AC is positive, which means exceeds the ADB-TVT
required by the ADB), then the eVM decrypts the ADB using the ADB second private
decryption key (included in the positive AC). Note that this will result in decrypting the
ADB iVM, but the ADB sensitive data and metadata are still protected by another
encryption (the one using the first encryption key, cf. Step 3 in ADB creation above);
ii) Otherwise (i.e., if the VHTV is Insufficient), the eVM apoptosizes the entire ADB. Then
ADB enabling is ended.

46
47

This requires that ADB Creator notifies TTP about all possible VH destinations for a given ADB.
We assume that the AC is protected only via its integrity protection and authentication (there is no need to keep it encrypted). Communication
among the TTP and the ADB through the VH is secured using Message Authentication Code (MAC) for authentication, and a secure hash
algorithm for integrity.
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Start ADB Authorization

a) eVM provides VH with ADB’s identifiers

b) VH sends AR to TTP

c) TTP checks ADB integrity and sends AC to VH

d) VH forwards AC to ADB

e) eVM checks AC
failed
succeeded

f) eVM checks VH trust level
insufficient
sufficient

eVM apoptosizes ADB
eVM decrypts ADB

End ADB Enabling

End ADB Authorization

Figure 4.7. ADB authorization activities.

3) The ADB Integrity Verification Activities
We get to this step only when the VHTV is Sufficient (Step 2f-i), i.e., the VHTV exceeds the
minimum ADB-TVT required by the ADB. So, the iVM is ready to perform the following tasks
(cf. Figure 4.8):
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a) The iVM checks integrity of ADB data and metadata: The iVM.48 checks ADB data and
metadata as follows:
The iVM sends to the TTP an integrity verification request, asking for integrity verification
information (IVI). The IVI includes the hash value for the ADB sensitive data and metadata
(earlier received by the TTP in Step 8 of ADB creation) and the ADB first private decryption
key (see Step 3 in ADB creation).
i) Without waiting for the response from the TTP, the iVM computes the hash value49 for
the ADB sensitive data and metadata. Note that sensitive data and metadata are still
encrypted.
ii) Once the IVI is received from the TTP, the iVM compares the “locally computed” and
the received hash values for ADB sensitive data and metadata as follows:
ii-1) If both hash values are identical, i.e., the result of the ADB integrity check is
Success; the iVM decrypts ADB sensitive data and metadata using the first private
decryption key. (Then, the ADB policy enforcement activities are started by the
ADB iVM —see Step 4 below.)
ii-2) Otherwise, (i.e., if the two hash values differ), the result of the ADB integrity check
is Failure, so the ADB passes control to Step 4a-iii below (which iVM apoptosizes
the entire ADB). Then ADB enabling is ended.

48
49

This case is different that the integrity check in Step 2c-ii where we check the integrity of whole ADB (including also its iVM).
Note that this is the second computed hash value, and this time the hash is computed over the encrypted ADB metadata and sensitive data only.
Before, when the VH run the ADB eVM, the VH computed the hash value for the whole ADB.
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Start ADB Integrity Verification

a) iVM checks integrity of ADB

iVM sends integrity verification request to TTP

iVM computes the hash value of ADB data

iVM asks for and receives IVI from TTP

iVM compares hash values
failed
succeeded

iVM apoptosizes ADB
iVM decrypts ADB data

End ADB Enabling

End ADB Integrity Verification

Figure 4.8. ADB integrity verification activities.
4) The ADB Policy Enforcement Activities
ADB metadata include ADBPPs, consisting of privacy policy rules, which are created by the
originating host during the ADB creation.
ADBPPs control sensitive data and prescribe their disclosing to VH. Sensitive data may be divided
into a number of data records. Each record of sensitive data is controlled by one (or more) sets of
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privacy policy rules. Each rule has one or more required conditions. We use the VHTV included in
the “positive” AC which TTP sent to the ADB through the VH (see Step 2c and 2d above).
The ADB iVM enforces ADBPPs, that is, the iVM verifies that all ADBPPs rules are satisfied.
Given the VHTV, the iVM goes through each rule for each sensitive data record, and checks
whether the VHTV satisfies the privacy policy rule condition of each record of sensitive data.
Then, the ADB iVM starts enforcing all ADBPPs rules by applying actions to all data records in
sensitive data using the following procedures (cf. Figure 4.9):
a) Data reduction:
During data reduction, one of the following actions is performed:
i) Noop: If the VHTV is sufficient, i.e., equal or exceed the ADB-TVT of each record in
sensitive data, then no data reduction activities are needed in this step. ADB sensitive data
(including all these records) remain unchanged.
ii) Evaporation by the ADB iVM: If the VHTV is mildly insufficient, i.e., lower than the
ADB-TVT, evaporation destroys all ADB data records with the required trust value above
the VHTV; only less sensitive data remain (the “less sensitive data” are the data that even
this VH—having a lower trust value—may access).50 That is, ADB iVM evaporates the
more sensitive data portions that the VH must not see.51
iii) Apoptosis by the ADB iVM: In this case (i.e., VHTV is highly insufficient), the iVM
irretrievably self-destroys the ADB completely (including its data, metadata, and itself).52
Then ADB enabling is ended.
b) Data disclosure:
The ADB iVM discloses the remaining of ADB data (after data reduction) to the specific single
user53 in the VH. After preceding data reduction activities, the ADB iVM performs one of the
following disclosure actions:

50

51

52
53

We assume using the single-destination ADB dissemination model. In this model, the given ADB source sends a different ADB copy to each of
its VH destinations. This means that each VH has its “own” ADB that is addressed solely to it. Therefore, after releasing (or not) data to the VH,
the ADB is no longer needed and can terminated as will see next in ADB Termination in Subsection 4.4.5. In the alternative multiple-destination
ADB dissemination model (to be addressed in the future) a single ADB can visit multiple destination VHs. At each of its destination VHs, the
ADB delivers to the VH only these data that the VH is authorized to see; then the ADB can move to another destination VH.
In an extended evaporation model (yet to be considered) not only some data but also some metadata or a portion of the VM code could be
destroyed.
Recall that the apoptosis of ADB performed by the ADB iVM is also occurred when the ADB integrity check fails (Step 3a-ii-2).
In this model, the ADB data are customized by data reduction then disclosed for a specific user (no other user can access it). Another model
would be to assign ADB data for different users. In this case, the ADB data come after data reduction must not change because a user can get
all the remaining data while another user may get just part of remaining data. Such adjustment will be consider in our future work.
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i) Full ADB data: ADB iVM disclosed to the VH all remaining ADB data after data
reduction action since the VH has access privileges for all remaining data.54
ii) Partial ADB data: ADB iVM disclosed to the VH some of remaining ADB data after data
reduction action since VH lacks access privileges for all remaining data.
iii) Null ADB data: Data are completely destroyed by their ADB apoptosis. This case
prevents the VH from accessing any ADB data (no data exist anymore), so no data
disclosure activities are needed.
The ADB iVM data reduction and data disclosure are applied to ADB data according to the VHTV.
That is, the data reduction and data disclosure are done per a user (not per a host) where the iVM customizes
ADB data (by data reduction and data disclosure) to satisfy the ADBPP.

54

Remaining data refer to whatever left after data reduction including: (i) all original ADB data (when ADB iVM performs Noop), or (ii) some of
ADB data (when ADB iVM performs Evaporation).
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Start ADB Policy Enforcement
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End ADB Policy Enforcement
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Figure 4.9. ADB policy enforcement activities.
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4.4.4. ADB Auditing
ADB auditing aims to record and monitor all activities during the lifecycle of ADB. The ADB auditing
is a collaboration of different auditing subsystems during ADB creation, ADB enabling ADB
dissemination, and ADB termination. Note that audit data for ADB dissemination are recorded during ADB
creation. Also, audit data for ADB termination are recorded during ADB enabling. These auditing
subsystems included in DHS, ADB, and TTP. All auditing data are recorded and stored as follows:
1) Saving audit data of ADB Creation on the OHS:
Audit data for all ADB creation processes are recorded and stored by the HES audit subsystem in
the HES-Audit File at the OHS (in OH).
2) Updating audit data on the TTP during ADB Enabling:
a) During ADB enabling, audit data are recorded by the eVM audit subsystem and iVM audit
subsystem. During ADB authentication activities and ADB authorization activities, the eVM
audit subsystem stores audit data in the eVM-Audit File. During ADB integrity verification
activities and ADB policy enforcement activities, the iVM audit subsystem stores audit data in
the iVM-Audit File.
b) The eVM and iVM send (using a secure messaging method) their audit files to the TTP after the
end of the ADB enabling phase (when the ADB data are either disclosed to the VH or the
eVM/iVM apoptosizes the entire ADB).55,56 In the latter case, the eVM/iVM uses a commit
protocol (e.g., [SAGT10, PuiN88]) to assure that the TTP receives audit files.57
3) Saving audit data of ADB Enabling on the OHS:
The TTP sends the audit files (logging all ADB actions on this specific DH) to the OHS at OH. The
OHS updates its audit database for the ADB. From now on it can use this information in further
ADB dissemination. (For example, if the originating host notices that an ADB is apoptosized at a
specific DH, the originating host may remove this DH from its future dissemination list.)

55

56

57

We understand that when an ADB is apoptosized, the audit file will be useless, so we may consider just sending a short alert to the TTP that the
ADB was apoptosized, rather than sending the full audit file.
We note that a careful reader might say that when an ADB is apoptosized, its audit files become useless. However, our planned work on the
inclusion algorithm will make such files useful (these files will include useful data on the level of the VM that apoptosized the ADB).
The TTP will receive either one audit file from the eVM (when the eVM apoptosizes the ADB during its execution in Step 1a-i or Step 2f-ii), or
two audit files from both eVM and iVM (when the iVM apoptosizes the ADB during ADB integrity verification activities in Step 3a-ii-2 that
passes the control to Step 4a-iii which performs apoptosis).
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4.4.5. ADB Termination
ADB termination refers to the end of ADB after successfully disclosing its data to the VH. We
propose one termination method as following:
1) ADB –initiated Apoptosis
ADB iVM would be able to initiate an apoptosis of ADB including itself. This apoptosis has
different trigger than previously, i.e., during ADB enabling. Apoptosis during ADB enabling was
triggered by danger, while the current apoptosis is triggered by successful completion or deadline.
There are two types of ADB Apoptosis:
a) Immediate ADB Apoptosis: The iVM apoptosizes ADB at the DHS right after delivering ADB
data to the DHS.
b) Scheduled ADB Apoptosis:
After a specific date and time (“expiration date and time”) or specific number that DHS accesses
ADB, the iVM apoptosizes ADB at the DHS.

4.5. Details of the Hospital Response in the Healthcare Scenario: Protecting Privacy of Users’ EHRs
in HISes using ADB-TTP
This section illustrates our solution for protecting users’58 privacy by protecting their EHRs through
presenting a simple scenario of using the ADB-TTP in HISes [SaLi11]. The scenario refers to the hospital
response (Step 13) included in the high-level healthcare scenario (cf. Figure 4.1) when the HES sends the
H-EHR to CES.
The scenario indicates that ADB-TTP meets research objectives discussed in detail in Section 1.6
(Problem Statement and Research Hypothesis).
To show different cases of the proposed solution, we consider three possible visited hosts (VHs) that
can receive an ADB after it sent by HES: (i) a Fully authorized CES (FCES) that is authorized to access the
whole ADB H-EHR; (ii) a Partially authorized CES (PCES) that is authorized to access a part of ADB HEHR; and (iii) Malicious host (MH) that is not authorized to access any part of ADB H-EHR.

58

Recall that users include patients and healthcare providers.
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4.5.1. ADB Creation
Figures 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 show ADB creation in the Hospital EHRs system (HES). After receiving a
request for a patient’s EHRs from the Clinic EHR system (CES), the HES packages into a new ADB a copy
of the patient’s H-EHR as sensitive data, the associated privacy and access policies as metadata, and builds
ADB (Step 1 in Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12). The HES generates two private encryption/decryption key pair for
the ADB (Step 2 in Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12). Using the first generated private encryption key, the HES
encrypts H-EHR and metadata of the ADB to additionally protect their privacy (Step 3 in Figures
4.10/4.11/4.12). Then, HES computes a hash value for H-EHR and metadata together to protect their
integrity (Step 4 in Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12). Next, HES bundles all ADB components (H-EHR, metadata,
and the iVM), and encrypts the whole ADB using the second generated an encryption key (Step 5 in Figures
4.10/4.11/4.12).
The HES computes the hash value of the whole ADB (i.e., the encrypted ADB) to protect its integrity
(Step 6 in Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12), and add the eVM to ADB (Step 7 in Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12).
The HES sends ADB enabling record (ER) to the designated TTP (Step 8 in Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12).
The ER includes two decryption keys (from Step 2), corresponding to the encryption keys that were used
by HES (for encrypting ADB H-EHR and metadata, and for encrypting the whole ADB) plus the two hash
values (from Steps 4 and 6) and the ADB-TVT.
Now, a newly created ADB is ready for dissemination (assuming that we use the single destination
ADB dissemination model, in particular, it is ready for being sent from HES to FCES/PCES).
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Figure 4.10. The detailed interactions during ADB lifecycle for a patient’s EHRs sent
to fully authorized clinic in the absence of an attack (cf. [SaLi11]).
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Figure 4.11. The detailed interactions during ADB lifecycle for a patient’s EHRs sent
to partially authorized clinic in the absence of an attack (cf. [SaLi11]).

Figure 4.12. The detailed interactions during ADB lifecycle for a patient’s EHRs sent
to fully/partially authorized clinic in the presence of an attack (cf. [SaLi11]).
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4.5.2. ADB Dissemination
The HES sends the ADB to the CES. (An ADB can be transferred via a sequence of intermediate hosts
using a secure transmission (Step 9 in Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12).

4.5.3. ADB Enabling
Figures 4.10, 4.11 show the ADB enabling process in the absence of an attack on the ADB when it sent
to FCES and PCES, respectively. Figure 4.12 shows the ADB enabling process in the presence of an attack
(MH) on the ADB when it sent to FCES or PCES. Recall that ADB enabling steps were described in
Subsection 4.4.3.
When an ADB reaches the FCES, PCES, or MH, the visited host starts ADB enabling process. ADB
enabling includes ADB authentication activities, ADB authorization activities, ADB integrity verification
activities, ADB policy enforcement activities.
1) ADB Authentication Activities
a) The FCES/PCES/MH runs the ADB eVM
The ADB eVM requests the FCES/PCES/MH to provide multiple identifiers including PID,
NPI, and EHRC-ID (Steps 10/10/10’ in Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12).59
The eVM produces one of the following authentication results according to the response of
FCES/PCES/MH:
i) If the FCES/PCES/MH authentication by the eVM fails, then the ADB eVM apoptosizes
the entire ADB (Step End 1—eVM: Apoptosis in Figure 4.12);
ii) Otherwise, if the FCES/PCES/MH authentication by the eVM succeeds, i.e., the eVM
authenticates FCES/PCES/MH (Steps 11/11/12’ in Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12), then eVM
performs the next ADB enabling activities (the ADB Authorization Activities).
2) ADB Authorization Activities
a) The ADB eVM provides FCES/PCES/MH with ADB identifiers
The eVM provides the FCES/PCES/MH with the identifiers of the ADB and the ADB
designated TTP (ADB-ID and TTP-ID), and computes on the fly the ADB hash value.
b) The FCES/PCES/MH sends authorization request to TTP

59

For clarification, “Steps 10/10/10’ in Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12” means: the Step 10 in Figure 4.10, the Step 10 in Figure 4.11, the Step10’ in Figure
4.12.
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The FCES/PCES/MH uses the identification of TTP (TTP-ID) to send a request asking for the
authorization code (AC) from the designated TTP (Steps 12/12/13’ in Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12).
The request includes ADB identifier (ADB-ID), the ADB hash value (computed in Step 2a
above), and the identifier for FCES/PCES/MH (FCES-ID/PCES-ID/MH-ID).
c) The TTP verifies request for FCES/PCES/MH and sends the AC to the FCES/PCES/MH
TTP uses the information included in the authorization request for FCES/PCES/MH to perform
the following verifications:
i) The TTP verifies if the record <ADB-ID, FCES-ID/PCES-ID/MH-ID> is in the TTP
database;
ii) The TTP retrieves the trust level of FCES/PCES/MH, and checks if it above (or equal to)
the required ADB-TVT (provided by ADB Creator during ADB creation).
iii) The TTP verifies whether the ADB hash value (included in the authorization request for
FCES/PCES/MH) matches the hash value in the ADB enabling record (ER) that the TTP
received from HES during ADB creation. This verifies the integrity of the whole ADB.
If all verifications succeed, the TTP is confident that authorization request for FCES/PCES/MH
is related to a genuine ADB. The TTP prepares the positive AC including the trust value for
FCES/PCES/MH, ADB-TVT, and ADB second private decryption key.
If even one of the verifications fails, then the TTP prepares the negative AC; it includes neither
the trust value for FCES/PCES/MH, nor the ADB-TVT, nor the ADB second private
decryption key.
Then the TTP sends the prepared (either positive or negative) AC to FCES/PCES/MH60 (Steps
13/13/14’ in Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12).
d) The FCES/PCES/MH forwards the AC to the ADB eVM (Steps 14/14/15’ in Figures
4.10/4.11/4.12).
e) The ADB eVM checks the AC
The eVM checks the AC61 (Steps 15/15/16’ in Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12):
i) If the verification of the AC fails (Step 17’ in Figure 4.12), then the eVM apoptosizes the
entire ADB (Step End2—eVM: Apoptosis in Figure 4.12).

60

61

Again, we show what happens if the MH passes this step and all other verification steps in order to demonstrate all protection methods of ADB
data in the scheme.
The AC is protected by authentication using Message Authentication Code (MAC).
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ii) If the verification of the AC succeeds (Steps 16/16/18’ in Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12), then
the eVM checks the trust value of FCES/PCES/MH as shown next
f) The ADB eVM checks the trust value of FCES/PCES/MH
The eVM checks the trust value of FCES/PCES/MH included in the AC (Steps 17/17/19’ in
Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12):
i) If the trust value of FCES/PCES/MH is Sufficient, i.e., the AC is positive (Steps 18/18/21’
in Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12), then the eVM uses the second private decryption key (included
in the AC) to decrypt the ADB, i.e., iVM is decrypted and it is ready to perform next stage
of ADB activities. Note that the ADB H-EHR and metadata are still protected by the
encryption using the first private encryption key (Step 3) in the ADB creation.
ii) If the trust value of FCES/PCES/MH is Insufficient, i.e., the AC is negative (Step 20’—
Insufficient in Figure 4.12), then the eVM apoptosizes the entire ADB (Step End 3—eVM:
Apoptosis in Figure 4.12).
3) ADB Integrity Verification Activities
After showing that the trust value of FCES/PCES/MH exceeds the minimum threshold required by
the ADB, i.e., exceeds Sufficient (in Step 2f-i), then iVM performs the following tasks:
a) The iVM checks integrity of ADB data and metadata
The ADB iVM verifies the integrity of H-EHR data and related metadata62 included in ADB
as follows:
i) The iVM sends an integrity verification (IV) request
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(Steps 19/19/22’)—Send IV

Request in Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12) to the TTP asking for integrity verification information
(IVI). The IVI includes the hash value for the ADB H-EHR and metadata jointly, and
ADB first private decryption key (included in the ADB enabling record that is received
by the TTP in Step 8 in ADB creation).
ii) Without waiting for the answer from the TTP, the iVM asynchronously computes the hash
value for the ADB H-EHR and metadata (Steps 20/20/23’—Compute Hash Value in
Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12). (Note that H-EHR and metadata are still encrypted).

62
63

“Related metadata” for an EHR are metadata that the system defines and employs for this EHR.
This is the second request received by the TTP; the first one was the authorization request (AR) asking for the authorization code (AC) sent by
the FCES/PCES/MH to the TTP (Step 2b).
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iii) Once the ADB iVM receives the IVI response from the TTP (Steps 21/21/24’—Send IVI
to ADB in Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12), the iVM compares the computed and the received hash
values (Steps 22/22/25’—Compare Hash Values in Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12).
iii-1) If both hash values are identical, the integrity check succeeds (Steps 23/23/27’ in
Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12); in this case, the iVM first decrypts ADB H-EHR and
metadata using the first private decryption key (Steps 24/24/28’—Decrypts ADB
Data in Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12). Then the iVM proceeds to Step 4 below (initiates
the ADB policy enforcement activities).
iii-2) If the comparison of the hash values fails (Step 26’ in Figure 4.12), then the control
is passed by the ADB to Step 4a-iii below (in which the ADB iVM apoptosizes the
entire ADB—cf. Step End 4—iVM: Apoptosis in Figure 4.12).
4)

ADB Policy Enforcement Activities
The ADB VM enforces ADB privacy policies (ADBPP)64 by making sure that all ADBPPs’ rules
are satisfied. The ADB iVM uses the trust value of FCES/PCES/MH to perform the following
procedures:
a) Data reduction DR
Recall that data reduction is done per a user according to the trust level of FCES/PCES/MH.
During data reduction one of the following actions is performed:
i) Noop (Step 25—DR: Noop in Figure 4.10)
When the trust value of FCES is equal or exceed the threshold of ADB-TVT of each
record included in patient’s H-EHR, no data reduction activities are applied to the ADB
H-EHR. The ADB data remain unchanged.
ii) Evaporation by the ADB iVM (Step 25/29’—DR: Evaporation in Figures 4.11/4.12)
The ADB iVM might decide to destroy irretrievably records of the H-EHR that the
PCES/MH is not authorized to access when the trust value of PCES/MH is lower than the
ADB-TVT.
In more detail: If the trust value of PCES is insufficient, then evaporation is applied to the
ADB H-EHR. The evaporation destroys all ADB H-EHR records with the required trust
value (i.e., ADB-TVT) above the assigned trust value of the PCES/MH. This protects the

64

ADBPPs are assigned by the origination site during the ADB creation. ADBPPs could combine both: patient privacy policies, and healthcare
provider privacy policies.
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more sensitive record(s) in the H-EHR; so, only the less sensitive records “survive” in the
H-EHR.
Note that we did not consider the other two cases of evaporation where the ADB data has
“zero” evaporation (0%), or “full” evaporation (100%) in the sense that zero evaporation
would be a special case of Noop (above), and full evaporation would be a special case of
apoptosis (below). Such distinction will investigate in our future work.
iii) Apoptosis by the ADB iVM (Step End 4—iVM: Apoptosis in Figure 4.12)
The ADB iVM apoptosizes, or destroys irretrievably the entire ADB (including its HEHR, metadata, and the iVM itself). Then the MH (and nobody else) will ever be able to
access the ADB H-EHR. Note that this is the only one that iVM apoptosizes the ADB, the
previous three apoptoses are done by eVM65.
b) Data disclosure DD
Recall that data disclosure is done per a user (not per a host), i.e., the ADB remaining data after
data reduction are assigned to a specific user (single user not different users). After data
reduction procedure, the original ADB H-EHR that was delivered to the FCES, PCES, or MH
might become one of the following:
i) Full ADB data (Step 26—DD: Full ADB Data (H-EHR) in Figure 4.10): all the remaining
ADB’ H-EHR after data reduction (i.e., after Noop or Evaporation by the ADB iVM) are
disclosed to FCES by iVM since the FCES has access privileges for all ADB H-EHR.
ii) Partial ADB data (Steps 26/30’—DD: Partial ADB Data (H-EHR) in Figures 4.11/4.12)
:some of the remaining ADB H-EHR after data reduction (i.e., after Noop or Evaporation
by the ADB iVM ) are disclosed to PCES by iVM since the PCES lacks access privileges
for all remaining ADB H-EHR.
iii) Null ADB data (Steps End 1, End 2, End 3, and End 4—Apoptosis in Figure 4.12): ADB
is destroyed completely by apoptosis, so no H-EHR, metadata, and iVM/eVM exist
anymore.

65

Note that the eVM can apoptosize the ADB earlier when: (i) the MH authorization by eVM fails (Step 11’, then Step End1—eVM:Apoptosis in
Figure 4.12); (ii) the eVM receives the negative AC from the TTP (Step 17’, then Step End 2—eVM:Apoptosis in Figure 4.12); or (iii) the CES
trust level is Insufficient (Step 20’, then Step End 3—eVM:Apoptosis in Figure 4.12).
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4.5.4. ADB Auditing
The ADB auditing is a collaboration of different auditing subsystems included in HES, ADB, and TTP.
The ADB auditing is not shown in Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12.
1) Saving audit data on the HES during ADB Creation:
Audit data for all ADB creation processes is recorded by the audit subsystem in ADB Creator
software and stored in the ADB Creator audit file on the HES at Hospital.
2) Updating audit data on the TTP during ADB Enabling:
a) During ADB enabling, audit data for ADB eVM is recorded by the eVM audit subsystem and
stored by in the eVM audit file (located in the eVM data area on the FCES/PCES). Finally, audit
data for ADB integrity verification activities and ADB policy enforcement activities are
recorded by the iVM audit subsystem and stored in the iVM audit file located in ADB metadata
on the FCES/PCES.
b) The ADB eVM and iVM send (through a secure messaging method) their audit files to the TTP66
after the end of ADB enabling process (i.e., when ADB H-EHRs are either disclosed to the
FCES/PCES or the ADB is apoptosized in the MH). A commit protocol (e.g., a one from
References [SAGT10, PuiN88]) can be used by ADB eVM/iVM to assure that the TTP receives
the audit file or files before the end of ADB enabling.
3) Saving audit data on the HES after ADB Enabling:
Later, the TTP sends the audit file(s)67 to the HES. The HES updates its audit database for the ADB
and uses this information for further ADB dissemination.68

4.5.5. ADB Termination
During the ADB termination (not shown in Figures 4.10/4.11/4.12), the iVM performs the following
actions according to the ADBPPs:
1) ADB –initiated Apoptosis
ADB iVM apoptosized the entire of ADB including itself. Recall that this apoptosis is triggered by
successful completion or deadline according to the ADBPP.
66
67

68

All information exchanges are protected through the use of Message Authentication Code.
Recall that the TTP should receive either one audit file from the eVM (when the eVM apoptosizes the ADB during its execution in Step 1a-i or
Step 2f-ii), or two audit files from both eVM and iVM (when the eVM apoptosizes the ADB during ADB integrity verification activities in Step
3a-ii-2 that passes the control to Step 4a-iii which performs apoptosis).
When the HES notices that the ADB is apoptosized on a specific CES, then the HES removes the CES name from ADB future dissemination
list, for example, removes the name of the MH in Figure 4.12.
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There are two types of ADB Apoptosis:
i) Immediate: the iVM apoptosized ADB at the CES (i.e., FCES or PCES) exactly after the
disclosure of ADB data to CES.
ii) Schedule: the iVM apoptosized ADB at the CES after a specific time according to ADBPPs.
The ADBPP may include a specific date or number of times that CES uses ADB.

4.6. Chapter Conclusions
This chapter presented the Active Data Bundle with Trusted Third Party (ADB-TTP) for protecting the
privacy of patients’ healthcare data in health information systems (HISes). ADB-TTP enhances Active
Bundle using Trusted Third Party (ABTTP) and uses it in healthcare applications. We presented our solution
in the context of a simple healthcare scenario (EHR/EMR dissemination).
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CHAPTER 5

THE PROPOSED SOLUTION: ACTIVE DATA BUNDLES
WITH MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM (ADB-MAS)

“We must develop as quickly as possible technologies that make
possible a direct connection between brain and computer, so that
artificial brains contribute to human intelligence rather than
opposing it.”
~Stephen Hawking

5.1. Introduction
Using mobile agent technology in HISes will improve the healthcare quality. There are several reasons
to adopt the mobile technology including:
1) The increase of Electronic Health (e-health) services via the Internet introduced by Pervasive
Computing and the Internet of Things (IoT) which are indeed dealing with stationary and mobile
users (patients and healthcare providers) [More06, BePo09, ShRe15].
2) Agents provide a solution for HIS problems such as interface, scheduling, and policy enforcement,
and planning with deliberative, flexible, and learning behavior [More06].
3) Agents provide distributed problem-solving approach, where agents cooperate via MAS to solve
sub-problems while solving a complex problem [More06, BePo09].
A mobile agent is a goal-oriented computer software able to perform tasks on one host and move to
another host, where it resumes its execution on behalf of an individual or organization [JaKa09]. Recall that
an agent encapsulates its state and controls this state using designated methods [JeWo98]. These methods
let an agent to select (via agent actuators) actions, which is done via agent’s precepts obtained by the
agent’s sensors from the environment. An agent uses an executable code to perform these actions and keeps
data that support its state and the execution of its code.
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Execution State
Application Data

Code
Program code
Program code
:
Program code

Figure 5.1. Mobile agent components [HTKS12].

A mobile agent consists of three components as shown in Figure 5.1 [LiDP95, JaKa09, HTKS12,
ClPV03, AlBr05]:
1) Execution State: Represents a set of internal variables that make the agent perform its activities
when the agent senses some changes within its environment or when the agent reaches its
destination. For example, program counter and execution stack pointers are a part of the state.
2) Application Data: Represent agent values and include user’s preference, resources, and agent plans
and policies according to the agent type or application. An agent should be able to access and
manage its data to update its status or perform actions.
3) Code: Represents a set of program codes (functions and methods) that perform the tasks of the
agent.
A mobile agent is considered one of the paradigms of code mobility together with remote evaluation69
and code on demand 70 [CoMo16]. Code mobility refers to the ability to run and move a program, code, or
object among different applications or machines [Ichi06].
In this chapter, we integrate ADBs and mobile agents by introducing a new ADB scheme
implementation called the Active Data Bundles with The Multi-Agent System (ADB-MAS). The ADB-MAS

69

70

Remote evaluation refers to the transfer of executable software code from a client to a server to perform some tasks, and return the results back
to the server [ReEv16].
Code on demand refers to sending an executable code from a server to a client upon request that received from client [CoDe16].
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uses active data bundles implemented as mobile agents to replace the use of the TTP; the agents cooperate
with each other to protect users’ privacy while disseminating their data among different hosts.
Some of the advantages of integration of ADBs into agent-based systems can be enhanced. We believe
that providing to intelligent agents the protection, verification and policy enforcement capabilities that
ADBs offer can turn intelligent agents into secure intelligent agents. “In reverse,” by providing intelligent
agent capabilities to an ADB, we can replace a designated TTP with an ADB-based intelligent agent.
We introduce the use of ADB-MAS to protect the privacy of users while transferring their EHRs among
healthcare providers in HISes.
The rest of the chapter includes the following sections: Section 5.2 introduces the high-level healthcare
scenario for dissemination of patient’s EHR among healthcare providers in HISes. Section 5.3 discusses
the structure of ADB-MAS and Section 5.4 shows the operations of ADB-MAS. Section 5.5 presents a
healthcare scenario using the proposed solution. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.

5.2. The High-Level Healthcare Scenario: Dissemination of EHRs in HISes
We used the same high-level healthcare scenario discussed in Section 4.2. In the following, we include
a copy of Figure 4.1 from this section for a reader convenience.

Figure 5.2. Information flow for a patient visiting the Clinic for the first time, with the patient’s
EHR located in the hospital (Copy of Figure 4.1 provided for a reader convenience).
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Figure 5.2 shows a basic scenario for a patient visiting a clinic for the first time (a new admission),
while his most up-to-date EHR is located in a general hospital that she usually visits (cf. [SaLi11]).
The basic scenario includes the following steps:
S1) Steps 1-6 at the Clinic EHR System (CES):
1) The CES sends a local request to its database (CES-DB) asking for C-EHR—the local patient’s
EHR,
2) The CES-DB receives the CES request,
3) The CES-DB searches for C-EHR and finds no such record,
4) CES-DB notifies CES that it failed to find C-EHR in CES-DB (this is a new patient in the clinic),
5) The CES receives information that there is no C-EHR for the patient,
6) The CES sends a request for the patient’s H-EHR, that is, the patient’s EHR stored in the Hospital
EHR System (HES).
S2) Steps 7-13 at the Hospital EHR System (HES):
7) The HES receives the request from the CES,
8) The HES sends a local request to its database HES-DB,
9) The HES-DB receives the HES request,
10) The HES-DB searches for the patient’s H-EHR, finds it, and retrieves it,
11) The HES-DB sends the patient’s H-EHR to HES,
12) The HES receives the patient’s H-EHR,
13) The HES sends patient’s H-EHR to the CES,
S3) Steps 14-37 at the CES:
14) The CES receives the patient’s H-EHR, F
15) The CES sends patient’s H-EHR to CES-DB,
16) The CES-DB receives the H-EHR, and modifies it into the patient’s C-EHR,
17) The CES-DB sends patient’s C-EHR to CES,
18) The CES receives the patient’s C-EHR,
19) The CES sends the C-EHR to a physician (in clinic) to meet the patient,
20) The physician receives and reviews patient’s C-EHR,
21) The physician meets the patient in her office in the clinic for diagnosing, the physician requests
tests from a clinic laboratory and the X-Ray department
22) New request is received in the clinic laboratory and
23) New request is received in the X-Ray department,
24) The lab test results are sent to the CES-DB,
25) The X-Ray results are sent to the CES-DB,
90

26) The CES-DB periodically (e.g., once a day) updates patients’ C-EHRs with the results accumulated
since the last update,
27) The CES-DB sends the updated patient’s C-EHR to CES,
28) The CES receives the patient’s C-EHR,
29) The CES notifies the physician about the patient’s test results and makes them available as a part
of the patient’s C-EHR in the CES-DB.
30) The physician accesses the updated patient’s C-EHR (with integrated new lab and X-Ray results)
in the CES-DB to review them, and makes her decision about the patient’s case; for example, she
finds that the patient must see a surgeon in the hospital.
31) The physician gives this information to a nurse (not shown in Figure 5.2) who schedules an
appointment for the patient with a surgeon, and includes this information in a message to CES,
asking CES to update the patient’s C-EHR,
32) The CES receives the patient’s C-EHR (including the appointment information to meet surgeon),
33) The CES sends the patient’s C-EHR to CES-DB,
34) The CES-DB receives C-EHR,
35) The CES-DB saves the patient’s C-EHR,
36) The CES-DB sends the updated patient’s C-EHR to the CES,
37) The CES receives the patient’s C-EHR,
38) The CES sends the patient’s C-EHR to the HES.
S4) Steps 39-41 at the HES:
39) The HES receives the patient’s C-EHR and forwards it to the HES-DB,
40) The HES-DB receives the patient’s CES,
41) The HES-DB updates the patient’s H-EHR in the HES-DB,

5.3. Structure of ADB-MAS
This section discusses the structure (static characteristics) of ADB-MAS and its operations (dynamic
characteristics). The ADB-MAS adopts some of the ADB-TTP enhancements including the use of nested
VMs and ADB termination and uses them with ADB agents.
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5.3.1. ADB Agents
As mentioned before, the mobile agent consists of execution state, application data, and code
[HTKS12]. Figure 5.3 shows the proposed ADB mobile agents use in ADB-MAS.
As we can see, the ADB agent is the merging between an agent and ADB. That is, the ADB agent is an
agent with ADB capabilities. ADB agent can perform all ADB activities (that we discussed before in
Chapter 4) while it moved among different visited hosts.

Nested VM

Execution State
Application Data

Sensitive data
Code
Program code
Program code
:
Program code

Metadata
Internal VM (iVM)
External VM (eVM)

(a) ADB

(b) Agent

Execution State
VM (Code)

Sensitive Data
Metadata
Internal VM (iVM)
External VM (eVM)

Application Data

(c) ADB Agent
Figure 5.3. The merging between (a) ADB and (b) Agent to produce (c) ADB agent.

The ADB agent includes Execution State, Code, and Application Data71. The execution state represents
a set of internal variables (such as program counter and call stack pointers) that make ADB agent performs

71

We change the order of agent components from execution state, application data, and code to execution state, code, and application data in
order to fit with our ADB structure. In Figure 5.3c the VM (which represents the code in mobile agent) includes the application data.
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its activities when it reaches the vested host. The code of ADB includes either a single VM or a nested VMs
according to the critical tasks that the agent performs. The nested VMs includes both an external VM (eVM)
and an internal VM (iVM). The VM or nested VM manages and executes ADB agent action. Note that the
application data represent data that ADB agent hold. The application data include sensitive data, metadata,
or any data required for the agent to perform its tasks. The agent must protect its own data when it uses or
exchanges portion of data according to its actions.
We use four types of ADB agents in ADB-MAS: Sensitive data Agent (SdA), Trust-verification Agent
(TvA), ADB Enabling Agent (EnA), and Data-audit Agent (DaA). All these agents are created in the home
platform (HP), and each agent has an independent role in the designated lifecycle. All agents are cooperated
together to make sure the sensitive data are delivered to the authorized destination platform (DP).

5.3.1.1. Sensitive Data Agent (SdA)
The Sensitive Data Agent (SdA) holds and protects the sensitive data during SdA lifecycle, i.e.,
beginning its dissemination from the HP to the DP. Note that, the SdA might move among different
intermediate hosts to reach the DP. Before delivering the sensitive data to the DP, the SdA performs
different verifications (authentication, authorization, and data integrity) or activities (communicate with
other agents and DP or enforces its privacy policies). As we mentioned before, the SdA includes its
execution state, VM, and application data as shown in Figure 5.4. Note that, the metadata (part of
application data) includes information describing sensitive data and prescribing its use.

Execution State
VM

Sensitive Data
Metadata

iVM
eVM
Application Data

Figure 5.4. Sensitive data agent (SdA).
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5.3.1.2. Trust-verification Agent (TvA)
The Trust Verification Agent (TvA) collects trust information about the DP and makes them available
to the HP before creating and sending the SdA to the DP. Figure 5.5 shows the TvA and its execution state,
VM, and application data. Note that the TvA includes a single VM (not nested VMs as SdA) to perform its
tasks. The TvA moves outside the HP and collects trust information about the DP from different other hosts,
trust broker (developed by other [KLYT05]), or Trust Broker Information Overlay Network (TBION).
Then, the TvA returns to deliver the trust information to the HP.

Execution State
VM

Trust information
Metadata

Application Data

Figure 5.5. Trusted verification agent (TvA).

5.3.1.3. ADB Enabling Agent (EnA)
The Enabling Agent (EnA) holds the Enabling Record (ER) that includes the required private
decryption keys and hash values required for SdA enabling at the DP. The EnA is created in the HP right
after the creation of SdA. Figure 5.6 shows EnA components. Note that the EnA includes single VM to
perform its tasks. The EnA moves to a designated arbitrary network where it can be able to communicate
with SdA. During SdA enabling at DP, the EnA provides ER information to the SdA. The SdA uses ER
information to decrypt its encrypted data and check its integrity before delivering them to the DP.
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Execution State
VM

Enabling Information
Metadata

Application Data

Figure 5.6. ADB enabling agent (EnA).

5.3.1.4. Data-audit Agent (DaA)
The Data Audit Agent (DaA) records and keeps audit data about all agent activities in the ADB-MAS.
The DaA is created in the HP right after the creation of TvA. Figure 5.7 shows DaA three components. The
DaA includes single VM to perform its tasks. The DaA maintains a database (part of application data)
includes all audit data messages that each agent provides before starting an action. The DaA moves to a
designated arbitrary network where it can be able to communicate with SdA and EnA during SdA enabling.
The DaA returns its audit data to the HP for further processing.

Execution State
VM

Audit DB

Metadata

Application Data

Figure 5.7. Data audit agent (TvA).
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It should be emphasized that the SdA is the only agent that uses the nested VM to protect the sensitive
data that hold and protect. Other agents (TvA, EnA, and DaA) use single VM.

5.3.2. Platform Components
In the following, we discuss the home platform and destination platform.

5.3.2.1. Home Platform
The Home Platform (HP) 72 represents originating host that contains the sensitive data. The HP includes
two main components, Home Health Information System (HHIS) and Home Health Information System
Database (HHIS-DB). HHIS-DB includes sensitive data and its privacy policies.
The home platform consists of four components including Access Preparation, Agents Creation, Agents
Registration, and Agents Scheduling.

5.3.2.1.1. Access Preparation
Data preparation responsible for receiving and verifying the data access requests came from another
DP that wants to access the HP data. The access preparation is responsible for collecting sensitive data and
metadata from HP database, encrypting sensitive data and metadata after generating encryption/decryption
keys, and providing the encrypted data to the agent creation.

5.3.2.1.2. Agent Creation
Agent creation is responsible for creating all ADB-MAS agents, i.e., TvA, DaA, SdA, EnA
respectively.

5.3.2.1.3. Agent Registration
Agent registration is responsible for registering all agent in the ADB-MAS. Each agent must be
registered to perform its tasks in the ADB-MAS. The registration of an agent comes right after the creation
of the agent. The agent is registered using its unique name or identifier.

72

For clarification, the Home Platform and HHIS are equivalent to the Hospital and HES in the proposed high-level healthcare scenario.
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5.3.2.1.4. Agent Scheduling
Agent scheduling responsible for scheduling and assigning tasks to each registered agent in the ADBMAS. Each agent maintains its schedule and updates its task list. Agents scheduling is essential to monitor
the performance status of each agent and to track all activities of registered agents.

5.3.2.2. Destination Platform
The Destination Platform (DP)73 represents the designated host that should receive SdA to access its
sensitive data. DP includes the Destination Health Information System (DHIS) and Destination Health
Information System Database (DHIS-DB).

5.3.2.3. Trust Broker Information Overlay Network
Trust Broker Information Overlay Network (TBION) manages and provides trust value (actually,
reputation, that is, “second-hand trust”) for all platforms/hosts that can become destinations for EHR
dissemination.

5.4. Operations of ADB-MAS
Operations of ADB-MAS refer to the dynamic representation of ADB-MAS components. These
operations are employed by components of HHIS in the HP and all ADB-MAS agents to deliver sensitive
data to DHIS in the DP.
The DHIS (in DP) creates and sends an access request to the HHIS (in HP) asking to access sensitive
data.
1) Access Preparation in HHIS:
1a) Receiving access request from DHIS: The HHIS receives the access request from the DHIS.
The HHIS verifies the access request. If the request is insufficient, then the HHIS sends
rejection notification to DHIS. (Otherwise, the HHIS prepares the requested data as shown
next).
1b) Preparing Data: The HHIS collects sensitive data and metadata from the HHIS-DB.
2) DHIS Trust Value Retrieving from TBION:

73

The Destination Platform and DHIS are equivalent to the Clinic and CES in the proposed high-level healthcare scenario.
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2a) Creating TvA and DaA: The HHIS creates the TvA and the DaA (discussed below in Subsection
5.4.2.1.1 and Subsection 5.4.2.1.2).
2b) Registering TvA and DaA: The HHIS registers the TvA and the DaA.
2c) Scheduling TvA and DaA: The HHIS schedules the DaA and the TvA.
2d) Disseminating TvA to TBION: The HHIS Sends TvA to the TBION.
2e) TvA enabling in TBION: The TvA starts enabling a process in TBION (discussed in Subsection
5.4.4.)
2f) Collecting Trust Value of DHIS: The TvA collects DHIS trust Value (DHIS-TV) from TBION.
2g) Delivering DHIS-TV to HHIS: The TvA provides DHIS-TV to the HHIS, and then TvA
terminates by apoptosis in the HHIS.
2h) Enforcing Privacy Policies Step One in HHIS: The HHIS enforces user’s privacy policies (PPs)
step one according to the trust value received by TvA. The enforcement of user’s PPs in this
step includes only data reduction. HHIS prepares the remaining sensitive data and metadata.
That is, the user’s PPs are applied even before creating SdA agent.
3) SdA and EnA Creation:
3a) Creating SdA and EnA: The HHIS creates the SdA (includes sensitive data, metadata, iVM,
and eVM) and the EnA (includes the hash values and decryption keys to support SdA
enabling). Creating SdA and Ena discussed below in Subsection 5.4.2.1.3 and Subsection
5.4.2.1.4.
3b) Registering SdA and EnA: The HHIS registers the SdA and the EnA.
3c) Scheduling SdA and EnA: The HHIS schedules the SdA and the EnA.
4) Agents Disseminating:
The HHIS sends EnA and DaA to Arbitrary Network (AN) respectively, then sends SdA74 to the
DHIS. Note that TvA is disseminated to TBION (Step 2d above).
5) EnA Enabling in AN: The EnA starts enabling a process in AN (discussed in Subsection 5.4.5)
6) DaA Enabling in AN: The TvA starts enabling a process in AN (discussed in Subsection 5.4.6)
7) SdA Enabling in DHIS:
7a) Authenticating DHIS: In the DHIS, the SdA eVM authenticates the DHIS (discussed in
Subsection 5.4.7.1). If DHIS is not authentic, then: (i) SdA sends audit data to DaA75, (ii) SdA
74

75

Note that the SdA can be transferred from its home platform to the destination platform via a sequence of an intermediate hosts using a secure
transmission.
Note that the DaA receives audit data from other agents and stores them in different files in its DB.
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apoptosizes in DHIS, (iii) EnA apoptosizes in NA, and (iv) DaA moves to HHIS to deliver its
audit data.
7b) Authorizing DHIS: In the DHIS, along with the supported of EnA in AN, the SdA eVM checks
whether DHIS is authorized or not (discussed in Subsection 5.4.7.2). If the DHIS is authorized,
then SdA eVM decrypts iVM and EnA terminates (i.e., finishes it task) in the AN. If the DHIS
is unauthorized, then: (i) SdA sends audit data to DaA, (ii) SdA apoptosizes in DHIS, (iii) EnA
apoptosizes in NA, and (iv) DaA moves to HHIS to deliver its audit data.
7c) Checking Integrity of SdA data: The SdA’ iVM checks the integrity of its application data
(discussed in Subsection 5.4.7.3). If the integrity check is succeeded, then the iVM decrypts
SdA application data (i.e., sensitive data and metadata) using the first decryption key.
Otherwise: (i) SdA sends audit data to DaA, (ii) SdA apoptosizes in DHIS, and (iii) DaA moves
to HHIS to deliver its audit data.
7d) Enforcing Privacy Policies Step Two: The SdA iVM enforces SdA privacy policies (SdA-PP)
step two. The enforcement of user’s PPs in this step includes only data disclosure PPs
(discussed in Subsection 5.4.7.4).
7e) Disclosing Sensitive Data: The SdA iVM discloses the remaining sensitive data to the DHIS.
7f) Terminating SdA in DHIS: The SdA is terminated (by apoptosis) in the DHIS (discussed in
Subsection 5.4.9).
8) Audit Data Delivering:
8a) Moving DaA to HHIS: DaA returns to the HHIS.
8b) Delivering Audit Data to HHIS: DaA provides all audit data (files) to the HHIS.
8c) Terminating DaA in HHIS: DaA is terminated (by apoptosis) in HHIS.
Below, we briefly discuss all operations of ADB-MAS.

5.4.1. Access Preparation
The HHIS receives an access request from the DHIS asking for user’ sensitive data. The HHIS verifies
the request. If the request is insufficient, the HHIS sends a rejection to the DHIS. If the request is sufficient,
the HHIS processes the request and retrieves the sensitive data and metadata from the HHIS-DB. (Then
HHIS is ready to start the process of Agent Construction in the next step).
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5.4.2. Agent Construction
This subsection discusses the construction of ADB-MAS agents. The construction process includes
agent creation, agent registration, agent scheduling.

5.4.2.1. Agent Creation
All ADB-MAS agents (including TvA, DaA, SdA, and EnA) are created in the HHIS in HP. Agent
creation is arranged in the following subsections according to their creation order in the HHIS.

5.4.2.1.1. Creating TvA
The TvA is responsible for collecting the trust value of the DHIS from the TBION and making them
available to the HHIS. Creating TvA includes the following steps:
1) HHIS retrieves the information of DHIS from the access request and information of TBION.
2) HHIS collects DHIS information as sensitive data and information of TBION (such as its identifier)
as metadata. (The TvA uses this information to authenticate TBION).
3) HHIS computes the hash value for the plain application data (No need to encrypt sensitive data and
metadata). HHIS keeps a copy of the computed hash value.
4) HHIS adds VM as a code. We use single unencrypted VM in this type of agent due to the limited
tasks that TvA performs.
5) HHIS bundle TvA components including execution state, single VM (code), and application data.

5.4.2.1.2. Creating DaA
The DaA records and maintains audit messages that are sent by all agents in ADB-MAS. Creating of
the DaA includes the following steps:
1) The DaA sensitive data includes a database (DB) to store all audit data messages received from
ADB-MAS agents and platforms/hosts in the ADB-MAS.
2) The HHIS collect agents’ identifiers and information of platforms, hosts, and AN as metadata. (The
TvA uses this information to authenticate AN).
3) HHIS computes the hash value of DaA application data. HHIS keeps a copy of the computed hash
value.
4) HHIS adds the VM as a code. We used single unencrypted VM in this agent type. The VM able to
encrypt all audit data messages and stores them in the DB (in metadata).
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5) HHIS bundles DaA components including execution state, single VM (code), and application data
(sensitive data and metadata).
To protect DaA audit data, the DaA uses Blackchain list [Bloc17]. The DaA encrypts and computes
the hash value for each received audit data message. Then, the DaA includes the hash value of the previous
audit data message in the following audit data message and so on. Blackchain is suitable for the event,
record, and identity management. Note the encryption is required when DaA receives audit data. During
Creating DaA, encrypting sensitive data is not required.

5.4.2.1.3. Creating SdA
The SdA holds and protects the sensitive data during its dissemination from the HHIS to the DHIS.
Creating of SdA includes the following steps:
1) The HHIS enforces the PPs step one (i.e., part of PPs) to the sensitive data after receiving the DHISTV. The remaining sensitive data include only less sensitive data. The HHIS enforce just data
reduction in this step. The data reduction includes noop, evaporation by HHIS. Noop means that
DHIS-TV is equal or exceed the trust value threshold (TVT) required by user’s PPs of each portion
of sensitive data. Therefore, the sensitive data remain unchanged. Evaporation by HHIS means that
DHIS-TV is lower than the TVT required by user’s PPs, then evaporation destroys all sensitive
data with the required trust value above the DHIS-TV; only less sensitive data remain.
2) HHIS generates encryption/decryption key pair.
3) HHIS collects the remaining sensitive data and the metadata. Metadata includes the privacy policies
that describe and prescribe sensitive data.
4) HHIS encrypts the application data (i.e., the sensitive data and the metadata) using the first
asymmetric encryption key.
5) HHIS computes the first hash value for application data. Note that hash is calculated over an
encrypted sensitive data and metadata. HHIS keeps a copy of the first computed hash value.
6) HHIS adds the iVM as a first part of the code.
7) HHIS encrypts application data (sensitive data and metadata) and iVM jointly using the second
asymmetric encryption key.
8) HHIS computes the second hash value for application data and iVM jointly. Note that hash value
is calculated over encrypted application data and encrypted iVM.
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9) HHIS adds eVM as a second part of the code. Note that eVM is not encrypted. The eVM includes
agents’ names and information of platforms and hosts. (The SdA eVM uses this information to
authenticate DHIS).
10) HHIS builds the enabling record (ER) that includes two private decryption keys and two hash
values.
11) HHIS bundles all agent components, i.e., execution state, eVM (code), and encrypted application
data.

5.4.2.1.4. Creating EnA
The EnA keeps the enabling record (includes two private decryption keys and two hash values) that is
required by SdA during its enabling at DHIS on the DP. Creating of EnA includes the following steps:
1) HHIS adds the ER as a sensitive data and adds information (names and identifiers) of all
registered/scheduled agents and involved platforms/hosts as metadata. (The EnA uses this
information to authenticate AN)
2) HHIS encrypts sensitive data using a symmetric encryption key. No need to encrypt metadata.
3) HHIS computes the hash value for application data (i.e., encrypted sensitive data and metadata).
HHIS keeps a copy of the computed hash value.
4) HHIS adds the VM as a code. We use single unencrypted VM due to the limited task of EnA.
5) HHIS bundles all agent components, i.e., execution state, single VM (code), and application data.

5.4.2.2. Agent Registration
The HHIS requests Agent Registration (ARg) to register all ADB-MAS agents using their unique names
and types. Agents are registered in the same sequence of their creation. First, the agent registration registers
TvA and the DaA respectively. Then the ARg registers SdA and EnA after their creation in HHIS.

5.4.2.3. Agent Scheduling
The HHIS requests agent scheduling (AS) to schedule and to assign tasks to each registered agent in
the ADB-MAS. Each agent is scheduled according to its name and identifier. Each agent has a specific
sequence of tasks preassigned by HHIS. The scheduling process comes after the registration process. First,
agent schedules and assigns tasks for both TvA and the DaA respectively. Second, agent scheduling
schedules and assigns tasks for SdA and EnA respectively.
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5.4.3. Agent Dissemination
HHIS disseminates ADB-MAS agents in following order:
1) HHIS disseminates TvA to the TBION to collect the DHIS-TV.
2) HHIS disseminates EnA to the AN.
3) HHIS disseminates DaA to AN.
4) HHIS disseminates SdA to DHIS.
Note that each agent dissemination can transfer from the HP (HHIS) to DP (DHIS) via a sequence of
intermediate platforms using a secure transmission.

5.4.4. TvA Enabling
When TvA reaches TBION, TvA VM76 starts the TvA enabling process. The TvA enabling includes
TvA authentication activities, TvA authorization activities, and trust retrieving activities.
5.4.4.1. TvA Authentication Activities
TvA authentication activities include the following steps:
1) The TvA VM authenticates TBION by asking for its identifier.
2) The TBION provides its identifier to the TvA.
3) The TvA checks TBION identifier:
3a) If the identifier is insufficient, then the TvA VM sends audit data to DaA in HHIS and
apoptosizes the entire TvA.
3b) Otherwise, TvA VM authenticates TBION and computes the hash value for its application data.
5.4.4.2. TvA Authorization Activities
TvA authorization activities include the following steps:
1) The TvA VM includes the hash value in a request and sends it to HHIS asking for Confirmation
Code (CCd). The CCd is either a positive or a negative code. The CCd should include a
confirmation to authorize or invalidate TBION.
2) The HHIS receives the request and compares the saved hash value with the received hash value
(included in TvA Request). If the hash values are identical, the HHIS prepares the Positive CCd
(includes a confirmation to authorize the TBION). Otherwise, the HHIS prepares the Negative CCd
(includes a confirmation to invalidate TBION).

76

Recall that TvA uses a single VM.

103

3) The HHIS sends the CCd (either positive or negative) to the TvA.
4) The TvA receives and checks the CCd:
4a) If the CCd is negative, the TvA VM sends audit data to DaA in HHIS and apoptosizes the entire
TvA in TBION.
4b) Otherwise, then TvA VM authorizes TBION.
5.4.4.3. Trust Retrieving Activities
The TvA asks the TBION to provide the DHIS-TV. The TBION retrieves the DHIS-TV and saves it in
the TvA. The TvA returns to HP and delivers the DHIS-TV to HHIS. The TvA send audit data to the DaA
and terminates (by apoptosis) itself in HHIS.

5.4.5. EnA Enabling
When EnA reaches AN, EnA VM77 starts the EnA enabling process. The EnA enabling includes two
activities: EnA authentication activities and EnA authorization activities.

5.4.5.1. EnA Authentication Activities
EnA authentication activities include the following steps:
1) The EnA asks AN to provide its identifier.
2) The AN provides its identifier to EnA.
3) The EnA checks AN identifier.
3a) If the identifier is insufficient, then the EnA VM sends audit data to DaA in HHIS and
apoptosizes the entire EnA.
3b) Otherwise, EnA authenticates AN and computes the hash value for its application data.

5.4.5.2. EnA Authorization Activities
EnA authorization activities include the following steps:
1) The EnA includes the hash value in a request and sends it to HHIS asking for Authorization Code
(ACd). The ACd should either be Positive ACd (decryption key for EnA application data) or
Negative ACd (include a confirmation to invalidate AN).
2) The HHIS receives the request and compares the saved hash value (saved during EnA creation)
with the received hash value (included in the EnA request). If both hash values are identical, the

77

Recall that EnA uses a single VM.
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HHIS prepares the positive ACd. Otherwise, the HHIS prepares the negative ACd. Then HHIS
sends audit data to DaA in HHIS.
3) The HHIS sends ACd (either positive or negative) to EnA.
4) The EnA receives and checks the ACd:
4a) If the ACd is negative, the EnA sends audit data to DaA in HHIS and apoptosizes the entire
EnA in AN.
4b) Otherwise, EnA VM authorizes AN and decrypts its application data using the decryption key
(included in positive ACd).

5.4.6. DaA Enabling
When DaA reaches AN, DaA VM78 starts the DaA enabling process. The DaA enabling includes DaA
authentication activities only (no EnA authorization activities) since the AN is authenticated and
authorized by EnA.

5.4.6.1. DaA Authentication Activities
DaA authentication activities include the following steps:
1) The DaA asks AN to provide its identifier.
2) The AN provides its identifier to DaA.
3) The DaA checks AN identifier.
3a) If the identifier is insufficient, then the DaA VM updates its audit data and moves back to
HHIS.
3b) Otherwise, DaA authenticates AN.
5.4.7. SdA Enabling
The SdA enabling starts when SdA reaches the DHIS in the DP. The SdA enabling in DHIS is supported
by EnA and DaA that are disseminated to the AN. The SdA enabling includes SdA authentication activities,
SdA authorization activities, SdA integrity verification activities, and SdA policy enforcement activities.
Figure 5.8 shows the SdA enabling in DHIS:

78

Recall that DaA uses a single VM.
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Start SdA

1) SdA Authentication Activities
failed
succeeded

2) SdA Authorization Activities
(Plus Integrity Check for Application Data and iVm)

failed
succeeded

3) SdA Integrity Verification Activities
failed
succeeded

4) SdA Policy Enforcement Activities
SdA Apoptosizes

Disclose Data to DHIS

End SdA Enabling

Figure 5.8. SdA enabling steps: SdA authentication activities, SdA authorization activities,
SdA integrity verification activities, and SdA policy enforcement activities.

1) If SdA authentication activities of DH failed, then SdA apoptosizes and then SdA enabling is ended.
Otherwise (i.e., SdA authentication activities succeeded). Then SdA starts its next activities
(authorization activities).
2) If SdA authorization activities of DH failed, then SdA apoptosizes and SdA enabling is ended.
Otherwise, SdA starts its next activities (integrity verification activities).
3) If SdA integrity verifications activities failed, then SdA apoptosizes and SdA enabling is ended.
Otherwise, SdA starts next activities (policy enforcement activities).

106

4) In SdA policy enforcement activities, the SdA enforces the privacy policies and delivers the
remaining of SdA data to the DH.

5.4.7.1. SdA Authentication Activities
The SdA eVM initiates DHIS authentication: When SdA reaches the DHIS in DP, its execution state is
initiated. The SdA authentication activities started. The authentication activities involve both the SdA and
the DHIS. The SdA eVM asks the DHIS to provide multiple identifiers including patient identification
(PID), national provider identification (NPI), and EHR certification identification (EHRC-ID) to prove its
identity. The eVM compare latter identifiers with its local protected values

79

(are added in SdA during

SdA creation, cf. Subsection 5.4.2.1.3 Step 9).

Start SdA Enabling

Start SdA Authentication Activities

1) SdA eVM checks DHIS identifier
failed
succeeded

a) eVM sends audit data to DaA

b) eVM authenticates DHIS

eVM apoptosizes SdA

End SdA Enabling

End SdA Authentication Activities

Figure 5.9. SdA Authentication Activities in DHIS.
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We consider move these local protected values to metadata for more protection, however this adjustment required to propose special and secure
method to access or retrieve these values from a dual encrypted data (metadata and sensitive data are encrypted two times). We also consider
using information hiding technique (such as steganography) to hide (conceal) these values within the encrypted application data and iVM during
SdA creation (Step 7). Then, during SdA authentication activities, we can use extraction method to extract these values from encrypted
application data. Such adjustment will be considered in our future work.
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1) The SdA check the DHIS identifiers and produces one of the following authentication results (cf.
Figure 5.9):
a) If the DHIS authentication by the SdA eVM fails, then the SdA eVM sends audit data message
to the DaA and apoptosizes the entire SdA;
b) Otherwise, the DHIS authentication by the SdA eVM succeeds, i.e., the eVM authenticates the
DHIS identity,
In Figure 5.9, we refer to the primary activity in a double line box with bold text and the subactivity in
single line box with italic text (we continue to do so for coming activities figures).
Figure 5.9 shows two starts and two ends. Start SdA Enabling refers to the beginning of SdA enabling,
and Start SdA Authentication refers to the initiation of authentication activities. End SdA Enabling (with
bold line rounded rectangle) refers to the end of the SdA enabling phase, while End SdA Authentication
refers to the end of authentication activities, and then ADB enabling continues to the next group of activities
(SdA Authorization Activities).

5.4.7.2. SdA Authorization Activities
The authorization activities involve both the SdA, DHIS, and EnA as shown in the following steps:
1) The SdA eVM provides DHIS with SdA identifiers: After SdA authentication activities, the eVM
provides the DHIS with the identifiers of the SdA, the EnA, AN (SdA-Id, EnA-Id, AN-Id), and
computes on the fly the hash value of application data and iVM jointly (cf. Figure 5.10).
2) The DHIS sends a request to EnA: The DHIS sends to the EnA (identified by SdA-Id, EnA-ID, and
AN-ID) a request for the enabling record (ER)80 for accessing the SdA data. Also, the request
includes the DHIS identifier (DHIS-Id) and the hash value (calculated in previous Step 1).
3) The EnA verifies DHIS request, and sends the ER to the DHIS: The EnA VM performs the following
verifications:
a) After receiving the DHIS request, the EnA (in AN) verifies whether the record identified by
<SdA-ID, DHIS-ID> is in the EnA database.81
b) The EnA verifies the hash value in the DHIS request, that is, EnA checks if it matches the
second hash value (included in ER that HHIS added to the EnA in Step 1 of creating EnA).
This verifies the integrity of both: the application data and the iVM of SdA.

80
81

Recall that ER includes two decryption keys and two hash values required to encrypt SdA application data and check its integrity.
This requires that HHIS provides EnA with a possible DHIS destinations for a given SdA.
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b1) If above verifications succeed, the EnA is confident that the DHIS request is related to a
valid (genuine) SdA. Next, the EnA prepares the positive ER (which includes a hash value
and two private decryption keys).
b2) Otherwise, if at least one of above verifications fails, then the EnA prepares the negative
ER (it includes neither hash value, nor two private decryption keys).
c) The EnA sends the prepared positive or negative ER to the DHIS. The EnA VM sends audit
data to the DaA and apoptosizes the entire EnA in the AN.

Start SdA authorization Activities

1) eVM provides DHIS with SdA identifiers

2) DHIS sends request to EnA in AN

3) EnA verifies request and sends ER to DHIS

4) DHIS forwards ER to SdA eVM

5) SdA eVM checks ER
failed

a) eVM sends audit data to DaA
eVM apoptosizes SdA

succeeded

b) eVM authorized DHIS

eVM decrypts application data and iVM

End SdA Enabling

End SdA Authorization Activities

Figure 5.10. SdA authorization activities in HHIS.
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4) The DHIS forwards the ER to the SdA eVM.
5) The SdA eVM checks the ER:
a) If the verification of the ER is failed ( i.e., the ER is negative), the SdA eVM sends audit file
to the DaA and apoptosizes the entire SdA;
b) If the verification of the ER is succeeded (i.e., the ER is positive), the eVM authorized DHIS,
then the eVM decrypts the application data and iVM using the second private decryption key
(included in the positive ER). Note that the sensitive data and metadata are still protected by
another encryption (the one using the first asymmetric encryption key, cf. Step 4 in creating
SdA above);

5.4.7.3. SdA Integrity Verification Activities
The SdA iVM is ready to perform the following tasks (cf. Figure 5.11):
1) The iVM checks integrity of SdA application data: Here, the integrity of SdA application data (i.e.,
sensitive data and metadata) is checked by its iVM as follows:
a) The iVM computes the hash value82 for the SdA application data (i.e., sensitive data and
metadata). Note that sensitive data and metadata are still encrypted.
b) The iVM compares the “locally computed” and the received hash values for SdA application
data (included in ER) as follows:
i) If the comparison of hash values is succeeded (i.e., they are identical), then the iVM decrypts
SdA sensitive data and metadata using the first private decryption key (included in ER).
(Then, the SdA policy enforcement activities are started by the SdA iVM —cf. Subsection
5.4.7.4 below.)
ii) Otherwise, the comparison of hash values is failed (i.e., if the two hash values differ), then
the SdA iVM sends audit file to the DaA and apoptosizes the entire SdA.

82

Note that this is the second computation of the hash value, and this time the hash is computed over SdA encrypted application data only (i.e.,
metadata and sensitive data). During SdA authorization activities (cf. Step 1 in Subsection 5.4.7.2), the hash value was computed for the
encrypted application data and iVM.
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Start SdA Integrity Verification Activities

1) iVM checks integrity of SdA application data

a) iVM computes hash value of SdA application data

b) iVM compares hash values
failed
succeeded

ii) iVM sends audit info. to DaA

iVM apoptosizes SdA

i) iVM decrypts SdA application data

End SdA Enabling

End SdA Integrity Verification Activities

Figure 5.11. SdA integrity verification activities in DHIS.

5.4.7.4. SdA Policy Enforcement Activities
SdA metadata include SdA-PPs, consisting of privacy policies that are added by the HHIS during the
SdA creation.
The SdA iVM enforces SdA-PPs83, that is, the iVM verifies that all SdA-PPs rules (data disclosure
rules) are satisfied. Note that HHIS enforce PPs rules step one (data reduction rules) during SdA creation
(cf. Step 1 in Subsection 5.4.2.1.3).
Given the trust value of the DHIS (DHIS-TV), the iVM goes through each data reduction rule for
sensitive data portions and checks whether the DHIS-TV satisfies the privacy policy rule condition of each
portion of sensitive data. Then, the SdA iVM starts enforcing all SdA-PPs rules by applying the actions to
all data portions of sensitive data using the following procedure (cf. Figure 5.12):
83

This the second time that PPs are enforced. The first time was during creating SdA (cf. Subsection 5.4.2.2.1.3)
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1) SdA Data disclosure:
a) The SdA iVM performs one of the following disclosure actions:
i)

Full SdA data: SdA iVM discloses to the DHIS all remaining SdA sensitive data (after data
reduction during creating SdA) since the DHIS has access privileges for all remaining
data.84

ii) Partial SdA data: SdA iVM discloses to the DHIS some of remaining SdA sensitive since
DHIS lacks access privileges for part of remaining data.
iii) Null SdA data: Data are completely destroyed by SdA apoptosis. This case prevents the
DHIS from accessing any SdA sensitive data. So no data disclosure activities are needed.
b) The iVM discloses remaining SdA sensitive data to DHIS

Start SdA Policy Enforcement

1) SdA data disclosure

a) SdA iVM performs disclosure
action

highly insufficient

sufficient

mildly insufficient

iii) Null SdA data

iVM sends audit data to DaA

ii) Partial SdA data

i) Full SdA data

iVM discloses remaining SdA data to DHIS

iVM apoptosizes SdA

End SdA Enabling

End SdA Policy Enforcement

Figure 5.12. SdA policy enforcement activities (step two) in DHIS.
84

Remaining data refer to whatever left after data reduction (step one) including: (i) all original SdA sensitive data (when SdA iVM performs
Noop), or (ii) some of SdA sensitive data (when SdA iVM performs Evaporation).
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The SdA iVM data reduction rules are applied to SdA sensitive data according to the conditions that
the HHIS might add such as DHIS-TV, date, and time. That is, data reduction rules (during creating of
SdA) are applied per a host while in data disclosure rules (during SdA Enabling) are applied per a user
where the iVM customizes SdA sensitive data (by data disclosure) to satisfy the SdA-PPs.
(After the end of the policy enforcement activities (step two), the SdA iVM sends audit file to the DaA
in AN, and apoptosizes the entire SdA in DHIS).

5.4.8. Auditing Activities
The DaA does all auditing activities. The DaA has the longest lifecycle compared with the other ADBMAS agents lifecycle (i.e., TvA, SdA, and EnA). The DaA starts its tasks at the HHIS in HP by collecting
audit data messages from HHIS and the TvA. For example, TvA sends audit data message to the DaA
before moving to the DHIS.
The DaA continues its tasks when it moves to the AN. In AN, the DaA collects audit data messages
from the SdA and the EnA after their dissemination to DHIS and AN respectively. For example, the EnA
sends audit data message to DaA to inform that the ER is sent to the SdA in DHIS.
During the SdA enabling in the DHIS, the DaA collects audit data messages from SdA. For example,
before the apoptosis of SdA, SdA sends audit data message to the DaA (i.e., during SdA authentication
activities, SdA authorization activities, or SdA integrity verification activities).
Lastly, after the successful end of SdA enabling, the DaA returned to the HHIS in HP to deliver all
audit data messages received from SdA and EnA. After delivering all audit data to the HHIS, the DaA
terminates (by apoptosis).
Recall that the DaA uses Blackchain list [Bloc17] to protect its audit data messages during its lifecycle.
The DaA encrypts and computes the hash value for each received audit data message. Then, the DaA
includes the hash value of the previous audit data message in the following audit data message and so on.

5.4.9. Agent Terminating
Each agent in ADB-MAS is terminated after successfully done with all its tasks that were assigned by
HHIS. We proposed one termination methods as follows:
1) Agent–initiated Apoptosis
Agent iVM (or VM) can apoptosize the agent. Recall that this SdA apoptosis has different trigger
than previously discussed (c.f. Subsection 5.4.7.1 1a, i.e., during SdA enabling). Apoptosis during
SdA enabling was triggered by danger, while the current apoptosis is triggered by successful
completion or deadline. We identify two types of agent apoptosis:
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a) Immediate: This apoptosis can be initiated by any of ADB-MAS agents exactly after the
successful completion of all agent tasks that were assigned by HHIS. For example, the TvA
apoptosizes (in HHIS) immediately after delivering the DHIS-TV to the HHIS. Also, the EnA
apoptosizes (in AN) immediately after sending the ER to the DHIS.
b) Schedule: This apoptosis initiated only by SdA at the DHIS after a specific time according to
an arrangement between the HHIS and the DHIS. Recall that the arrangement may indicate a
specific date or number of times that DHIS should access sda. This arrangement can be
included in the DHIS access request that sent by DHIS to HHIS.

5.5. Details of the Hospital Response in the Healthcare Scenario: Protecting Privacy of Users in
HISes using ADB-MAS
In this section, we show our proposed solution for protecting the privacy of HISes’ users by protecting
their EHRs. We introduce a simple scenario of using the ADB-MAS. The scenario refers to the hospital
response included the high-level healthcare scenario in Figure 5.2 (Step 13) when the HES sends the HEHR to CES.
As we mentioned in Footnote 72 and 73, the Home Platform, the HHIS, the Destination Platform, and
the DHIS are equivalent to the Hospital, the HES, the Clinic, and the CES respectively.

5.5.1. Sending Access Request from DP to HP
Sending a request from DP to HP includes the following step (cf. Figure 5.13):
1) The DHIS in the DP prepares an Access Request (AR) and sends it to the HHIS in the HP asking
for a copy of patient’s EHR.

5.5.2. Processing Access Request in HP
The access preparation in HP includes the following steps (cf. Figure 5.13):
2) Access Processing (AP) verifies the AR in the Request Verification (RV), then:
2n1) If the request is not authentic, the AP sends rejection notification to DHIS,
2y1) Otherwise, the AP processes the AR in the Request Processing (RP).
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3) The RP processes the AR.
4) The RP collects data from HHIS-DB. Data includes patient’s EHR and metadata. Metadata
include privacy policies (PPs).
5) The HHIS -DB retrieves designated data.
6) The HHIS -DB sends data to RP.
7) RP processes data including the time and date of the last EHR updating and retrieving.
8) RP forwards data along with DP information to the Agent Creation (AC). DP information
includes identifiers for DP and DHIS (included in the AR).
9) AC receives data for further processing.

Figure 5.13. Sending access request from DH and processing it in the HP.

5.5.3. Retrieving DHIS-TV from TBION
Retrieving DHIS-TV from TBION includes the following steps (cf. Figure 5.14):
10) The AC creates Trust-verification Agent (TvA) and Data-audit Agent (DaA).
11) The Agent Registration (ARg) registers the DaA and the TvA.
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12) The Agent Scheduling (AS) schedules the DaA and the TvA.
13) The AS sends a list of tasks assigned to each agent (i.e., list for the TvA and list for the DaA).
14) The TvA sends audit data message to DaA before moving to the TBION.
15) The TvA is disseminated to the TBION.
16) In TBION, the following steps are performed:
16a) The TvA verifies if TBION is authentic by asking TBION to provide correct identifiers.
If the identifiers are not accurate (i.e., the TBION is inauthentic), then:
16an1) The TvA sends audit data message to DaA in HHIS (not shown in Figure 5.14),
16an2) The TvA apoptosizes (not shown in Figure 5.14).
Otherwise, the TvA authenticates TBION, then:
16ay1) The TvA computes the hash value for its data (not shown in Figure 5.14).
16b) The TvA includes the hash value in a request and send it to HHIS asking for asking for
Confirmation Code (CCd).
16c) The HHIS receives the request and compare the saved hash value with the received hash value.
If the hash values are identical, the HHIS prepares the positive CCd (includes a confirmation
to authenticate the TBION). Otherwise, the HHIS prepares the negative CCd (includes a
confirmation to invalidate TBION).
16d) The HHIS sends the CCd to the TvA via secure message,
16e) The TvA receives and checks the CCd (not shown in Figure 5.14):
If the CCd is negative,
16en1) the TvA VM sends audit data to DaA in HHIS.
16en2) The TvA VM apoptosizes the entire TvA in TBION.
Otherwise:
16ey1) The TvA VM authorizes DHIS.
16f) The TvA asks TBION to provide DHIS-TV,
16g) The TBION provides DHIS-TV to TvA.
17) The TvA returns to the HHIS in HP.
18) The TvA reaches the HHIS in HP.
19) The TvA provides DHIS-TV to the HHIS.
20) The AC receives the DHIS-TV.
21) The TvA sends audit data message to DaA.
22) The TvA terminates by apoptosis in HP (HHIS).
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Figure 5.14. Retrieving DHIS-TV from TBION.

5.5.4. Creating Agents
Agent creation includes the following steps (cf. Figure 5.15):
23) The AC (in HHIS) enforces PPs rules (step one). The AC uses these PPs rules that evaporate
(remove) these patient’s EHR record(s) for which DHIS-TV is insufficient (is below the required
trust value threshold). That is, only data reduction (no data disclosure) is applied to the prepared
data in the AC. The data reduction includes noop and evaporation by HHIS (no apoptosis). The
remaining data after data reduction (noop or evaporation) are included in the SdA as a sensitive
data (cf. Subsection 5.4.2.1.3 Step 1).
24) The AC creates the SdA.
25) The AC creates the EnA.
26) The AC provides new information about SdA and EnA to DaA.
27) The ARg registers SdA and EnA.
28) AS schedules SdA and EnA.
29) AS sends list of tasks to each agent (SdA, EnA, and DaA).
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5.5.5. Disseminating agents
All ADB-MAS agents are disseminated to different parties including TBION, AN, and DP. The first
dissemination agent is TvA (cf. Step 15 in Figure 15.4). The other disseminating agents are shown in the
following steps:
30) The HHIS sends EnA to the AN.
31) The HHIS sends DaA to the AN.
32) The HHIS sends SdA to the DHIS.
Note that the EnA is disseminated to the AN. If the EnA enabling goes well, then DaA is disseminated
to AN. Finally, the SdA is disseminated to the DHIS

5.5.6. Enabling EnA in AN
After moving to the AN (Step 30), the EnA VM starts its enabling process. The enabling EnA includes
the following steps (cf. Figure 5.15):
30a) The EnA reaches the AN,
30b) The EnA VM verifies if AN is authentic by asking AN to provide a correct identifier.
If the identifier is not accurate (the AN is inauthentic), then:
30bn1) The EnA sends audit data message to DaA in HHIS (not shown in Figure 5.15),
30bn2) The EnA apoptosizes (not shown in Figure 5.15).
Otherwise, the EnA authenticates AN, then:
30by1) The EnA sends audit data message to DaA in HHIS. Next, the EnA computes the hash
value for its application data (not shown in Figure 5.15).
30c) The EnA includes the hash value in a request and sends it to HHIS asking for authorization
code (ACd).
30d) The HHIS receives the request and compares the saved hash value (saved during EnA
creation) with the received hash value from EnA. If both hash values are identical, the HHIS
prepares the positive ACd (includes the decryption key). Otherwise, the HHIS prepares the
negative ACd (includes an arbitrary code). Then HHIS sends audit data to DaA (in HHIS).
30e) The HHIS sends ACd (either positive or negative) to EnA.
30f) The EnA receives and checks the ACd.
If the ACd is negative, then:
30fn1) The EnA sends audit data message to DaA in HHIS (not shown in Figure 5.15),
30fn2) The EnA apoptosizes (not shown in Figure 5.15).
Otherwise (i.e., positive ACd), the EnA authorizes AN, then:
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30fy1) The EnA VM decrypts its application data using the decryption key (included in positive
ACd). Note that 30fy1 is not shown in Figure 5.15.
31) The HHIS sends DaA to the AN

5.5.7. Enabling DaA in AN
After moving to the AN (Step 31), the DaA VM starts its enabling process. The enabling DaA includes
the following steps:
31a) The DaA reaches the AN,
31b) The DaA VM authenticates AN by asking AN to provide a correct identifier.
If the identifier is not accurate (the AN is inauthentic), then:
31bn1) The DaA updates its audit data (not shown in Figure 5.15),
31bn2) The DaA apoptosizes (not shown in Figure 5.15).
Otherwise:
31by1) The DaA authenticates AN (not shown in Figure 5.15).
The DaA should authenticate AN without difficulty because AN is authenticated and authorized by
EnA.
32) The HHIS sends SdA to the DHIS
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Figure 5.15. Creating SdA and EnA; Disseminating EnA, DaA, and SdA; and EnA
Enabling in AN.

5.5.8. Enabling SdA in DP
Enabling SdA in DP includes the following steps (cf. Figure 5.16):
33) The SdA reaches the DHIS.
34) The SdA eVM verifies if the DHIS is authentic by asking DHIS to provide a correct identifier.
If identifiers are not accurate (the DHIS is inauthentic), then:
34n1) The SdA VM sends audit data message to DaA in AN
34n2) The SdA apoptosizes in the DP (DHIS). Next, the EnA apoptosizes in AN. Then the DaA
returns to HHIS (cf. Step 39 in Subsection 5.5.9).
Otherwise, the DHIS is authentic, then:
34y1) The SdA computes the hash value for its application data and iVM jointly,
34y2) The SdA provides hash value and Ids (SdA-Id, EnA-Id, and AN-Id) to DHIS,
34y3) The DHIS includes the hash value in a request,
34y4) The DHIS sends the request to EnA asking for ER,
34y5) The EnA verifies the request,
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34y6) The EnA sends audit data message to the DaA,
34y7) The EnA sends the ER to the DHIS,
34y8) The DHIS forwards the ER to the SdA. The DHIS should forwards the ER to SdA without
any modification. The ER protected by Message Authentication Code (MAC).
34y9) The EnA terminates by apoptosis in the AN.
35) The SdA eVM verifies if DHIS is authorized. The SdA receives and checks the ER.
If the DHIS is not authorized (i.e., the ER is negative), then:
35n1) The SdA eVM sends audit data message to DaA,
35n2) The eVM apoptosizes the entire SdA in DHIS. Then the DaA returns to HHIS (cf. Step 39 in
Subsection 5.5.9.).
Otherwise, the DHIS is authorized, then:
35y1) SdA decrypts its application data and iVM using the second private decryption key included
in the ER. This step decrypts the iVM only. Note that the patient’s EHR and metadata (SdAPPs) are still protected by the encryption using the first asymmetric encryption key (Step 4)
in the creating SdA.
36) SdA iVM checks the integrity of application data (i.e., the EHR and the PPs).
36a) The iVM computes the hash value for its encrypted application data.
36b) The iVM compares the computed hash with the first hash value (included in ER).
If the hash values are identical, the integrity check is a failure, then:
36bn1) The iVM sends audit data message to DaA.
36bn2) The iVM apoptosizes the entire SdA in DHIS. Then the DaA return to HHIS (cf. Step
39 in Subsection 5.5.9.)
Otherwise, the integrity check is a success, then:
36by1) SdA iVM decrypts application data (patient EHR and metadata) using the first private
decryption key.
37) The SdA iVM enforces SdA-PPs rules (step two).
37a) The SdA iVM verifies that all SdA-PPs are satisfied and applies the data disclosure procedure
to the EHRs. The data disclosure procedure includes full SdA data, partial SdA data, and
null85 SdA data.
37b) The SdA iVM discloses the remaining EHRs to the DHIS in the DP.

85

Example of null SdA data by iVM (not shown in Figure 5.16) in this stage occurs when healthcare provider wants to access SdA’ EHR after
the business hours, even though she is authenticated and authorized to access SdA EHR.
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Figure 5.16. Enabling SdA in DHIS, terminating SdA in DHIS, and delivering audit data to
HHIS.

5.5.9. Terminating SdA in DP
Terminating SdA includes the following steps (cf. Figure 5.16):
38) The SdA terminates in two steps:
38a) The SdA sends audit data message to DaA,
38b) The SdA terminates in DP (DHIS).

5.5.10. Delivering Audit Data to HP
Delivering audit data to HP includes the following steps (cf. Figure 5.16):
39) The DaA returns to HHIS in HP.
40) The DaA provides all audit data to AC.

122

41) The AC Processes audit data.
42) The iVM terminates (by apoptosis) the entire DaA.

5.6. Chapter Conclusions
This chapter discussed the Active Data Bundle with Multi-Agent System (ADB-MAS) for protecting
patients’ privacy in health information systems (HISes). This new solution uses multiple agents to protect
sensitive user data during their dissemination from the home platform to the destination platform. We
presented our solution within the context of a detailed healthcare scenario.
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CHAPTER 6

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF ADB-BASED SOLUTION
FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATION SYSTEMS
“Learning by doing, peer-to-peer teaching, and computer simulation
are all part of the same equation”
~Nicholas Negroponte

6.1. Introduction
This chapter presents our solutions to for protecting user privacy in HISes. We use the term testbed to
refer to an emulation/simulation program used for evaluation of solutions proposed by us. The chapter
includes testbed scenarios for two designs: for the Active Data Bundle with Trusted Third Parties (ADBTTP), and for the Active Data Bundles with Multi-Agent System (ADB-MAS); design of the testbed
programs for these two testbed scenarios; and testbed results. Also, it compares the ADB-TTP with the
ADB-MAS.

6.2. Testbed Performance Evaluation for ADB-TTP
This subsection presents the testbed scenario for the ADB-TTP, testbed program design and its setup,
testbed parameters, testbed variables, testbed operation, as well as the experimental results provided by the
testbed, and their discussions.

6.2.1. Overview of the ADB-TTP Testbed Scenario: Dissemination of EHRs in HISes
We simulate the healthcare scenario for the dissemination of a patient’s EHRs among healthcare
providers, as discussed in Section 4.2. We use an ADB to disseminate a patient’s EHRs from Hospital to
Clinic. The ADB protects privacy of the EHR during the entire EHR lifecycle.
The testbed uses Java Standard Edition (JDK 1.8), and the Eclipse Integrated Development
Environment. The testbed code is publically available, as indicated in Appendix B.
Figure 6.1 shows the parties participating in our scenario:
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1) Hospital: A healthcare provider that operates the originating host, which is the home for the ADB
creation phase. Hospital includes the Hospital EHR System (HES), whose local database stores
patients’ EHRs with their metadata (for this testbed, metadata are limited to a set of privacy
policies).
2) Clinic: A healthcare provider that operates the destination host (the visited host), which receives
the ADB, and hosts the ADB enabling phase. Clinic includes the Clinic EHR System (CES), whose
local database stores patients’ EHRs with their metadata. We assume that the destination host may
be one of the following:
a) An authorized host (at the Clinic or another healthcare provider): It represents a healthcare
provider that is supposed to receive either all ADB data (when fully authorized) or portions
of ADB data (when partially authorized)—according to the trust value for the authorized host
and ADB privacy policies (ADBPP).
b) An unauthorized host (or malicious host): It represents a host that is not approved to access
ADB data. The unauthorized host interferes with an ADB either during its dissemination
among healthcare providers, or during ADB enabling at a given healthcare provider.

Figure 6.1. The testbed scenario: Hospital, Clinic, TTP, and a disseminated ADB.
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3) Trusted Third Party (TTP): It is a host trusted by both Hospital and Clinic (might be operated by
another healthcare provider, a business, or a government agency). The TTP maintains and provides
to an ADB hash values and decryption keys that are required for ADB enabling.
Figure 6.1 shows also basic interactions among parties in our scenario. They include the following
numbered steps:
1) EHR Access Request: The CES sends an access request (including CES credentials) to the HES
asking for a patient’s EHRs.
2) ADB Creation: The HES receives the CES access request and starts the ADB creation process:
2a) Creating ADB: The HES creates the ADB, i.e., the HES retrieves the patient’s H-EHRs
(Hospital EHRs)—consisting of encrypted sensitive data and metadata (privacy policies)—and
adds a VM;
2b) Saving Enabling Record: The HES sends the enabling record (ER) to the TTP for saving it
there. The ER includes ADB decryption keys, hash values, and the ADB-TVT;
2c) Saving HES-Audit File: During ADB creation, the HES records audit data of all ADB activities
in a HES-Audit File and stores it in the HES.
3) ADB Dissemination: The HES disseminates the ADB to the CES.
4) ADB Enabling: The CES receives the ADB, and starts the ADB enabling process:
4a) ADB Authenticates CES: The ADB asks the CES for its identifiers/credentials. The CES
provides its identifiers/credentials. The ADB checks them and authenticates CES. The ADB
provides the CES with the identifiers of the ADB and the TTP (ADB-ID and TTP-ID), and
computes on the fly the ADB hash value;
4b) CES Asks TTP for AC: The CES asks the TTP for the Authorization Code (AC), which is a data
structure created by the TTP including only a part of ER data, which comes in two varieties: a
positive AC and a negative AC.86 The positive AC includes the CES trust value (CES-TV), ADB
trust value threshold (ADB-TVT), and the decryption key for the ADB. The negative AC
includes only arbitrary code as a kind of indication for ADB to apoptosis (it does not include
either the CES-TV or the ADB-TVT or the decryption key for the ADB).
The AC is used to authorize CES—when it is a “positive AC,” or deny authorization of CES
—when it is a negative AC.

86

We do not want to risk all 5 pieces of ER information by sending it to ADB in one step, so instead we send only AC, a subset of ER information
(either 3 information pieces or an arbitrary code information pieces—for the positive AC and the negative AC, resp.).
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4c) TTP Sends AC to ADB: The TTP sends the AC to the ADB at the CES;
4d) ADB Authorizes CES: The ADB recognizes the AC as either positive or negative. If AC is
positive, then ADB authorizes the CES. Otherwise, ADB apoptosizes (not shown, cf.
Subsection 4.5.3);
4e) ADB Asks TTP for IVI: The ADB asks the TTP for integrity verification information (IVI). IVI
includes a hash value for the ADB sensitive data and metadata. Note that Steps 4b and 4e
cannot be combined (to reduce message overhead) because each step is sent to TTP to provide
information for specific verification;
4f) TTP Sends IVI to ADB: The TTP sends the IVI to ADB at the CES. Note that Steps 4c and 4f
cannot be combined because each step provides information to ADB in CES to support specific
ADB decision;
4g) Data Integrity Check: The ADB receives the IVI and checks the integrity of its H-EHR data
and metadata. The ADB computes the hash value of its data. Then, the ADB compares the
computed and the received hash values (included in the IVI). If both hash values are identical,
the integrity check succeeds. Otherwise, ADB apoptosizes (not shown, cf. Subsection 4.5.3);
4h) Data Reduction: The ADB enforces its privacy policies by deleting from the H-EHR all
attribute values with the required trust value above the trust value of the visited host (CES);
4i) Data Disclosure: The ADB delivers to the CES all, part, or none of the patient’s EHR data as
dictated by enforcement of the ADB privacy policies;
4j) Saving ADB-Audit File: While performing Steps 1-4i, ADB records information about its
enabling and pending termination (see the next step). In this step, the ADB sends the audit file
to the TTP.
5) ADB Termination: The ADB terminates itself.

6.2.2. Testbed Design and Setup
This subsection discusses design and setup for our testbed. It presents testbed assumptions and
specifications, ADB-TTP specifications for the testbed, testbed parameters, testbed variables, testbed
measures, testbed operations, and experimental testbed results and their discussion.

6.2.2.1. Testbed Assumptions and Specifications
This subsection discusses assumptions and specifications for our testbed.
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6.2.2.1.1. Testbed Assumptions
The assumptions for the testbed are as follows:
A1) Imperviousness to host attacks: An ADB has such a strong protection that it can visit even a host
with a trust value below the trust threshold (e.g.., a rogue host). Therefore, we do not preform a
priori verification of a host to be visited by the ADB.
A2) Authenticated messages: All messages among Clinic, Hospital, and the TTP are authenticated.
A3) Secure and trusted authorized sites and hosts: Hospital and Clinic (authorized sites) are secure
and trusted sites, and the HES and the CES (authorized hosts) are secure and trusted hosts within
these sites. This means that these sites and hosts are secure against any outside attacks that might
threaten data released by ADBs at these sites/hosts, and they are trusted within their network to
receive ADBs.
A4) Trusted TTP: The designated TTP is trusted by both Hospital and Clinic (which include the HES
and the CES, respectively). We assume that TTP can provide the CES-TV trust value to CES from
its local database, or can retrieve it from a trusted network (maintain trust values). We assume that
TTP maintains a database including trust information about healthcare providers, or can request
for information about a host, etc., from other trusted parties, such as local healthcare networks,
Trust Broker [KLYT05], or DirectTrust87 [DiTr17]. Those parties are trusted because they enforce
an effective agreement among their members in their network.
A5) Single-destination ADB dissemination: An ADB is sent via a single hop from its source (Clinic)
to its destination (Hospital). Our solution can be generalized to dissemination over multiple hops
rather easily.
A6) Access Policy Limitation: access policies use in this testbed are limited to privacy policies.
A7) XACML Privacy Policy Evaluation: In general, evaluating XACML privacy policies produces
four possible results: Permit, Deny, Indeterminate, or NotApplicable. In the ADB-TTP testbed,
we consider only Permit and Deny.

6.2.2.1.2. ADB-TTP Specifications for Testbed
This subsection presents specifications for parties involved in the testbed, namely the originating host
(HES), ADB, TTP, and the destination host (CES).

87

DirectTrust is a collaborative non-profit association supporting secure, interoperable health information exchange among healthcare provider
organizations.
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A) Originating Host (HES) Specifications for Testbed
The following specifications are used for the originating host, that is, the HES:
1) The HES uses the (simulated) ADB Creator (ADBC) software to create an ADB.
2) The HES uses a secure database for storing patients’ EHRs. We use MyPhpSQL to create a database
with records for 100 patients. The database has the following specifications:
i)

Each patient has a unique identifier such as Patient Identification (PID), National Provider
Identification (NPI), or EHR Certification Identification (EHRC-ID);

ii) Each patient has only one EHR representing her sensitive data;
iii) Each patient has one set of privacy policies (PPs) for the data, included in a metadata file,
whose location (but not contents) is stored in the same database.
3) The HES receives access requests asking for a patient’s EHR from the CES at the Clinic. Each
request includes the identifier and the credentials of the requester (the CES) as well as the patient’s
name and PID. We generate these requests by randomly selecting their values using uniform
distributions (from the set with n values), as shown in Subsection 6.2.2.2.

B) ADB Component Specifications for Testbed
The ADB components specifications include healthcare data specifications, metadata specifications,
and VM specifications, all discussed in turn.
B.1) Healthcare Data Specifications for Testbed
We use Extensible Markup Language (XML) [ExML17] to write EHRs. XML is aided by
SAX (Simple API for XML) for parsing to read, access, and modify elements and attributes in EHR files
(with an EHR file including one or multiple EHRs). SAX is supported by API developed by the XML-DEV
mailing list [SAXM17]. The XML-DEV mailing list is a public archived list supporting XML
implementations and developments [XDML17]. Figure 6.2 shows an example EHR using the proposed
XML template.
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<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<ehr id="BH13325600">
<personalInfo>
<patientId > PI-33181CRA </patientId>
<name> Fred, Smith </name>
<birthdate > 07/01/1962 </birthdate>
<driverL> S350-000-4434 </driverL>
<p_email> F.smith@domain.net </p_email>
<gender> Male </gender>
<address> 166 Horton Ave </address>
<city> Kalamazoo </city>
<state> Michigan </state>
<postCode> 49008 </postCode>
<homePhone> 333-333-3333 </homePhone>
<workPhone> 555-555-5555 </workPhone>
<status> Active </status>
<physician> Lakani, Ashok </physician>
</personalInfo>
<healthInfo>
<summaryOVisit>
Mr. Smith is 53 years-old MALE who is complaining about his breathing
for the last month. During his sleep, he feels difficult to breathe.
He also noticed that he has been getting up to the bathroom frequently,
esp. at night. Currently, he urinates 3-4 times a night.
He is not aware of any particular weight loss but he does feel
thirsty much of the time.
</summaryOVisit>
<diagnosis>
recently been diagnosed with both knees inflammation </diagnosis>
<physicianNotes >
The patient has a heart illness, diabetes, and hypertension.
</physicianNotes>
<labResults>
Glucose
H107 74-100
mg/dL,
Ca
10.1 8.6-10.2 mg/dL,
BUN
17
8-23
mg/dL,
Creatinine 0.9 0.8-1.3
mg/dL,
HGB
L7.0* 14.0-18.0 mg/dL,
HCT L21.1
42.0-52.0
41 %
</labResults>
<medicationInfo>
Lipitor 20 MG Oral Tablet,
Theophylline 100 MG Tablet,
Plavix 300 MG Oral Tablet;
</medicationInfo>
<accountInfo>
Active since 08/22/2008, referred by Dr. Jeff Peterson
</accountInfo>
</healthInfo>
<billingInfo>
<name> Smith Fred </name>
<birthdate> 07/01/1962 </birthdate>
<sSN> 888-888-8888</sSN>
<healthInsPolicyNo> JXE2346620 </healthInsPolicyNo>
<paymentType> CCard </paymentType>
<cardNumber> 0000-0000-0000-0000 </cardNumber>
<address> 166 Horton Ave </address>
<city> Kalamazoo </city>
<state> Michigan </state>
<postalCode> 49008 </postalCode>
<homePhone> 333-333-3333 </homePhone>
</billingInfo>
</ehr>

Figure 6.2. An example EHR using the proposed XML template (a copy of Figure
1.3 provided for reader convenience).
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B.2) Metadata Specifications for Testbed
Metadata includes access control policies for the ADB and its data, named Active Data Bundle Privacy
Policies (ADBPP).
The ADBPP combines a patient’s privacy policies and a healthcare provider’s (HES’s) privacy policies.
These policies govern sensitive ADB data (EHRs), and prescribe their use.
The eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML). We use XACML to specify access
Request of the visited host (CES), Response, and PolicySet (i.e., ADBPP).
XACML Access Request Example. Figure 6.3 shows an example of an access Request in the XACML
format sent from the Clinic EHR System (CES) to the Hospital EHR System (HES).
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<Request
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
xmlns:xsi="https://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-xmlschema-1-20041028"
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17
http://docs.oasis-open.org/xacml/3.0/xacml-core-v3-schema-wd-17.xsd"
ReturnPolicyIdList="false"
CombinedDecision="false">
<Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access-subject">
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id">
<AttributeValue DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data-type:rfc822Name">
mjones@ces.dh.com <!—Subject Name-->
</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Attributes>
<Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:resource">
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
SmithFred <!-- Patient Name -->
</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Attributes>
<Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:action">
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
read <!-- Access Actions-->
</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Attributes>
</Request>

Figure 6.3. An example of a CES access Request in the XACML format.

The access request indicates that the subject is Dr. Mike Jones (identified by his email name “mjones”),
who wants to access the resource identified by the name of a patient, Mr. Fred Smith (it is assumed that a
resource identified by a patient’s name is his EHR) in order to perform the read action.
Note

that

“urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17”

and

“https://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-xmlschema-1-20041028” (in Lines 3-4 of Fig. 6.3) are
declared namespaces (that is, sets of names that can be used) for XACML and XML, respectively. The
location of the XML schema is specified by “urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd131

17<newline>http://docs.oasis-open.org/xacml/3.0/xacml-core-v3-schema-wd17.xsd” (in Lines 5-6). The string “data-type:rfc822Name” indicates an email data type.

Note that neither RequestDefaults, MultiRequests, Issuer, IncludeInRsult, and Content subelements are
shown in our example (in Figure 6.3) nor used in this testbed.

XACML Response Example. Figure 6.4 shows the example of the XACML access response sends from
the Hospital EHR System (HES) to Clinic EHR System (CES).
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<Response
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
xmlns:xsi="https://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-xmlschema-1-20041028"
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17
http://docs.oasis-open.org/xacml/3.0/xacml-core-v3-schema-wd-17.xsd">
<Result>
<Decision>
Deny
</Decision>
</Result>
</Response>

Figure 6.4. An example of the XACML access Response by HES.

XACML PolicySet Example. Figure 6.5 shows as an example the XACML PolicySet named
ADBPP1. It includes four policies: Authentication Policy, Business Hours Policy, Data Reduction Policy,
and Data Disclosure Policy. We assume that all four policies are firm, i.e., if at least one does not satisfy
its rules, then the “Deny” Response is produced for the whole PolicySet (i.e., for the whole ADBPP).
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<PolicySet
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
xmlns:xsi="https://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-xmlschema-1-20041028"
PolicySetId= "ADBPP1"
Version="1.0"
PolicyCominingAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:policy-combining-algorithm:deny-unless-permit">
<Description>
ADB-TTP Privacy Policy Number 1. It includes four policies: Authentication, Business Hours,
Data Reduction and Data Disclosure
</Description>
<Target/> <!--empty-->
<Policy
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
xmlns:xsi="https://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-xmlschema-1-20041028"
PolicyId= "Authentication Policy"
Version="1.0"
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:first-applicable">
<Description>
The email of requester must match to authenticate the requester.
</Description>
<Target/> <!--empty-->
<VariableDefinition VariableId= VH-TV/>  discussed after figure
<Rule RuleId="Authentication Rule" effect= "Permit">
<Description>
This rule checks if the subject is identified by given requester’s an e-mail
</Description>
<Target>
<Anyof>
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<Allof>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:rfc822Name-match">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
mjack@ces.dh.com
</AttributeValue>
<AttributeDesignator
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access-subject"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id"
DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data-type:rfc822Name"
MustBePresent="false"/>
</Match>
</Allof>
</Anyof>
</Target>
</Rule>
</Policy>
<Policy
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
xmlns:xsi="https://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-xmlschema-1-20041028"
PolicyId= "Business Hours Policy"
Version="1.0"
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:first-applicable">
<Description>
Business Hours from 8:00 am to 4:59 pm
</Description>
<Target/> <!--empty-->
<Rule RuleId="Business Hours Rule" Effect="Permit">
<Description>
A subject is permitted to access any attribute’s value only during business hours.
</Description>
<Condition FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:function:time-in-range">
<Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:time-one-and-only">
<AttributeDesignator
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#time"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:environment:current-time"/>
</Apply>
<AttributeValue DataType=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#time >08:00:00 </AttributeValue>
<AttributeValue DataType=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#time” >4:59:00 </AttributeValue>
</Condition>
</Rule>
</Policy>
<Policy
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
xmlns:xsi="https://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-xmlschema-1-20041028"
PolicyId= "Data Reduction Policy"
Version="1.0"
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-unless-permit">
<Description>
Remove EHR data attribute value that visited host is not authorized to see
</Description>
<!--Rule for each attribute in EHR-->
<Rule RuleId="CardNumber Attribute Access" effect="Permit">
<Description>
Any subject (user in the VH) can access CardNumber only when visited host trust value
(VH-TV) >= CardNumber Attribute-TVT.
</Description>
<Condition>
<Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-greater-than-or-equal">
<VariableReference VariableId=VH-TV>
<AttributeValue DataType=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer” > 85
<AttributeValue/>
</Apply>
</Condition>
</Rule>
.
.
.
<Rule RuleId="Address Attribute Access" effect="Permit">
<Description>
Any subject (user in VH) can access Address only when VH-TV >= Address Attribute-TVT
</Description>
<Condition>
<Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-greater-than-or-equal">
<VariableReference VariableId=Address Attribute-TVT>
<AttributeValue DataType=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer” > 50 <AttributeValue/>
</Apply>
</Condition>
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</Rule>
</Policy>
<Policy
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
xmlns:xsi="https://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-xmlschema-1-20041028"
PolicyId= "Data Disclosure Policy"
Version="1.0"
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-unless-permit">
<Description>
Disclose to VH the EHR data attribute(s) that VH is authorized to keep (copy)
</Description>
<!-- Rule for each attribute in EHR -->
<Rule RuleId="CardNumber Attribute Access" effect="Permit">
<Description>
Any subject (user in the VH) can keep copy of CardNumber attribute only when VH-TV >=
CardNumber Attribute-TVT.
</Description>
<Condition>
<Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-greater-than-or-equal">
<VariableReference VariableID= CardNumber Attribute-TVT> TVT
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer" > 95
<AttributeValue/>
</Apply>
</Condition>
</Rule>
.
.
.
<Rule RuleId="Address Attribute Access" effect="Permit">
<Description>
Any subject (user in VH)can access Address only when VH-TV >= Address Attribute-TVT
</Description>
<Condition>
<Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-greater-than-or-equal">
<VariableReference VariableId= CardNumber Attribute-TVT>
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">50<AttributeValue/>
</Apply>
</Condition>
</Rule>
</Policy>
</PolicySet>

Figure 6.5. An example of the proposed XACML ADBPP1 PolicySet.

The Data Reduction and Data Disclosure Policies include multiple rules, one for each EHR attribute).
For example, the first rule of the Data Reduction Policy, named CardNumber Attribute Access, The last
rule of this policy, named Address Attribute Access,
If the decision of a policy is “Permit,” then at least one rule of the policy returns “Permit.” This means
a Condition for this rule returned “True.” For example, if the VH-TV = 85 (the VariableId attribute for the
VariableReference subelement in the CardNumber Attribute Access rule in the Data Reduction Policy),
then VH-TV >= 85 (the DataType attribute for AttributeValue subelement). So, the Condition for the rule
returns “True” which means the rule returns “Permit.” Then the Policy returns “Permit.” In this case all or
some EHR attributes are available for access by the destination host depending on how many rules were
satisfied (namely, all attributes which match any satisfied attribute are available). Otherwise (if the decision
of a policy is “Deny”), none of the rules of the policy were satisfied (i.e., all rules returned “False”). In this
case no EHR attributes are available for access by the destination host.
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Table 6.1 shows the truth table for the ADBPP PolicySet used in our testbed.
Table 6.1. The Truth Table for the ADBPP PolicySet.
Authentication
Policy

Business
Hour

Data Reduction
Policy

Data Disclosure
Policy

Final PolicySet
Decision

Permit
Permit
Permit
Permit
Deny

Permit
Permit
Permit
Deny
Don’t care

Permit
Permit
Deny
Don’t care
Don’t care

Permit
Deny
Don’t care
Don’t care
Don’t care

Permit
Deny
Deny
Deny
Deny

As shown, PEP produces “Permit” for the ADBPP only when all its policies return “Permit.” Note that
we use Deny-unless-permit as PolicyCominingAlgId and both First-applicable and Deny-unless-permit as
RuleCombiningAlgId as shown in Figure 6.4. Deny-unless-permit means if the decision is “Permit,” the
result of Policy or Rule is “Permit”. Otherwise, the result of Policy or Rule is “Deny”. First-applicable
means the Policy or Rule result is the result of the first one (i.e., Policy or Rule) that produces either of
“Permit” or “Deny”.
Then in PEP, the rules of data reduction policy that return “Deny”, then their EHR attributes are assigned
to be evaporated (by ADB’ VM) from the EHR; otherwise (i.e., rules return “Permit”), no action is needed.
Similarly, the rules of data disclosure policy that return “Deny”, then their EHR attribute values are assigned
to be undisclosed to the destination host; otherwise (i.e., rules return “Permit”), the rules’ attributes would
be disclosed to the destination host.

XACML Implementation Selected for Testbed. There are several non-commercial and commercial
implementations of XACML using different programming languages. The former include a few Java-based
implementations: enterprise-java-xacml [EJXI15], Balana [BaXI15], SunXACML [SuXI15], and AT&T
XACML [AtXI15]; as well as a Python-based implementation ndg-xacml [NDXP15]. Commercial
implementations include Axiomatics Policy Server [AxPS16] and BiTKOO [AxPS15].
In our testbed, we simulate the policy enforcement using the enterprise-java-xacml, the XML
serialization and configuration framework named Simple (simpleframework.xml) [SiXM15], and an XML
parsing algorithm SAX (Simple API for XML) [PaXM15].
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B.3) VM Specifications for Testbed
The ADB VM is an executable code included in the ADB and responsible for performing all ADB
operations during ADB enabling, as we previously discussed in Section 4.4.
In this testbed, we used Nested VMs [Virt15] in ADBs instead of using a single VM. Our nested VM
includes two levels: External VM (eVM) and Internal VM (iVM). The eVM is responsible for authenticating
and authorizing the CES during ADB enabling in the CES (cf. 1 and 2 in Subsection 4.4.3). The iVM is
responsible for checking the integrity of ADB data and enforcing ADBPP (cf. 3 and 4 in Subsection 4.4.3).

C) TTP Specifications for Testbed
Trusted Third Party (TTP) represents a stationary party acting as a secure mediator among HES, ADB,
and CES. TTP has the following specifications:
1) The TTP able to exchange requests with HES, ADB, and CES.
The TTP verifies all received requests and responds accordingly.
2) TTP uses MAC to secure its communications with HES, ADB, and CES.

3) The TTP retrieves the CES trust value (CES-TV) through Trust Verification Services of the TPP.
TTP is an arbitrary host that assigned a trust value for CES (CES-TV) in the range [0-99].
4) TTP checks the integrity of ADBs and TTP provides required keys and hashes to ADB during ADB
enabling in the CES.

D) Destination Host (CES) Specifications for Testbed
The destination host CES receives and hosts the ADB.
The CES has the following specifications:
1) During ADB enabling (i.e., during ADB authentication and ADB authorization activities), CES
must respond to ADB within a certain timeout period specified by ADB. If the CES does not
respond to ADB within the timeout period, the eVM apoptosizes the entire ADB.
2) CES forwards ADB audit files to TTP during ADB enabling. All auditing files sent from the
ADB to the TTP (through CES) are protected during transmission using MAC .
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6.2.2.2. Testbed Parameters
The testbed parameters listed according to the order of ADB-TTP operations appear in the testbed
scenario. Table 6.2 lists and describes the testbed parameters.
Table 6.2. Testbed Parameters.
No

Parameter

Type and Value

Value

Description

Input Parameters for EHR Access Request
1

CES National Provider

Integer

Arbitrary

Identifier (CES-NPI)
2

HES National Provider

identifier of the CES.
Integer

Arbitrary

Identifier (HES-NPI)
3

Patient Name

Simulates a unique

Simulates a unique
identifier of the HES.

String

Arbitrary

Simulates a patient’s
last name and first
name.

4

Date and Time

Integer

Consecutive

Simulates time and

integers starting

data information

with 0

recorded by system
immediately after each
action.

5

TTP Candidates List

List of strings

Arbitrary

Simulates a TTP list
includes TTP
candidates selected by
CES.

Input Parameters for ADB Creation
6

Patient Identifier (PID)

Integer

Arbitrary

Simulates a unique
identifier of a patient.

7

Electronic Health Record

Text file

(EHR)

Arbitrary (for

Simulates an XML file

testbed contents

including patient’s

does not matter)

personal, health, and
billing data.

8

EHR Certificate Identifier

Integer

Arbitrary

Simulates a unique
identifier of a patient’s

(EHRC-ID)

EHRC. We used 100
EHRC-IDs.
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9

ADB Identifier (ADB-ID)

Integer

0, 1, 2, …

Simulates a unique
identifier of an ADB
generated by the ADB
Creator (ADBC).

10

Encryption/Decryption Keys

String including

Arbitrary (for

Simulates 2 pairs

hex (a

testbed contents

(First and Second)

hexadecimal

does not matter)

encryption and

number)

decryption keys
generated by the
ADBC.

11

Hash Value (HV)

Integer

Arbitrary

Simulates a hash value
used to check the
integrity of an ADB or
its data during ADB
Enabling in CES.

12

TTP Identifier (TTP-ID)

Integer

Arbitrary selected

Simulates a unique

from TTP

identifier of a TTP.

Reference List in
the Access
Request
Input Parameters for ADB Enabling
13

Authorization Code (AC)

Array of String

(CES-TV, ADB-

Simulates an array

TVT, Second

includes (CES-TV,

Decryption key)

ADB-TVT, and
Second Decryption
key) generated by the
TTP and it is either a
positive or a negative
code. Positive AC
includes the actual
values of these
variables. Negative
AV arbitrary code ( we
used [1234]). See Item
2c in Subsection 4.4.3.
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Other Testbed Parameters
14

Enabling Record (ER)

Array of String

[two private

Simulates an array

including hex

decryption Keys,

includes (first private

two hash values,

decryption key, second

and ADB trust

private decryption key,

value threshold]

first hash value,
second hash value, and
ADB trust value
threshold) generated
by the ADB Creator
(ADBC) and it is
either a positive or a
negative code (cf.
Subsection 4.4.1).

15

Number of Iterations

Integer

10,000

An iteration consists
of sending one ADB
from the HES to the
CES.

16

Iteration Group Size

Integer

500

Number of iterations
in Iteration Group.

Notes for Subsection 6.2.2.2:
1) A single testbed iteration represents a full single lifecycle of an ADB, i.e., an ADB creation, an
ADB dissemination, an ADB enabling, and an ADB termination. The iterations of the testbed are
repeated with different parameter values.
2) In the testbed, we send 500 ADBs (iteration group) from HES to CES sequentially. We run the
testbed for 20 iteration groups. So, the total testbed iteration is 10,000 iterations.
3) In HES, we used a secure database that includes 100 Patients using MyPhPSQL. The patient’s
name is the primary key to retrieve unique PID of the patient and her EHRs location. Also, the CES
maintains a local database to store local patient’s EHRs and other associated information.
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6.2.2.3. Testbed Variables
The testbed variables listed according to the order of operations as listed in the ADB-TTP testbed
scenario. Table 6.3 lists and describes the testbed variables.
Table 6.3 Testbed Variables.
Random Variables

Value Range

Distribution

Description

Random Variables for Testbed
1

ADB Trust Value Threshold

[50-99]

(ADB-TVT)

Uniform

Simulates the

distribution

minimum trust value
that the CES (or
another host) must
possess to access
ADB.

2

ADB Privacy Policy

[1-9]

(ADBPP)

Uniform

Simulates an XACML

distribution

file that includes set of
policies.

3

CES Trust Value (CES-TV)

[0-99]

Uniform
Distribution

Simulates

the

trust

value of the CES.

Notes for Subsection 6.2.2.3:
1) Each patient has one EHR with an associated privacy policy PP. This EHR and PP are embedded
in a single ADB.
2) The TTP provides the CES Trust Value (CES-TV).

6.2.2.4. Testbed Measures
We track all important activities during ADB creation and ADB enabling. Table 6.4 lists and describes
the measures we use in the ADB-TTP testbed.
Table 6.4. Testbed Measures.

1A

Measure

Description

Rates (percentage) of different

1) Count the total number of ADB noop, evaporation by ADB,

ADB data reduction types

and ADB apoptosis by ADB for all testbed iterations,

(ADB noop, ADB
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evaporation, and ADB

1B

2A

2) Compute the percentage of ADB noop, evaporation by ADB,

apoptosis) for the whole

and apoptosis by ADB in all testbed iterations (the 3 values

testbed

add to 100%).

Rates of different ADB data

1) Count the number of full ADB data disclosure, partial ADB

disclosure types (full ADB

data disclosure, and null ADB data disclosure for all testbed

data disclosure, partial ADB

iterations,

data disclosure, and null ADB

2) Compute the percentage of full ADB data disclosure, partial

data disclosure) for the whole

ADB data disclosure, and null ADB data disclosure in all

testbed

testbed iterations (the 3 values add to 100%).

Rates of ADB apoptosis for
different verification
mechanisms (authentication,

1) Count the total number of ADB apoptosis for all testbed
iterations,
2) Compute the number ADB apoptosis caused by each

authorization, ADB integrity,

verification mechanisms separately (i.e., authentication,

and data integrity) for the

authorization, ADB integrity, and data integrity),

whole testbed.

3) Compute the percentage of ADB apoptosis cause by each
verification mechanisms (the 4 values add to 100%).

3A

The average of ADB data
reduction ratio, average of
data disclosure ratio, average
of ADB-TVT, and an average

1) Compute the averages of data reduction ratios, data disclosure
ratios, ADB-TVTs, CES-TVs for each ADBPP,
2) Compute the standard deviation for each average computed in
step 1.

of CES-TV per ADBPP for
the whole testbed

4A

The number of ADB
apoptoses per a single testbed

4B

1) Collect the number of ADB apoptosis for each iterations
group. Each iteration group includes 500 iterations,

iteration group (group plot).

2) Repeat step (1) for 20 iteration groups.

The number of ADB

1) Collect the number of ADB apoptosis for iteration group (i.e.,

apoptoses and average value
of CES-TV per a single
testbed iteration group (group

20 iteration groups),
2) Compute the average of all values of CES-TVs in each
iteration group.

plot).

5A

The number of ADB
evaporations per a single

1) Collect the number of ADB evaporations for each iteration
group,
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testbed iteration group (group

2) Repeat step (1) for 20 iteration groups.

plot).
5B

The number of ADB
evaporations per average
value of CES-TV per a single
testbed iteration group (group

1) Collect the number of ADB evaporations count for each
iteration group (20 iteration groups),
2) Compute the average of all values of CES-TVs for each
iteration group.

plot).

6A

The number of ADB
disclosures per a single
testbed iteration group (group

1) Collect the number of ADB disclosures count for each
iteration group,
2) Repeat Step (1) for 20 iteration groups.

plot).
6B

The number of ADB
disclosures per average of
CES-TV per a single testbed
iteration group (group plot).

7A

The average of ADB data
evaporation ratio per a single
testbed iteration group
(group plot).

1) Collect the ADB disclosures count for each iteration group
(20 iteration group),
2) Compute the average of all values of CES-TVs for each
iteration group.

1) Compute average of ADB data evaporation ratios for each
iteration group,
2) Compute the standard deviation for ADB data evaporation
ratios for each iteration group,
3) Repeat steps (1 and 2) for 20 iteration groups.

7B

The average of ADB data
evaporation ratio per average

1) Compute average of ADB data evaporation ratios for each
iteration group,

of CES-TV per a single

2) Compute average of CES-TV for each iteration group,

testbed iteration group (group

3) Repeat steps (1 and 2) for 20 groups.

plot).

8A

The average of ADB data
disclosure ratio per a single
testbed iteration group (group

1) Compute average of ADB data disclosure ratio for each
iteration group,
2) Repeat step (1) for all 20 iteration groups.

plot).
8B

The average of ADB data
disclosure ratio per average of
CES-TV for TV per a single

1) Compute the average of ADB data disclosure ratios for each
iteration group,
2) Compute average of CES-TV for each iteration group,
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Table 6.4 —Continued
testbed iteration group (group

3) Repeat steps (1 and 2) for all groups 20 iteration groups.

plot).

9A

The number of

1) Compute the number of ADB disclosures (which refers to

successful/unsuccessful ADB

number of successful ADB data delivery) for each iteration

data deliveries per testbed

group,

iterations group (group plot).

2) Unsuccessful ADB data delivery count = iteration in each
group (i.e., 500) – number of successful ADB data delivery.

6.2.2.5. Detailed Testbed Scenario and Implementation
We use Java Standard Edition to design and execute the ADB operations in this testbed. The code was
executed in the Eclipse Integrated Development Environment Version: Neon.2 Release (4.6.2).
In the testbed, the Application is Java class (included in ADB application package) generates an CES
access request (CES-AR). We assume the Clinic EHR system (CES) in destination host (DH) sends AR to
the Hospital EHR system (HES) in originating host (OH). In the HES, the ADB creation starts. The ADB
is an object that created by HES at the OH and then moved to the CES at the DH. The CES is created and
initiated according to the information included in the CES-AR received by the HES. The TTP is initiated
during ADB creation.

6.2.2.5.1. ADB Creation
After receiving an access request from CES, ADBC in the HES, creates an ADB.
The ADB Creator (ADBC) is a Java class that uses the ADB creation package, which includes four
classes: eVM class, iVM class, metadata class, and data class.
The ADB components (i.e., sensitive data, metadata, and VMs) are implemented using inherited and
nested java classes as shown in Figure 6.6. The inheritance structure of classes as follows: the iVM class
includes metadata class and data class. Metadata class includes ADBPP while data class includes the HEHR (sensitive data). The eVM class extends the iVM class. We establish an inheritance relationship
between eVM class and iVM class to take advantage of dynamic binding and polymorphism that made the
code easier to change and address the structure of ADB.
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eVM class
extends

iVM class
extends

Metadata class (ADBPP)
Data class (H-EHR)

Figure 6.6. The inheritance of ADB classes.
In the following text every named action is simulated. For example, “builds” in the next sentence
actually means “simulates/emulates building.”
The ADBC builds an ADB as follows:
1) Collect a copy of the patient’s H-EHR and the associated ADBPP from HES-DB.
2) The ADBC generates two asymmetric encryption/decryption key pairs using the Java Security
(java.security) package.
3) The ADBC encrypts the H-EHR and the metadata using the first generated encryption key and the
Java Cryptography (javax.crypto) package.
4) The ADBC computes a hash value for the H-EHR and the metadata together using the standard
Java hash function in (java.lang.object) library.
5) The ADBC bundles together the data class (H-EHR), the metadata class (ADBPP), and the iVM
by creating an instance of iVM class. Note that iVM class includes metadata class and data class.
6) The ADBC encrypts the whole ADB using the second generated encryption key and the Java
Cryptography (javax.crypto) package. Note that we did not encrypt the actual iVM class including
its subclasses (metadata and data). Instead, we encrypt its subclass contents (ADBPP and H-EHR)
again using the second encryption key. We make such adjustment since we fail to find a way to
simulate encryption/decryption of Java classes within runtime.
7) The ADBC computes a hash value for the encrypted whole ADB using the standard Java hash
function in (java.lang.object) library.
8) The ADBC bundles together all ADB components (the data class (H-EHR), the metadata class
(ADBPP), the iVM class, and the eVM class) by creating an instance of eVM class. Note that iVM
is a subclass of eVM.
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9) The ADBC sends the ADB enabling message (including the ADB identifier, the ADB-TVT, two
decryption keys, and two hash values) to the designated TTP.

6.2.2.5.2. ADB Dissemination
The ADBC disseminates the ADB to the CES. We used the Java Object Marshalling/Unmarshalling
method to simulate sending of ADB from HES to the CES (which is either FCES, PCES, or MS).

6.2.2.5.3. ADB Enabling
ADB enabling starts when the ADB reaches the CES. The ADB includes different Java methods that
perform activities listed in the Subsection 4.4.3.
ADB enabling include four group of activities (again, all of them are simulated despite the phrasing
suggesting actual execution of the activities):
1) ADB Authentication Activities
ADB eVM initiates the CES authentication process by asking for a few credentials to authenticate
the CES on the destination host. We use a Java function written by me to compare unique identifiers
(PID, CES-NPI, and EHRC-ID) provided by the CES with the identifiers included in ADB metadata
(as a static constant in data class). If the CES authentication by the eVM fails, then the eVM
apoptosizes its entire ADB using Java garbage collector method, and ends ADB enabling using
Java system exit method (java.lang.system.exit) library. Otherwise, we proceed to authorization
activities.

2) ADB Authorization Activities
ADB eVM initiates the CES authorization activities. These activities involve the eVM, the CES,
and the TTP as follows:
a) The eVM provides the identifiers (ADB-ID and TTP-ID) to the CES. Also, eVM calculates
ADB hash value using standard Java hash function in (java.lang.object) library and provides it
to the CES. We used an instance of a Java LinkedList class that includes ADB-ID, TTP-ID, and
ADB hash value.
b) The CES forwards these identifiers including its identifier (CES-ID) to request the authorization
code (AC) from the TTP. We update the instance of the Java LinkedList from the last step by
adding CES-ID.
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c) The TTP verifies whether the request identified by (ADB-ID and CES-ID) is in the in TTP
database using a Java local function written by me, and responds by sending the AC to the CES
(cf. Item 2c in Subsection 4.4.3 for explanation how TTP uses ADB-ID, CES-ID, and ADB hash
value to issue AC).
d) The CES provides the AC to the eVM. The AC is an instance of Java LinkedList class that can
be either negative or positive. A negative AC includes an arbitrary code while a positive AC
includes CES-TV, ADB-TVT, and the second private decryption key for the ADB.
e) The eVM checks the AC. If the AC is negative, the eVM apoptosizes the entire ADB using Java
garbage collector method and ends the ADB enabling using Java system exit method
(java.lang.system.exit).
f) The eVM checks the CES-TV (included in positive AC).
g) If CES-TV ≥ ADB-TVT for this ADB, then eVM decrypts ADB using the second private
decryption key and the Java Cryptography (javax.crypto) package. Otherwise, eVM apoptosizes
the entire ADB using Java garbage collector method and ends the ADB enabling using Java
system exit method (java.lang.system.exit).
3) ADB Integrity Verification Activities
At this point the ADB is decrypted, and the ADB iVM initiates integrity verification activities.
These activities involve the iVM, and the TTP as follows:
a) The iVM sends an integrity verification request to TTP asking for integrity verification
information (IVI), and computes the hash value for H-EHR and metadata,
b) The TTP receives the request and sends the IVI to iVM. The IVI includes the hash value for HEHR and metadata jointly, and the ADB first private decryption key.
c) The iVM compares the locally computed and the received hash values for ADB H-EHR and
metadata. If the integrity check is a failure (i.e., both hash values are not identical), iVM
apoptosizes the entire ADB using Java garbage collector method, and ends the ADB enabling
using Java system exit method (java.lang.system.exit). Otherwise, iVM decrypts ADB sensitive
data and metadata using the first private decryption key and the Java Cryptography
(javax.crypto) package.
4) ADB Trust and Policy Enforcement Activities
ADB iVM reads the ADBPP), retrieves privacy rules, and applies them to the patient H-EHR (a
simulated XML file). We use SAX (Simple API for XML) to parse and read the ADBPP.
For examples below we use the original EHR shown in Figure 6.7.
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<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<ehr id="BH13325600">
<personalInfo>
<patientId > PI-33181CRA </patientId>
<name> Smith, Fred </name>
<birthdate > 07/01/1962 </birthdate>
<driverL> S350-000-4434 </driverL>
<p_email> fsmith@domain.net </p_email>
<gender> Male </gender>
<address> 166 Horton Ave </address>
<city> Kalamazoo </city>
<state> Michigan </state>
<postCode> 49008 </postCode>
<homePhone> 333-333-3333 </homePhone>
<workPhone> 555-555-5555 </workPhone>
<status> Active </status>
<physician> Lakani, Ashok </physician>
</personalInfo>
<healthInfo>
<summaryOVisit>
Mr. Smith is 53 years-old MALE who is complaining about his breathing
for the last month. During his sleep, he feels difficult to breathe.
He also noticed that he has been getting up to the bathroom frequently,
esp. at night. Currently, he urinates 3-4 times a night.
He is not aware of any particular weight loss but he feels thirsty much
of the time.
</summaryOVisit>
<diagnosis>
recently been diagnosed with both knees inflammation </diagnosis>
<physicianNotes >
The patient has a heart illness, diabetes, and hypertension.
</physicianNotes>
<labResults>
Glucose
H107 74-100
mg/dL,
Ca
10.1 8.6-10.2 mg/dL,
BUN
17
8-23
mg/dL,
Creatinine 0.9 0.8-1.3
mg/dL,
HGB
L7.0* 14.0-18.0 mg/dL,
HCT L21.1
42.0-52.0
41 %
</labResults>
<medicationInfo>
Lipitor 20 MG Oral Tablet,
Theophylline 100 MG Tablet,
Plavix 300 MG Oral Tablet;
</medicationInfo>
<accountInfo>
Active since 08/22/2008, referred by Dr. Jeff Peterson
</accountInfo>
</healthInfo>
<billingInfo>
<name> Smith, Fred </name>
<birthdate> 07/01/1962 </birthdate>
<sSN> 888-888-8888</sSN>
<healthInsPolicyNo> JXE2346620 </healthInsPolicyNo>
<paymentType> CCard </paymentType>
<cardNumber> 0000-0000-0000-0000 </cardNumber>
<address> 166 Horton Ave </address>
<city> Kalamazoo </city>
<state> Michigan </state>
<postalCode> 49008 </postalCode>
<homePhone> 333-333-3333 </homePhone>
</billingInfo>
</ehr>

Figure 6.7. An example of the H-EHR. (Copy of Figure 1.3 provided for
readers’ convenience).
The ADB policy enforcement activities are as follows:
a) Data reduction
During data reduction one of the following actions is performed:
i)

Noop (No reduction)
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If CES-TV ≥ ADB-TVT for each attribute in the H-EHR, then no data reduction is needed.
ADB H-EHR remains unchanged. Figure 6.8 shows that the H-EHR after Noop is the same
as before Noop.
<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<ehr id="BH13325600">
<personalInfo>
<patientId > PI-33181CRA </patientId>
<name> Smith, Fred </name>
<birthdate > 07/01/1962 </birthdate>
<driverL> S350-000-4434 </driverL>
<p_email> fsmith@domain.net </p_email>
<gender> Male </gender>
<address> 166 Horton Ave </address>
<city> Kalamazoo </city>
<state> Michigan </state>
<postCode> 49008 </postCode>
<homePhone> 333-333-3333 </homePhone>
<workPhone> 555-555-5555 </workPhone>
<status> Active </status>
<physician> Lakani, Ashok </physician>
</personalInfo>
<healthInfo>
<summaryOVisit>
Mr. Smith is 53 years-old MALE who is complaining about his breathing
for the last month. During his sleep, he feels difficult to breathe.
He also noticed that he has been getting up to the bathroom frequently,
esp. at night. Currently, he urinates 3-4 times a night.
He is not aware of any particular weight loss but he feels thirsty much
of the time.
</summaryOVisit>
<diagnosis>
recently been diagnosed with both knees inflammation </diagnosis>
<physicianNotes >
The patient has a heart illness, diabetes, and hypertension.
</physicianNotes>
<labResults>
Glucose
H107 74-100
mg/dL,
Ca
10.1 8.6-10.2 mg/dL,
BUN
17
8-23
mg/dL,
Creatinine 0.9 0.8-1.3
mg/dL,
HGB
L7.0* 14.0-18.0 mg/dL,
HCT L21.1
42.0-52.0
41 %
</labResults>
<medicationInfo>
Lipitor 20 MG Oral Tablet,
Theophylline 100 MG Tablet,
Plavix 300 MG Oral Tablet;
</medicationInfo>
<accountInfo>
Active since 08/22/2008, referred by Dr. Jeff Peterson
</accountInfo>
</healthInfo>
<billingInfo>
<name> Smith, Fred </name>
<birthdate> 07/01/1962 </birthdate>
<sSN> 888-888-8888</sSN>
<healthInsPolicyNo> JXE2346620 </healthInsPolicyNo>
<paymentType> CCard </paymentType>
<cardNumber> 0000-0000-0000-0000 </cardNumber>
<address> 166 Horton Ave </address>
<city> Kalamazoo </city>
<state> Michigan </state>
<postalCode> 49008 </postalCode>
<homePhone> 333-333-3333 </homePhone>
</billingInfo>
</ehr>

Figure 6.8. An example of the H-EHR after ADB noop (the same as Figure
6.7).
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ii) Evaporation
If CES-TV < ADB-TVT, iVM evaporates (destroys in an irretrievable way) all ADB HEHR attributes with the required trust value above CES-TV; so, only less sensitive data
remain. We parse H-EHRs and remove attribute values that the CES is unauthorized to see.
Figure 6.9 shows the H-EHR after the evaporation.
<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<ehr id="BH13325600">
<personalInfo>
<patientId > --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </patientId>
<name> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </name>
<birthdate > 07/01/1962 </birthdate>
<driverL> S350-000-4434 </driverL>
<p_email> fsmith@domain.net </p_email>
<gender> Male </gender>
<address> 166 Horton Ave </address>
<city> Kalamazoo </city>
<state> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </state>
<postCode> 49008 </postCode>
<homePhone> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </homePhone>
<workPhone> 555-555-5555 </workPhone>
<status> Active </status>
<physician> Lakani, Ashok </physician>
</personalInfo>
<healthInfo>
<summaryOVisit> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </summaryOVisit>
<diagnosis>
recently been diagnosed with both knees inflammation </diagnosis>
<physicianNotes > --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </physicianNotes>
<labResults> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </labResults>
<medicationInfo> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </medicationInfo>
<accountInfo>
Active since 08/22/2008, referred by Dr. Jeff Peterson
</accountInfo>
</healthInfo>
<billingInfo>
<name> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </name>
<birthdate> 07/01/1962 </birthdate>
<sSN> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </sSN>
<healthInsPolicyNo> JXE2346620 </healthInsPolicyNo>
<paymentType> CCard </paymentType>
<cardNumber> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </cardNumber>
<address> 166 Horton Ave </address>
<city> Kalamazoo </city>
<state> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </state>
<postalCode> 49008 </postalCode>
<homePhone> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </homePhone>
</billingInfo>
</ehr>

Figure 6.9. An example of patient’s H-EHR after data reduction (data
evaporation), evaporated attribute values are highlighted in blue.

iii) Apoptosis
In this case, the iVM irretrievably self-destroys the ADB completely (including its data,
metadata, and itself). The whole H-EHR vanishes.
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b) Data Disclosure
After data reduction that ended with Noop or Evaporation, the iVM performs one of the
following data disclosures:
i)

Full H-EHR Disclosure
All attribute values of the patient’s H-EHR that remained after data reduction are disclosed
to the CES. Note that these might be: (i) all original H-EHR data (when iVM performed
the Noop data reduction), or (ii) some of the H-EHR data (when iVM performed
Evaporation). Assuming that data reduction ended with evaporation, the full H-EHR
disclosure results in the H-EHR presented to the CES as shown in Figure 6.9.

ii) Partial H-EHR Disclosure
As determined by the ADBPP policy, some (not all) attribute values of the patient’s HEHR that remained after data reduction are disclosed to the CES. Assuming that data
reduction ended with evaporation, Figure 6.10 shows an example for a partial H-EHR
disclosure.
iii) Null ADB H-EHR
As determined by the ADBPP policy, the whole patient’s H-EHR is destroyed by apoptosis.
This prevents the CES from accessing any attribute values of the patient’s H-EHR that
remained after data reduction.
Recall that the CES that gets output (either from the full or partial data disclosure) could be a fully
authorized CES (FCES) as shown in Figure 6.11, a partially authorized CES (PCES) as shown in
Figure 6.12, or a malicious host (MH) as shown in Figure 6.13 (cf. Subsection 4.5.3 for more details).
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<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<ehr id="BH13325600">
<personalInfo>
<patientId > --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </patientId>
<name> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </name>
<birthdate > --INFORMATION WITHHELD--</birthdate>
<driverL> S350-000-4434 </driverL>
<p_email> --INFORMATION WITHHELD-- </p_email>
<gender> Male </gender>
<address> --INFORMATION WITHHELD-- </address>
<city> --INFORMATION WITHHELD-- </city>
<state> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </state>
<postCode> --INFORMATION WITHHELD-- </postCode>
<homePhone> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </homePhone>
<workPhone> 555-555-5555 </workPhone>
<status> Active </status>
<physician> Lakani, Ashok </physician>
</personalInfo>
<healthInfo>
<summaryOVisit> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </summaryOVisit>
<diagnosis> --INFORMATION WITHHELD-- </diagnosis>
<physicianNotes > --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </physicianNotes>
<labResults> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </labResults>
<medicationInfo> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </medicationInfo>
<accountInfo>
Active since 08/22/2008, referred by Dr. Jeff Peterson
</accountInfo>
</healthInfo>
<billingInfo>
<name> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </name>
<birthdate> --INFORMATION WITHHELD-- </birthdate>
<sSN> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </sSN>
<healthInsPolicyNo> JXE2346620 </healthInsPolicyNo>
<paymentType> CCard </paymentType>
<cardNumber> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </cardNumber>
<address> --INFORMATION WITHHELD-- </address>
<city> --INFORMATION WITHHELD-- </city>
<state> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </state>
<postalCode> --INFORMATION WITHHELD-- </postalCode>
<homePhone> --INFORMATION EVAPORATED-- </homePhone>
</billingInfo>
</ehr>

Figure 6.10. An example of partial H-EHRs disclosure, withheld attributes are
highlighted in yellow.
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Figure 6.11. The details of interactions when ADB is sent to FCES in the absence of an
attack. (Copy of Figure 4.10 provided for reader’s convenience).

Figure 6.12. The details of interactions during ADB lifecycle when ADB is sent to PCES
in the absence of an attack. (Copy of Figure 4.11 provided for reader convenience).
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Figure 6.13. The detailed of interactions during ADB lifecycle when ADB is sent to
FCES/PCES in the presence of an attack. (Copy of Figure 4.12 provided for reader
convenience).

6.2.2.5.4. ADB Auditing
ADB auditing records all ADB activities during ADB creation, ADB enabling, ADB dissemination,
and ADB termination. Note that ADB dissemination and ADB termination activities are recorded before
their actual happening during ADB creation and ADB enabling, respectively. ADB auditing is
accomplished through the indicated subsystems as follows:
1) At the HES, the HES audit subsystem records and stores audit data in HES-Audit File during ADB
creation at HES. We use a local Java function that collects log messages and saves them
sequentially in HES-Audit File. Note that HES-Audit File is protected at HES by data encryption.
2) This and all following steps are performed at the CES. During eVM execution, the eVM audit
subsystem records and stores audit data in an eVM-Audit File in the eVM data area. We use a local
Java function that collects log messages and saves them sequentially in an eVM-Audit File. Note
that eVM-Audit File is protected at eVM by encrypted Blockchain list [Bloc17].
3) During iVM execution, the iVM audit subsystem records and stores audit data in an iVM-Audit File
in the ADB metadata. We use a local Java function that collects log messages and stores them
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sequentially in iVM-Audit File. Note that iVM-Audit File is protected at iVM by encrypted
Blockchain list [Bloc17].
4) The eVM audit subsystem sends the eVM-Audit file to TTP before ADB apoptosis by eVM or at
the end of eVM activities (i.e., after eVM decrypts ADB).
5) The iVM audit subsystem sends the iVM-Audit file to TTP before ADB apoptosis by iVM, or at the
end of iVM activities (i.e., when H-EHR is disclosed by iVM to the CES).
6) After receiving audit files from ADB, the TTP sends the audit files to the HES. The HES updates
its audit database with audit files for a given ADB and uses this information for further ADB
dissemination. For example, if the HES notices that an ADB is apoptosized at the CES, the
originating host may remove this CES from its future HES dissemination list.
Each audit file includes date, time, ADB operations (creation or enabling), party name (CES1, CES2,
etc.), action (apoptosis, evaporation, etc.), and status (end of creation or end of enabling). Note that audit
subsystems record audit data for action before it takes place to make sure that each record refers to the next
process even if it does not complete due special circumstances like system crash or failure.

6.2.2.5.5. ADB Terminating
In the testbed, we use the immediate ADB Apoptosis, during which iVM apoptosizes the entire ADB
(after delivering the H-EHR to the CES). We did not implement Schedule ADB termination.

6.2.3. The Experimental Results and Discussion
The goal of this testbed is to demonstrate the ADB solution to protect user’s privacy in HIS. The
proposed solution protects sensitive information included in the patient’s EHR that disseminated between
healthcare providers.
The testbed follows the testbed scenario shown in Figure 6.1 at the beginning of this chapter.
We assume the trust value (either for ADB or CES) is an integer in the range of [0-99]. Also, we assume
that any CES-TV value < 50 consider low trust value, and any value >=50 consider high/acceptable value.
We produce results according to the following categories:
Case A) When ADB-TVT = 50, i.e., ADB-TVT has a fixed value.
Case B) When 50 < ADB-TVT ≤ 99, i.e., we simulate ADB-TVT values using uniform distribution
within the range [51-99].
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In this testbed, we exclude all cases when SdA-TVT < 50 because we consider them low values. We
examine ADBs with SdA-TVT +- 50.

6.2.3.1. ADB Data Reduction and ADB Data Disclosure
ADB data reduction means that ADB deletes from the patient’s EHR (H-EHR) all attributes with the
required trust value above the trust value of the CES according to the ADB privacy policies. ADB data
disclosure means ADB delivers to the CES all, part, or none of the H-EHR data according to the ADB
privacy policies.
The results of both ADB Data reduction and ADB Data Disclosure categorize as follows:
1) Rate for ADB Data Reduction Types and ADB Data Disclosure Types

Rares for ADB Data Reduction Types and ADB
Data Disclosure Types
100

84.27%

Rate

80
60
40
20

10.66%

6.14%4.52%

5.07% 4.54%

0

0.53%

0%

0%

ADB Noop
Evaporation by ADB Apoptosis by ADB
Total
Partial Disclosure
Full Disclosure
ADB-TVT= 50; ADBPP= Uniform in [1-9]; CES-TV= Uniform in [0-99];
Iterations =10,000

Figure 6.14. Rates of ADB data reduction types and ADB data
disclosure types for all testbed iterations.

Figure 6.14 shows rates of ADB data reduction types and ADB data disclosure types for the Case
A. We can see that the total rate of noop (10.66%) includes partial ADB Data (6.14%) and Full
ADB Data (4.52%). That means (6.14 %) from the total iterations results in partially disclosed EHR
to the CES (i.e., PCES), and a (4.52%) of total noop data results in fully disclosed to the CES (i.e.,
FCES). That is, a (4.52 %) of all ADBs are delivered the original ADB H-EHR (same as at its
creation in the HES) successfully to the FCES. Also, we can see that the total of evaporation by
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ADB (5.07%) includes (4.54%) partially disclosure (after evaporating ADB H-EHR, the iVM
discloses some of remaining H-EHR to PCES), and (0.53%) full disclosure (after evaporation ADB
H-EHR, the iVM disclosed all the remaining H-EHR to FCES).
The rate of apoptosis by ADB is larger than the noop and evaporation rates.
As we expected, the large rate of apoptosis by ADB occurs due to the use of different verifications
(authentication, authorization, ADB integrity check, and ADB data integrity check) performed by
ADB that may lead to apoptosis (cf. Figure 16). Because we use the uniform distribution in the
range [0, 99] for the CES-TV values and ADB-TVT = 50, many CES-TV values are below the
ADB-TVT value which increases the ADB apoptosis rate.

100

Rates for Data ADB Reduction Types and ADB Data
Disclosure Types
91.83%

Rate

80
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40
20

8.27%
4.31% 3.86%
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Total
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Evaporation by ADB
Partial Disclosure

Apoptosis by ADB
Full Disclosure

ADB-TVT= Uniform in [51-99]; ADBPP= Uniform in [1-9]; CES-TV= Uniform in [099]; Iterations =10,000

Figure 6.15. Rates of ADB data reduction types and ADB data
disclosure types for all testbed iterations.

Figure 6.15 shows rates of ADB data reduction types and ADB data disclosure types for the Case
B, i.e., when 50 < ADB-TVT ≤ 99. As expected, the rate of apoptosis increases while other rates
(noop and evaporation by ADB) decrease due to the increment of ADB-TVT values. That means
the CES cannot accede the minimum trust required by ADB plus it cannot accede ADB
verifications during ADB enabling in CES. Then the apoptosis rate increases.

2) Rate of ADB Apoptosis for Different Verification Mechanisms

156

40

Rates of ADB Apoptosis for Diffrent Verification
Mechanisms
33.53%

33.26%

Rate

30

16.43%

20
10

1.05%
0
Authentication

Authorization

ADB Integrity

Data Integrity

ADB Protection Techniques
ADB-TVT= 50; ADBPP= Uniform in [1-9]; CES-TV= Uniform in [0-99]; Iterations
=10,000

Figure 6.16. Rates of ADB apoptosis for different verification
mechanisms.

Figure 6.16 shows rates of different verifications mechanisms (authentication, authorization, ADB
integrity check, and ADB data integrity check) for the Case A. These verifications lead to
apoptosize the entire ADB. We can see the authentication and authorization rates are the higher
than ADB integrity and data integrity rate.
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Figure 6.17. Rates of ADB apoptosis for different verification
mechanisms.

Figure 6.17 shows rates of different verifications (authentication, authorization, ADB integrity
check, and ADB data integrity check) for the Case B. As expected, all rates increase including the
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increment in the rate of authorization verification (38.82 %) due to the increment of the ADB-TVT
values.

3) Average of ADB Data Reduction Ratio, Average of ADB Data Disclosure Ratio, Average of CESTV, and Average of ADB-TV Versus ADBPP Number.
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Figure 6.18. Averages of ADB data reduction ratio, ADB data
disclosure ratio, CES-TV, and ADB-TVT vs. ADBPP number.

Figure 6.18 shows the average of ADB data reduction ratio, the average of ADB data disclosure ratio,
the average of CES-TV, and the average of ADB-TVT versus the selected ADBPP for the Case A. The
ADBPPs used in the testbed are arranged form restricted (ADBPP1) to unrestricted (ADBPP 9) as
shown on the X axis. As expected, the average of ADB data reduction ratio decreases when the ADBPP
number increases. Also, the average of ADB data disclosure ratio increases when the ADBPP number
increases.
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Avg. of ADB Data Reduction Ratio, Avg. of ADB Data
Disclosure Ratio, and Avg. of CES-TV vs. ADBPP Number
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Figure 6.19. Averages of ADB data reduction, ADB data disclosure,
CES-TV, and ADB-TVT vs. ADBPP number.

Figure 6.19 shows the average of ADB data reduction ratio, average of ADB data disclosure ratio, an
average of CES-TV, and an average of ADB-TVT versus the selected ADBPP for the Case B. Like
Figure 6.18, the average of ADB data reduction ratio decreases and the average of ADB data disclosure
ratio increases when the ADBPP number increases.

6.2.3.2. ADB Data Reduction
This subsection shows ADB data reduction result of the testbed.
1) Numbers of ADB Data Reduction Types vs. Group Number
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Figure 6.20. Number of ADB data reduction types vs. group number.

Figure 6.20 shows numbers of data reduction types versus group number for the Case A. The ADB
apoptosis number is the greater than ADB noops number and the ADB evaporations number due
to the use of different verifications mechanisms that may lead to apoptosize the entire ADB as
shown in Figure 16.
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Figure 6.21. Number of ADB data reduction types vs. group
number.
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Figure 6.21 shows numbers of data reduction types versus group number for the Case B. Due to
the increment of ADB-TVT values, the ADB apoptoses number in Figure 6.21 is greater than
apoptosis number in Figure 6.20. The rest of data reduction types in Figure 6.21 are slightly below
than data reduction types in Figure 6.20 due to the increment of ADB-TVT values.

6.2.3.3. ADB Data Disclosure
This subsection shows ADB data disclosure result of the testbed.
1) Numbers of ADB Data Disclosure Types vs. Group Number
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Figure 6.22. Number of ADB data disclosure types vs. group
number.

Figure 6.22 shows number of ADB data disclosure types versus group number for the Case
A. We can see, the number of null ADB data increases due to the higher apoptosis number.
The number of partials ADB data is greater than full ADB data. As expected, the number of
full ADB data and number of partials ADB data show small values due to the use of different
variety of ADBPPs.
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Figure 6.23. Number of data disclosure types vs. group number.
Figure 6.23 shows number of ADB data disclosure types versus group number for the Case
B. We can see the number of null ADB data is greater than the number of null ADB data in
Figure 6.23 due to the increment of ADB-TVT values. Full ADB data and partial ADB data
are overlapped and slightly below the corresponding values in Figure 6.23 due to the
increment of ADB-TVT values.
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2) Number of Successful/Unsuccessful ADB Data Delivery vs. Group Number
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Figure 6.24. Number of successful/unsuccessful ADB data deliveries
vs. group number.
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Figure 6.24 shows the number of successful and unsuccessful ADB data delivery versus
group number for the Case A. Successful delivery means that ADB disclosed its H-EHR to
the CES fully or partially (i.e., either ADB full or ADB partial Data). Unsuccessful delivery
means that ADB disclosed no data to the CES (i.e., ADB null data). As expected, the number
of the unsuccessful data delivery is greater than the count of successful data delivery due to

Iteration Number

the different verifications mechanisms performed by ADB.
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Figure 6.25. Number of successful/unsuccessful ADB data deliveries
vs. group number.

Figure 6.25 shows the number of successful and unsuccessful ADB data delivery versus
group number for the Case B. We can see that the number of successful data deliveries
increases while the number of unsuccessful data deliveries decreases (compared with the
numbers in Figure 6.24) due to the increment of ADB-TVT values.

6.3. Testbed Performance Evaluation for ADB-MAS
The Active Data Bundles with Multi-Agent System (ADB-MAS) is the second solution of ADB-based
solutions. The solution uses mobile agents to protect privacy of users during dissemination of their sensitive
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data among different hosts. We use the scenario of dissemination of EHRs in HISes from Subsection 4.2 to
show applying our solution in HISes
This section discusses the testbed scenario for the ADB-MAS, testbed program design and its setup,
testbed parameters, testbed variables, testbed operation, as well as the experimental results provided by
the testbed, and their discussions.

6.3.1. Java Agent DEvelopment Framework (JADE)
JADE (Java Agent DEvelopment Framework) is a framework which fully implemented in the objectoriented Java language. JADE facilitates the development of multi-agent systems through a middle-ware
that follows the FIPA specifications (cf. Subsection 1.6). Also, JADE provides a set of graphical tools that
support the debugging and deployment phases [BCG07]. JADE is free software developed and distributed
by Telecom Italia (an Italian telecommunications company).
The JADE platform (software) is composed of active agent Containers. The agent container is a Java
process instantiated by a Java program that provides the JADE services including run-time services and
other services needed for hosting and executing agents [BCG07]. In JADE, containers can be distributed
among a set of platforms/hosts that communicate with each other. The container can contain several Agents.
An agent is a Java class contains multiple methods and inherited features that accomplish basic
interactions within the agent platform including registration, configuration, and remote management
[BCG07, JAPG17]. Also, the agent implements a behavior (i.e., a task) such as send/receive messages, use
interaction protocols, and terminate itself. That is, the agent (class) provides methods to perform transitions
between various states and behaviors within JADE platform.
JADE platform must initiate a special container called the Main Container. The main container
represents the bootstrap point of JADE Platform. The main container is launched first during the execution,
and then other normal containers (i.e., not main containers) are initiated if they registered with the main
container.
Unlike the normal containers, the main container holds two special agents (automatically started when the
main container is launched) as follows [JAPG17]:
1) Agent Management System (AMS): provides supervisory control over access and use of the agent
platform. The AMS provides white-page (the naming service) for agents in the platform, maintains
a directory of agent identifiers (AID), monitors agents’ state. Note that one AMS is initiated for
each platform.
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2) Directory Facilitator (DF): provides a Yellow Pages service that offers addressing services to
facilitate the communication and cooperation among agents in the platform.
Each agent should have name and address. The AMS and DF keep maintaining each agent information
while the agent is still active (alive) on the platform. The agent can communicate through the Message
Transport System (a.k.a., Agent Communication Channel or ACC) that controls all the exchange of
messages within the platform including messages to/from remote platforms [BCG07].

Figure 6.26 An example of JADE Framework [JAPG17].

Figure 6.26 shows an example of a JADE multi-agents framework includes Platforms A and Platform
B connected through a network. The Platform A includes the Main Container, Container1, and Container2
(one main container and two normal containers). Both container1 and container2 are registered with the
main container. The main container includes three agents (A1, AMS, and DF). The container1 includes two
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agents (A2 and A3). The container2 includes a single agent (A4). In platform A, container1 and container2
consider local containers to the main container because they belong to the same platform A.
The Platform B includes one Main Container that includes three agents (A5, AMS, and DF). The main
container in Platform B is considered as a remote container to containers in Platform A since they belong
to different platforms.
In JADE, each agent is an instance (extended) Java class called Agent supported by JADE package
(jade.core.Agent) package. Each agent performs a task by initiating a behavior. The behavior of an agent
is

implemented

as

an

object

extends

a

class

called

Behaviour

supported

by

jade.core.behaviours.Behaviour. The agent can perform multiple behaviors during its lifecycle.
JADE supports the agent mobility that refers to the ability for an agent to migrate, make a copy, or clone
itself across one or multiple platforms or hosts. The (jade.core.mobility) package implements agent mobility
and cloning service including transfer its state and code. Jade support intra-platform mobility (i.e., moving
agents among local platforms) and inter-platform mobility (i.e., moving agents among remote platforms).
Besides a jade.core package, JADE composes the following packages [JAPG17]:
1) The jade.lang.acl package implements Agent Communication Language (ACL) according to FIPA
standard specifications.
2) The jade.domain package contains classes that represent the agent management entities defined by the
FIPA standard (i.e., AMS and DF agents).
3) The jade.gui package contains generic classes used to create GUIs to display and edit agent identifiers,
agent location, agent descriptions, and agent ACL messages.
JADE framework provides other different features including distributed agent platform, automatic
registration/deregistration of agents with the AMS, and external applications to launch autonomous agents
[JAPG17, BCG07].

6.3.2. Overview of the ADB-MAS Testbed Scenario: Dissemination of EHRs in HISes
We simulate the healthcare scenario for the dissemination of a patient’s EHRs among healthcare
providers, as discussed in Subsection 5.2. We use an ADB Agent to disseminate a patient’s EHRs from
Hospital to Clinic. The ADB agent protects privacy of the EHR during the entire EHR lifecycle.
Testbed uses Java Standard Edition (JDK 1.8) and Java Platform DEvelopment Framework (JADE)
[Jade16] using the Eclipse Integrated Development Environment.
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The testbed code is publically available, as indicated in Appendix B.
The following parties participate in our scenario:
1) Home Platform (HP): A healthcare provider (Hospital) which is the home and guardian of patient’s
EHRs. The HP includes the Home Health Information System (HHIS) and Home Health
Information System Database (HHIS-DB). The latter stores patients’ EHRs with their metadata.
2) Trust Broker Information Overlay Network (TBION): A network that manages trust (actually,
reputation, that is, “second-hand trust”) of all platforms that can become destinations for EHR
dissemination.
3) Destination Platform (DP): A healthcare provider (Clinic) which receives the patient’s EHRs from
HP. The DP includes the Destination Health Information System (DHIS) and Destination Health
Information System Database (DHIS-DB). We assume that the destination platform may be one of
the following:
a) An authorized platform (at the Clinic or another healthcare provider): It represents a
healthcare provider that is supposed to receive either all ADB agent data (when fully
authorized) or portions of ADB agent data (when partially authorized)—according to the
trust value for the authorized platform and PPs.
b) An unauthorized platform (or malicious host): It represents a platform that is not approved
to access ADB agent data. The unauthorized platform interferes with an ADB agent either
during its dissemination among healthcare providers, or during ADB agent enabling at a
given healthcare provider.
In our scenario, the basic interactions among parties include the following numbered steps:
1) DHIS Access Request: The DHIS sends an access request (including DHIS credentials) to the HHIS
asking for a patient’s EHRs.
2) Data Preparation: The HHIS receives the DHIS access request and starts data preparation process:
2a) Verifying Access Request: The HHIS checks if the access request is authentic. If the access
request is not authentic, the HHIS sends rejection notification to DHIS;
2b) Collecting Patient’s EHR: The HHIS collects patient’s EHR and metadata from HHIS-DB.
3) DHIS Trust Value Retrieving: The HHIS starts DHIS trust value (DHIS-TV) retrieving process:
3a) Creating TvA and DaA: The HHIS creates TvA and DaA;
3b) Disseminating TvA: The HHIS sends TvA to TBION. Note that TvA notifies the DaA before
moving to TBION.
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3c) TvA Enabling: The TvA reaches TBION and starts the TvA enabling process:
3c1) Authenticating TBION: The TvA VM (we used single VM) authenticates TBION by
asking for its identifier. The TBION provides its identifier to the TvA. If the identifier is
insufficient, then the VM sends audit data to DaA (in HHIS) and apoptosizes the entire
TvA. Otherwise, TvA VM authenticates TBION and computes the hash value for its
application data.
3c2) Authorizing TBION: The TvA VM includes the hash value in a request and send it to
HHIS asking for the Confirmation Code (CCd). The CCd should include a confirmation
to authorize or invalidate TBION. The HHIS receives the request and compares the saved
hash value with the received hash value (included in TvA request). If the hash values are
identical, then HHIS prepare the Positive CCd (includes a confirmation to authorize the
TBION). Otherwise, the HHIS prepares the negative CCd (includes a confirmation to
invalidate the TBION). The HHIS sends the CCd to the TvA. The TvA receives and
checks the CCd. If the CCd is negative, the TvA VM sends audit data to DaA in HHIS
and apoptosizes the entire TvA. Otherwise, then TvA authorizes the TBION;
3c3) Retrieving DHIS-TV: The TvA asks the TBION to provide DHIS-TV. The TBION
retrieves the DHIS-TV and saves it in the TvA.
3d) Delivering DHIS-TV: The TvA returns to HP and delivers the DHIS-TV to HHIS. Then, the
TvA sends audit data to the DaA, and terminates by apoptosis in HHIS.
4) SdA Creation: The HHIS starts the SdA creation process:
4a) Enforcing Data Reduction PP: The HHIS enforces Data Reduction PP. Data Reduction PP is
a part of PPs. Enforcing data reduction evaporates (removes) some of patient’s EHR attributes
that their trust value threshold (TVT) above the DHIS-TV;
4b) Creating SdA: The HHIS creates SdA (cf. Subsection 5.4.2.1.3). The SdA includes the
remaining patient’s EHR, metadata, encrypted iVM, and eVM. Metadata include the Data
Disclosure PPs.
5) EnA Creation: The HHIS starts the EnA creation process:
5a) Creating EnA: The HHIS creates EnA (cf. Subsection 5.4.2.1.4). The EnA includes the enabling
record (decryption keys and hash values) which required during SdA enabling.
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6) EnA Dissemination: The HHIS sends EnA to the arbitrary network (AN). Note that HHIS send
audit data to DaA before sending EnA to AN.
7) EnA Enabling: The EnA reaches the AN and starts the EnA enabling process:
7a) Authenticating AN: The EnA asks the AN to provide its identifier. The AN provides its
identifier to EnA. The EnA checks AN identifier. If the identifier is insufficient, then the EnA
sends audit data to DaA (in HHIS) and apoptosizes the entire TvA. Otherwise EnA
authenticates AN and computes the hash value for its application data;
7b) Authorizing AN: The EnA includes the hash value in a request and sends it to HHIS asking for
Authorization Code (ACd). The ACd should include (or not) the decryption key for EnA
application data. The HHIS receives the request and compares the saved hash value (saved
during EnA creation) with the received hash value in EnA request. If both hash values are
identical, the HHIS prepares the Positive ACd (includes the decryption key). Otherwise, the
HHIS prepares the Negative ACd (includes confirmation to invalidate AN). Then HHIS sends
audit data to DaA (in HHIS). Next, HHIS sends ACd (either positive or negative) to EnA.
The EnA receives and checks the ACd. If the ACd is negative, the EnA send audit data to DaA
(in HHIS) and apoptosizes the entire EnA in AN. Otherwise, EnA authorizes AN and decrypts
its application data using the decryption key (included in ACd).
8) DaA Dissemination: The HHIS sends DaA to AN. Note that The HHIS receives all audit data from
DaA before moving to AN.
9) DaA Enabling: The EnA reaches AN and starts the DaA enabling process. The DaA authenticates
the AN without difficulty because the AN is authenticated and authorized by EnA.
10) SdA Dissemination: The HHIS sends SdA to DHIS. Note that the DaA (in AN) receives audit data
from HHIS before moving SdA to DHIS.
11) SdA Enabling: The SdA reaches DHIS and its eVM starts the SdA enabling process:
11a) Authenticating DHIS: The SdA eVM asks the DHIS to provide its identifier. The DHIS
provides its identifier to SdA. The SdA eVM checks theses identifier. If the identifier is
insufficient, then: (i) the SdA eVM send audit data to DaA (in AN), (ii) the eVM apoptosizes
the entire SdA (in DHIS), (iii) the EnA VM (we used single VM in EnA) apoptosizes entire
EnA (in AN), and (iv) the DaA moves from AN to HHIS to deliver audit data. Otherwise, the
SdA eVM authenticates DHIS. The SdA eVM computes the hash value for its application data
and iVM jointly. Then SdA eVM provides the hash value along with Ids (SdA-Id, EnA-Id,
and DHIS-Id) to the DHIS;
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11b) Authorizing DHIS: The DHIS includes the hash value in a request and sends it to EnA asking
for Enabling Record (ER).
The EnA receives the request and compares the saved hash value (i.e., the second hash value
during SdA creation) with the received hash value from SdA. If both hash values are identical,
the EnA VM prepares the Positive ER (includes hash value and decryption keys). Otherwise,
the EnA VM prepares the Negative ER (includes confirmation to invalidate the DHIS). Then
EnA VM sends audit data to DaA (in AN). Next, EnA VM sends ER (either positive or
negative) to DHIS. Then, the VM terminates entire EnA by apoptosis (in AN).
The DHIS receives ER and forwards it to SdA. The SdA receives and checks ER. If the ER is
negative, then: (i) the SdA eVM sends audit data to DaA (in AN), (ii) the SdA VM apoptosizes
the entire SdA, and (iii) the DaA moves from AN to HHIS to deliver audit data.
Otherwise, the SdA VM authorizes DHIS and decrypts its application data using the second
private decryption key (included in ER). This step decrypts the iVM only while application
data are still protected by another encryption (the one using the first asymmetric encryption
key, cf. Step 4 in Subsection 5.4.2.1.3).
12) Integrity Verification: The SdA iVM starts the integrity verification:
12a) Computing Hash Value: The SdA iVM computes the hash value for its encrypted application
data;
12b) Comparing Hash Values: The iVM compares the computed hash with the hash value included
in ER (i.e., the first hash value). If the hash values are identical, the integrity check is a failure,
then: (i) SdA iVM sends audit data message to DaA, (ii) the iVM apoptosizes the entire SdA
in DHIS, and (iii) the DaA moves from AN to HHIS to deliver audit data. Otherwise (the
integrity check is a success), the SdA iVM decrypts application data using the first private
decryption key.

13) Enforcing Data Disclosure PPs: The SdA iVM enforces data disclosure PPs. Data disclosure PPs
(or SdA-PP) includes to all policies of PPs without data reduction PP.
13a) The SdA iVM applies the data disclosure procedure to the EHRs. The data disclosure
procedure includes full SdA data, partial SdA data, and null88 SdA data (cf. Subsection
5.4.7.4);

88

Recall that an example of null SdA data by iVM could be occur when healthcare provider wants to access SdA’s H-EHR after the business
hours, even though she is authentic and authorized to access SdA’s EHR.
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13b) The SdA iVM discloses the remaining EHRs to the DHIS in the DP. The SdA send audit
data to the DaA in AN.
14) SdA Termination: The iVM terminates (by apoptosis) the entire SdA.
15) Delivering Audit Data: The DaA performs following actions:
15a) The DaA moves from AN to the HHIS to deliver audit data,
15b) The DaA reaches the HHIS and delivers audit data. The audit data included in a DaA-Audit
File. The DaA-Audit File is created and maintained by the DaA.
16) DaA Termination: The iVM terminates the entire DaA.

6.3.3. Testbed Design and Setup
This subsection discusses design and setup for ADB-MAS testbed. It presents testbed assumptions and
specifications, ADB-MAS specifications for the testbed, testbed parameters, testbed variables, testbed
measures, testbed operations, and experimental testbed results and their discussion.

6.3.3.1. Testbed Assumptions and Specifications
This subsection discusses assumptions and specifications for our testbed.
6.3.3.1.1. Testbed Assumptions
The assumptions for the testbed are as follows:
A1) Authenticated messages: All messages among agents and the platforms/networks are
authenticated.
A2) Secure and trusted authorized platforms and hosts: HP and DH (authorized sites) are secure and
trusted platforms, and the HHIS and the DHIS are secure and trusted hosts within these platforms.
This means that these platforms and hosts are secure against any outside attacks that might threaten
ADB agents, and they are trusted within their network to receive ADB agents.
A3) Trusted TBION: We assume that TBION maintains general database networks includes trust
information about healthcare providers, or can request for information about a host, etc., from
other trusted parties, such as local healthcare networks, Trust Broker [KLYT05], or DirectTrust
[DiTr17]
A4) Focusing on SdA behavior: we focus on the SdA behavior since it is responsible for disseminating
H-EHRs to the DP. The other agents including (TvA, EnA, and DaA) are consider supporter for
SdA, so we assume that they do their tasks efficiently. For example, we assume that the TvA gets
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the DHIS-TV form the TBION (i.e., TvA passes both authentication and authorization
successfully).
A5) Single-destination ADB dissemination: An ADB Agent is sent via a single hop from its HP (Clinic)
to its DP (Hospital). Our solution can be generalized to dissemination over multiple hops rather
easily.
A6) Access Policy Limitation: The access policies use in this testbed are limited to privacy policies.
A7) XACML Privacy Policy Evaluation: In general, evaluating XACML privacy policies produces
four possible results: Permit, Deny, Indeterminate, or NotApplicable. In the ADB-MAS testbed,
we consider only Permit and Deny.

6.3.3.1.2. ADB-MAS Specifications for Testbed
This subsection presents specifications for parties involved in the testbed, namely the Home Platform
(HP), ADB agents (TvA, DaA, SdA, and EnA), TBION, AN and the Destination Platform (DP).
A) Home Platform (HP) Specifications for Testbed
The following specifications are used for the home platform, that is, the HHIS:
1) The HHIS uses the (simulated) ADB agent Creator (ADBAC) software to create ADB agents.
2) The HHIS uses a secure database for storing patients’ EHRs. We use the same MyPhpSQL DB used
in ADB-TTP that includes records for 100 patients. The database has the following specifications:
i)

Each patient has a unique identifier such as Patient Identification (PID), National Provider
Identification (NPI), or EHR Certification Identification (EHRC-ID);

ii) Each patient has only one EHR representing her sensitive data;
iii) Each patient has one set of privacy policies (PPs) for the data, included in a metadata file,
whose location (but not contents) is stored in the same database.
3) The HHIS receives access requests asking for a patient’s EHR from the DHIS in DP (Clinic). Each
request includes the identifier and the credentials of the requester (the DHIS) as well as the patient’s
name and PID. We generate these requests by randomly selecting values using uniform
distributions (from the set with n values), as shown in Subsection 6.3.3.2.

B) ADB Agent Component Specifications for Testbed
The ADB agent components specifications include healthcare data specifications, metadata
specifications, VM specifications, all discussed in turn.
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B.1) Healthcare Data Specifications for Testbed
Recall that we use XML to write EHRs (cf. B.1 in Subsection 6.2.2.1.2).

B.2) Metadata Specifications for Testbed
Metadata includes access control policies used in ADB-MAS testbed. We use XACML to specify
access Request of the DHIS, Response, and PolicySet. In this testbed, we used the same access request and
Response that used for the ADB-TTP (cf. Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4).
We use XACML to specify the privacy policy (i.e., PolicySet) or PPs in ADB-MAS (that equivalent to
used ADBPP in ADB-TTP). We divide PPs into two sets of privacy policies: HHIS-PP and SdA-PP. The
HHIS-PP includes only one policy: Data Reduction Rules. After receiving the DHIS-TV by TvA, the HHIS
enforces the HHIS-PP. Figure 6.27 shows as an example the XACML PolicySet named HHIS-PP1.

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<PolicySet
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
xmlns:xsi="https://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-xmlschema-1-20041028"
PolicySetId= "HHISPP1"
Version="1.0"
PolicyCominingAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:policy-combining-algorithm:deny-unless-permit">
<Description>
ADB-TTP Privacy Policy Number 1. It includes one policy: Data Reduction Policy
</Description>
<Target/> <!--empty-->
<VariableDefinition VariableId= VH-TV/>
<Policy
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
xmlns:xsi="https://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-xmlschema-1-20041028"
PolicyId= "Data Reduction Policy"
Version="1.0"
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-unless-permit">
<Description>
Remove EHR data attribute(s)that visited host is not authorized to see
</Description>
<!--Rule for each attribute in EHR-->
<Rule RuleId="CardNumber Attribute Access" effect="Permit">
<Description>
Any subject (user in the VH) can access CardNumber only when VH-TV >= Address Attribute-TVT
</Description>
<Condition>
<Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-greater-than-or-equal">
<VariableReference VariableId =VH-TV>
<AttributeValue
DataType=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer” > 85
<AttributeValue/>
</Apply>
</Condition>
</Rule>
.
.
.
<Rule RuleId="Address Attribute Access" effect="Permit">
<Description>
Any subject (user in VH) can access Address only when VH-TV >= Address Attribute-TVT
</Description>
<Condition>
<Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-greater-than-or-equal">
<VariableReference VariableId=Address Attribute-TVT>
<AttributeValue DataType=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer” > 50
<AttributeValue/>
</Apply>
</Condition>
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</Rule>
</Policy>
</PolicySet>

Figure 6.27. An example of the proposed XACML HHIS-PP1 PolicySet.

The SdA-PPs include three policies: Authentication Policy, Business Hours Policy, and Data
Disclosure Policy. The HHIS adds SdA-PPs to SdA metadata during SdA creation. SdA-PPs are enforced
by SdA during SdA enabling in the DHIS. Figure 6.28 shows as an example of the XACML PolicySet
named SdA-PP1.

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<PolicySet
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
xmlns:xsi="https://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-xmlschema-1-20041028"
PolicySetId= "SdAPP1"
Version="1.0"
PolicyCominingAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:policy-combining-algorithm:deny-unless-permit">
<Description>
SdA-PP Privacy Policy Number 1. It includes three policies:
Authentication, Business Hours, and Data Disclosure
</Description>
<Target/> <!--empty-->
<Policy
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
xmlns:xsi="https://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-xmlschema-1-20041028"
PolicyId= "Authentication Policy"
Version="1.0"
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:first-applicable">
<Description>
The email of requester must match to authenticate the requester.
</Description>
<Target/> <!--empty-->
<VariableDefinition VariableId= VH-TV/>  discussed after figure
<Rule RuleId="Authentication Rule" effect= "Permit">
<Description>
This rule checks if the subject is identified by given requester’s an e-mail
</Description>
<Target>
<Anyof>
<Allof>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:rfc822Name-match">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
mjack@ces.dh.com
</AttributeValue>
<AttributeDesignator
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access-subject"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id"
DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data-type:rfc822Name"
MustBePresent="false"/>
</Match>
</Allof>
</Anyof>
</Target>
</Rule>
</Policy>
<Policy
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
xmlns:xsi="https://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-xmlschema-1-20041028"
PolicyId= "Business Hours Policy"
Version="1.0"
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:first-applicable">
<Description>
Business Hours from 8:00 am to 4:59 pm
</Description>
<Target/> <!--empty-->
<Rule RuleId="Business Hours Rule" Effect="Permit">
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<Description>
A subject is permitted to access any attribute only during business hours
</Description>
<Condition FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:function:time-in-range">
<Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:time-one-and-only">
<AttributeDesignator
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#time"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:environment:current-time"/>
</Apply>
<AttributeValue DataType=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#time”>08:00:00 </AttributeValue>
<AttributeValue DataType=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#time”>4:59:00 </AttributeValue>
</Condition>
</Rule>
</Policy>
<Policy
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
xmlns:xsi="https://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-xmlschema-1-20041028"
PolicyId= "Data Disclosure Policy"
Version="1.0"
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-unless-permit">
<Description>
Disclose to VH the EHR data attribute(s) that VH is authorized to access
</Description>
<!-- Rule for each attribute in EHR -->
<Rule RuleId="CardNumber Attribute Access" effect="Permit">
<Description>
Any subject (user in the VH) can keep copy of CardNumber attribute only when VH-TV >=
CardNumber Attribute-TVT.
</Description>
<Condition>
<Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-greater-than-or-equal">
<VariableReference VariableID= CardNumber Attribute-TVT>
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer" > 95
<AttributeValue/>
</Apply>
</Condition>
</Rule>
.
.
.
<Rule RuleId="Address Attribute Access" effect="Permit">
<Description>
Any subject (user in VH) can keep copy of Address only when VH-TV >= Address Attribute-TVT
</Description>
<Condition>
<Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-greater-than-or-equal">
<VariableReference VariableId= CardNumber Attribute-TVT>
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">50<AttributeValue/>
</Apply>
</Condition>
</Rule>
</Policy>
</PolicySet>

Figure 6.28. An example of the proposed XACML SdA-PP1 PolicySet.

We assume that policy (HHIS-PP or SdA-PP) is firm, i.e., if at least one does not satisfy its rule, then
the “Deny” Response is produced for the whole PolicySet (i.e., for the whole HHIS-PP or SdA-PP). Policy
Rules (in HHIS-PP and SdA-PP) are analogous with rules in ADBPP. Also, the decision policy for HHISPP or SdA-PP follows the truth table for ADBPP shown in Table 6.1 (cf. B2 in Subsection 6.2.2.1.2).

B.3) VM Specifications for Testbed
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The VM is an executable code included in the ADB agent (i.e., TvA, DaA, EnA, and SdA) and
responsible for performing all ADB agent operations, as we previously discussed in Subsection 5.4.
In this testbed, we used Nested VMs [Virt15] that used for the ADB-TTP (cf. B3 in Subsection
6.2.2.1.2). Our nested VM includes two levels: External VM (eVM) and Internal VM (iVM). The eVM is
is responsible for authenticating and authorizing the DHIS during SdA enabling in the DP (cf. Subsections
5.4.7.1 and 5.4.7.2). The iVM is responsible for checking the integrity of SdA data and enforcing SdA-PP
(cf. Subsections 5.4.7.3 and 5.4.7.4).

C) ADB Agents Specifications for Testbed
The ADB agent specifications include TvA specifications, DaA specifications, EnA specifications, and
SdA specifications, all discussed in turn.

C.1) TvA Specifications for Testbed
The TvA has the following specifications:
1) The TvA application data are not encrypted, but the TvA would be able to check the integrity of
its application data.
2) The TvA uses a single (not nested VMs) unencrypted VM to perform its tasks.
3) The TvA can perform authentication and authorization verifications in the TBION to collect the
DHIS-TV.

C.2) DaA Specifications for Testbed
The DaA has the following specifications:
1) The DaA uses a single unencrypted VM to perform its tasks.
2) The DaA uses a database (DB) to store all audit data during its lifecycle.
3) The audit data included in DaA application data are protected sing Blackchain list (cf. Subsection
5.4.2.1.2).
4) The DaA can perform only authentication verification in the AN.

C.3) SdA Specifications for Testbed
The SdA has the following specifications:
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1) The SdA uses nested VMs, i.e., eVM and iVM. The eVM is not encrypted while iVM is
encrypted.
2) The SdA application data (i.e., EHRs and SdA-PPs) are protected by data encryption and data
integrity verification.
3) The SdA performs three verification (authentication, authorization, and integrity check) in the
other sites (DHIS). Also, SdA enforces its SdA-PPs in DHIS.

C.4) EnA Specifications for Testbed
The EnA has the following specifications:
1) The EnA uses a single unencrypted VM to perform its tasks.
2) The EnA only sensitive data are protected by data encryption while application data protected by
integrity verification.
3) The EnA can perform authentication and authorization verifications in AN.

D) Trust Broker Information Overlay Network (TBION) Specifications for Testbed
Trust Broker Information Overlay Network (TBION) represents trust information network acting as a
secure repository among platforms and hosts that might receive SdA Agent. TBION has the following
specifications:
1) The TBION provides trust information about healthcare providers in a collaborative network that
rely on different trusted resources within its network such as local healthcare networks or Trust
Broker [KLYT05] or outside its network such as the DirectTrust89 [DiTr17].
2) The TBION retrieves trust information about the host that receives SdA (DHIS) and makes it
available for the TvA.
3) The TBION uses Message Authentication Code (MAC) to secure its communications with HHIS
and TvA.

E) Arbitrary Network (AN) Specifications for Testbed
Arbitrary network (AN) is a subjective network that can host EnA and DaA to support SdA enabling
in the DHIS. AN is a network that might include untrusted resources, so we suggest that both EnA and
DaA should preform authentication and authorization activities when they moved to AN. EnA and DaA

89

Recall that DirectTrust is a collaborative non-profit association supporting secure, interoperable health information among healthcare
providers.
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would be able to communicate and exchange information with SdA in DHIS during their staying in
AN.

F) Destination Platforms (DP) Specifications for Testbed
The destination Platform (DP) receives and hosts the SdA. The DP includes the DHIS. The DP
created and initiated according to the information included in the DHIS access request (AR) received by
the HHIS.
The DHIS has the following specifications:
1) During SdA enabling, the DHIS must respond to SdA within a certain timeout period specified by
SdA. If the DHIS does not respond to SdA within the timeout period, the eVM notifies others agents
(EnA and DaA in AN) and apoptosizes the entire SdA.
2) During SdA enabling, the DHIS allows SdA to communicate with EnA and DaA to perform its
tasks in the DHIS.

6.3.3.2. Testbed Parameters
The testbed parameters listed according to the order of ADB-MAS operations appear in the testbed
scenario. Table 6.5 lists and describes the testbed parameters.
Table 6.5. Testbed Parameters.
No

Parameter

Type and Value

Value

Description

Input Parameters for DHIS Access Request
1

DHIS National Provider

Integer

Arbitrary

Identifier (DHIS-NPI)

2

HHIS National Provider

of the DHIS.

Integer

Arbitrary

Identifier (HHIS-NPI)
3

Patient Name

Simulates a unique identifier

Simulates a unique identifier
of the HHIS.

String

Arbitrary

Simulates a patient’s last
name and first name.
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Table 6.5 —Continued
4

Date and Time

Integer

Consecutive

Simulates time and data

integers

information recorded by the

starting with

system immediately after

0

each action.

Input Parameters for Agent Creation
5

Patient Identifier (PID)

Integer

Arbitrary

Simulates a unique identifier
of a patient.

6

Electronic Health Record

Text file

(EHR)

Arbitrary (for

Simulates an XML file

testbed

including patient’s personal,

contents does

health, and billing data.

not matter)
7

EHR Certificate Identifier

Integer

Arbitrary

Simulates a unique identifier
of a patient’s EHRC. We

(EHRC-ID)

used 100 EHRC-IDs.
8

Agent Name

String

TvA, DaA, ...

Assigns a unique name for
each agent in ADB-MAS.

9

Agent Identifier (AID)

String

tva@localhos

Simulates a unique identifier

tIP/JADE,

for each ADB agents

daa@localhos

generated by the JADE.

tIP/JADE, ...
10

Encryption/Decryption
Keys

String including

Arbitrary (for

Simulates 2 pairs (First and

testbed

Second) encryption and

contents does

decryption keys generated by

number)

not matter)

the HHIS.

Integer

Arbitrary

Simulates a hash value used

hex (a
hexadecimal

11

Hash Value (HV)

to check the integrity of agent
application data or its data.
12

13

Trust Broker Information
Overlay Network Identifier
(TBION-ID)

String

Arbitrary Network (AN-

String

Arbitrary

Simulates a unique identifier
of TBION.

Arbitrary

ID)

Simulates a unique identifier
of AN.
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Table 6.5 —Continued
Input Parameters for ADB Agent Enabling
14

Confirmation Code (CCd)

String

Arbitrary (for

Simulates a string generated

testbed

by the HHIS and it is either a

contents does

positive or a negative code.

not matter)

Positive CCd includes
confirmation to authorize
TBION. Negative CCd
includes conformation to
unauthorize TBION. (cf.
Subsection 5.4.4.2).

15

Authorization Code (ACd)

Array of String

[confirmation

Simulates an array includes

, decryption

(confirmation and decryption

key]

key) generated by the HHIS
and it is either a positive or a
negative code. Positive ACd
includes the actual values of
these variables. Negative
ACd includes only a
confirmation to unauthorize
AN (cf. Subsection 5.4.5.2).

16

Enabling Record (ER)

Array of String

[two private

Simulates an array includes

including hex

decryption

(first private decryption key,

Keys and two

second private decryption

hash values]

key, first hash value, and
second hash value) generated
by the HHIS and it is either a
positive or a negative code
(cf. Subsection 5.4.2.1.3).

Other Testbed Parameters
17

Number of Iterations

Integer

10,000

An iteration consists of
sending one SdA from the
HHIS to the DHIS.

18

Iteration Group Size

Integer

500

Number of iterations in
Iteration Group.
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Notes for Subsection 6.3.2.2:
1) A single testbed iteration represents a single full lifecycle of SdA agent, i.e., the SdA creation, SdA
dissemination, SdA enabling, and SdA termination. The iterations of the testbed are repeated with
different parameter values.
2) In the testbed, we send 500 SdAs (supported by 500 TvAs, 500 EnAs, and 500 DaAs) from HHIS
to DHIS sequentially. We run the testbed for 20 iteration groups (i.e., each iteration group = 500
iterations). So, the total testbed iterations are 10,000 iterations.
3)

In HHIS, we used the same database (in ADB-TTP testbed) that includes 100 Patients using
MyPhPSQL.

6.3.3.3. Testbed Variables
The testbed variables listed according to the order of operations as listed in the ADB-MAS testbed
scenario. Table 6.6 lists and describes the testbed variables.
Table 6.6. Testbed Variables.
Random Variables

Value Range

Distribution

Description

Random Variables for Testbed
1

SdA Trust Value Threshold (SdA-

[50-99]

TVT)

Uniform

Simulates the minimum

distribution

trust value that the DHIS
(or another host) must
possess to access SdA
data.

2

Privacy Policy (PP)

[1-9]

Uniform
distribution

Simulates an XACML file
that

includes

set

of

policies.
3

Destination Health Information

[0-99]

System Trust Value (DHIS-TV)

Uniform
Distribution

Simulates the trust value
of the DHIS.

Notes for Subsection 6.2.2.3:
1) Each patient has one EHR with an associated privacy policy PP. This EHR and the rest of PP (i.e.,
SdA-PP) are embedded in the SdA.
2) The TBION provides the DHIS-TV to TvA.
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3) The random variables the Table 6.6 are analogous with the random variables in Table 6.3. We
changed names of these variables due the difference between testbeds.

6.3.3.4. Testbed Measures
We track all critical activities in HHIS and during SdA enabling in DHIS (we follow same measures
used in ADB-TTP testbed). Table 6.7 lists and describes the measures we use in the ADB-MAS testbed.
Table 6.7. Testbed Measures.

1A

Measure

Description

Rates (percentage) of different

1) Count the total number of AC noop, evaporation by

AC/SdA data reduction types (AC
noop and evaporation by AC, and

1B

AC, and apoptosis by SdA for all testbed iterations,
2) Compute the percentage of AC noop, evaporation by

apoptosis by SdA for the whole

AC, and apoptosis by SdA in all testbed iterations (the

testbed

3 values add to 100%).

Rates of different SdA data

1) Count the number of full SdA data disclosure, partial

disclosure types (full SdA data

SdA data disclosure, and null data disclosure for all

disclosure, partial SdA data

testbed iterations,

disclosure, and null SdA data
disclosure) for the whole testbed

2) Compute the percentage of full SdA data disclosure,
partial SdA data disclosure, and null SdA data
disclosure in all testbed iterations (the 3 values add to
100%).

2A

Rates of SdA apoptosis for different
verification mechanisms
(authentication, authorization, SdA

1) Count the total number of SdA apoptosis for all
testbed iterations,
2) Compute the number SdA apoptosis caused by each

integrity, and data integrity) for the

verification mechanisms separately (i.e.,

whole testbed.

authentication, authorization, SdA integrity, and data
integrity),
3) Compute the percentage of SdA apoptosis cause by
each verification mechanisms (the 4 values add to
100%).
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Table 6.7 —Continued

3A

The average of AC/SdA data
reduction ratio, average of SdA data
disclosure ratio, average of SdATVT, and an average of average of

1) Compute the averages of data reduction ratios, data
disclosure ratios, SdA-TVTs, DHIS-TVs for each PP,
2) Compute the standard deviation for each average
computed in step 1.

DHIS-TV per PP for the whole
testbed

4A

The number of SdA apoptoses per a

1) Collect the number of SdA apoptosis for each

single testbed iteration group (group

iterations group. Each iteration group includes 500

plot).

iterations,
2) Repeat step (1) for 20 iteration groups.

4B

The number of SdA apoptoses and
average value of DHIS-TV per a
single testbed iteration group (group
plot).

5A

The number of AC evaporation per a
single testbed iteration group (group

5B

2) Compute the average of all values of DHIS-TVs in
each iteration group.

1) Collect the number of AC evaporation for each
iteration group,
2) Repeat step (1) for 20 iteration groups.

The number of AC evaporations per

1) Collect the number of AC evaporations for each

single testbed iteration group (group
plot).

The number of SdA data disclosures
per a single testbed iteration group

6B

group (i.e., 20 iteration groups),

plot).

average value of DHIS-TV per a

6A

1) Collect the number of SdA apoptosis for iteration

iteration group (20 iteration groups),
2) Compute the average of all values of DHIS-TVs for
each iteration group.

1) Collect the number of SdA data disclosures count for
each iteration group,

(group plot).

2) Repeat Step (1) for 20 iteration groups.

The number of SdA data disclosures

1) Collect the number of SdA data disclosures for each

per average of DHIS-TV per a single
testbed iteration group (group plot).

iteration group (20 iteration group),
2) Compute the average of all values of DHIS-TVs for
each iteration group.
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Table 6.7 —Continued
7A

The average of AC evaporation ratio
per a single testbed iteration group
(group plot).

1) Compute average of AC evaporation ratios for each
iteration group,
2) Compute the standard deviation for data evaporation
ratios for each iteration group,
3) Repeat steps (1 and 2) for 20 iteration groups.

7B

The average of AC evaporation ratio
per average of DHIS-TV per a single
testbed iteration group (group plot).

1) Compute average of AC evaporation ratios for each
iteration group,
2) Compute average of DHIS-TVs for each iteration
group,
3) Repeat steps (1 and 2) for 20 groups.

8A

The average of SdA data disclosure
ratio per a single testbed iteration

8B

1) Compute average of SdA data disclosure ratio for
each iteration group,

group (group plot).

2) Repeat steps (1) for all 20 iteration groups.

The average of SdA data disclosure

1) Compute the average of SdA data disclosure ratios

ratio per average of DHIS-TV per a
single testbed iteration group (group
plot).

for each iteration group,
2) Compute average of DHIS-TV for each iteration
group,
3) Repeat steps (1 and 2) for all groups 20 iteration
groups.

9A

The number of

1) Compute the number of SdA disclosures (which

successful/unsuccessful SdA data

refers to number of successful SdA data delivery) for

deliveries per testbed iterations group

each iteration group,

(group plot).

2) Unsuccessful SdA data delivery count = iteration in
each group (i.e., 500) – number of successful SdA
data delivery.

6.3.3.5. Detailed Testbed Scenario and Implementation
We use Java Agent DEvelopment Framework (JADE) to design and execute multiple ADB agent
operations in ADB-MAS testbed. The code was executed in the Eclipse Integrated Development
Environment Version: Neon.2 Release (4.6.2).
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This subsection discusses the implementation of our solution ADB-MAS. The subsection includes
ADB-MAS Agents Creation, ADB-MAS Agents Dissemination, SdA Enabling, ADB-MAS Agents
Auditing, and ADB-MAS Agents Terminating.

6.3.3.5.1. DHIS Access Request
The Destination Container (represents the destination platform DHIS) sends a DHIS access request to
the Main Container (represents the home platform, that is, HHIS) asking for a patient’s H-EHR. We used
a Java application class (MAS-APP) to initiate and implement our ADB-MAS simulation. The MAS-APP
uses a local Java method to generate DHIS access request. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the
DHIS access request is already received by HHIS. Also, we assume that that the DHIS request is authentic,
i.e., no need to verify the access request by HHIS. The HHIS collects the patient H-EHR and its PP from
HHIS-DB. Then according to the DHIS access request, we create the following containers:
a) Destination container: represents the destination platform.
b) TBION container: represents the Trust Broker Information Overlay Network (TBION) platform.

6.3.3.5.2. Creating TvA and DaA in HHIS
The HHIS creates TvA and DaA as follows:
1) Creating TvA: The HHIS creates TvA (cf. Subsection 5.4.2.1.1) by creating an instance of TvAgent.
TvA Agent extends a Java class Agent (jade.core.Agent) package. The TvA includes the DHIS
information and TBION identifier as application data. Then, the HHIS computes the hash value for
the application data using the standard Java hash function (java.lang.object) library. HHIS adds
VM90 a set of behaviors in the TvA class.
2) Creating DaA: The HHIS creates DaA (cf. Subsection 5.4.2.1.2) by creating an instance of
DaAgent. The DaA agent extends a Java class Agent (jade.core.Agent) package. The DaA includes
the agents’ identifiers and information of platforms including AN as application data. Then, the
HHIS computes the hash value for the application data using the standard Java hash function
(java.lang.object) library. HHIS add VM91 a set of behaviors in the TvA class. DaA revives audit
messages form agents in ADB-MAS as a form of information messages (info).

90
91

Recall that TvA uses a single unencrypted VM.
Recall that DaA uses a single unencrypted VM.
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6.3.3.5.3. Retrieving DHIS-TV from TBION
Retrieving the DHIS-TV form TBION included the following steps:
1) Disseminating TvA: The HHIS sends TvA to TBION using the doMove() method. We use the
doMove() method to move TvA from Main Container to the Destination Container.
2) Starting TvA Enabling: The TvA reaches TBION and starts the TvA enabling process:
2a) Authenticating TBION: The TvA asks TBION for its identifier. The TBION provides its
identifier to the TvA. The TvA compares this identifier with the identifier included in its
application data. If the identifier is not identical (insufficient), then TvA VM apoptosizes the
entire TvA. Otherwise TvA VM authenticates TBION and computes the hash value for its
application data. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that TBION is an authentic site.
2b) Authorizing TBION: The TvA VM includes the hash value in a request and send it to HHIS
asking for the Confirmation Code (CCd). The CCd is either Positive CCd (includes a
confirmation to authenticate TBION) or negative (includes a confirmation to invalidate
TBION). The HHIS receives the request and compares the saved hash value with the received
hash value (included in TvA request). If the hash values are identical, then HHIS prepare the
Positive CCd. Otherwise, the HHIS prepares the negative. The HHIS sends the CCd to the
TvA. The TvA receives and checks the CCd. If the CCd is negative, the TvA VM apoptosizes
the entire TvA. Otherwise, then TvA authorizes the TBION. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that TBION is an authorized site.
2c) Retrieving DHIS-TV: The TvA asks the TBION to provide DHIS-TV. The TBION retrieves
the DHIS-TV and saves it in the TvA. We use Java method developed by us to generate the
value of DHIS-TV.
3) Delivering DHIS-TV: The TvA returns to HHIS and delivers the DHIS-TV to HHIS. Then, the TvA
terminates by apoptosis in HHIS. To terminate TvA, we use the doDelete() method.

6.3.3.5.4. Creating SdA and EnA in HHIS
The HHIS performs the following steps to create SdA and EnA as follows:
1) Enforcing Data Reduction PP: The HHIS enforces Data Reduction PP. Enforcing data reduction
PP evaporates (removes) some of patient’s EHR attributes that their trust value threshold (TVT)
above the DHIS-TV. The HHIS reads PPs, retrieves data reduction rules, and applies them to the
patient H-EHR (a simulated XML file). We use SAX (Simple API for XML) to parse and read the
ADBPP;
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2) Creating SdA: The HHIS create SdA (cf. Subsection 5.4.2.1.3) by creating an instance of SdA
agent. The SdA agent extends a Java class Agent (jade.core.Agent). The HHIS collects the
remaining H-EHR data and the PP from HHIS-DB (MyPhpSQL). The HHIS generates two
asymmetric encryption/decryption key pairs using the Java Security (java.security) package. Next,
the HHIS encrypts the application data (i.e., the H-EHR and the PP) using the first asymmetric
encryption key. The HHIS computes the first hash value for application data using the standard
Java hash function in (java.lang.object) library. HHIS keeps a copy of the first computed hash
value. The HHIS adds the iVM as a first part of the code. The iVM is protected set of behaviors
within the SdA class. The HHIS encrypts application data (sensitive data and metadata) using the
second generated encryption key and the Java Cryptography (javax.crypto) package. Note that we
did not encrypt the iVM (set of behaviors) because we fail to find a way to simulate
encryption/decryption for actual code within the runtime. The HHIS computes the second hash
value for application data using the standard Java hash function in (java.lang.object) library. Again,
we exclude iVM from the second hash calculation since iVM is a set of behaviors inside the SdA
class. The HHIS adds eVM as a second part of the code. Note that eVM is not encrypted and it is
a set of behaviors in the SdA class. The eVM includes identifiers of platforms and agents. (The
SdA eVM uses this information to authenticate DHIS). That is, the SdA includes VM (eVM and
iVM) and encrypted application data (remaining patient’s H-EHR and SdA-PP). The HHIS builds
the enabling record (ER) that includes two private decryption keys and two hash values.

3) Creating EnA: The HHIS creates EnA (cf. Subsection 5.4.2.1.4) by creating an instance of
EnAgent. The EnAgent extends a Java class Agent (jade.core.Agent) package. The EnA includes
the ER as a sensitive data and identifiers of all agents and platforms in ADB-MAS as metadata.
The HHIS encrypts ER using a symmetric encryption key and the Java Cryptography (javax.crypto)
package. However, there is no need to encrypt metadata, but we use protected private constants
within the EnA class to protect the metadata. HHIS computes the hash value for application data
using the standard Java hash function (java.lang.object) library, and keeps a copy of the computed
hash value. Then HHIS adds the encrypted VM, which is a set of behaviors in the EnA class.

6.3.3.5.5. Disseminating EnA, DaA, and SdA
The HHIS performs the following steps:
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i) Disseminating EnA to AN: The HHIS disseminates EnA to Arbitrary Network (AN). The EnA
remains in AN to support the SdA. The EnA provides the required ER to SdA during SdA enabling
in the DHIS.
ii) Disseminating DaA to AN: The HHIS disseminates DaA to Arbitrary Network (AN). The DaA
collects and saves the audit messages come from all agents in ADB-MAS.
iii) Disseminating SdA to DHIS: The HHIS disseminates DaA to DHIS in the Destination Platform
(Clinic) to deliver the patient’s H-EHR.

6.3.3.5.6. EnA Enabling in the AN
When EnA reaches AN, EnA VM92 starts the EnA enabling process. The EnA enabling includes two
activities:
1) Authenticating AN: The EnA asks the AN to provide its identifier. The AN provides its identifier
to EnA. The EnA checks AN identifier. If the identifier does not match the identifier included in
the metadata, then the EnA VM apoptosizes the entire EnA using the doDelete() method. Otherwise
EnA authenticates AN and computes the hash value for its application data using the standard Java
hash function (java.lang.object) library.
2) Authorizing AN: The EnA includes the hash value in a request and sends it to HHIS asking for
Authorization Code (ACd). The ACd should either be Positive ACd (decryption key for EnA
application data) or Negative ACd (include a confirmation to invalidate AN). The HHIS receives
the request and compares the saved hash value (saved during EnA creation) with the received hash
value (included in the EnA request). If both hash values are identical, the HHIS prepares the
Positive ACd. Otherwise, the HHIS prepares the Negative ACd. The HHIS sends ACd (either
positive or negative) to EnA. The EnA receives and checks the ACd. If the ACd is negative, then
EnA VM apoptosizes the entire EnA in AN using the doDelete() method. Otherwise, EnA VM
authorizes AN and decrypts its application data using the decryption key (included in Positive ACd)
and the Java Cryptography (javax.crypto).

6.3.3.5.7. DaA Enabling in the AN
The DaA VM starts the DaA enabling process in AN. The DaA enabling includes authenticating AN
(no authorizing AN). For the sake of simplicity, we assume that AN is an authentic and an authorized
92

Recall that EnA uses a single VM.
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network for DaA because EnA authenticated and authorized AN during EnA enabling (cf. Subsection
6.3.2.5.6 above).

6.3.3.5.8. SdA Enabling in the DHIS
When SdA reaches the DHIS, SdA eVM starts the SdA enabling process:
1) Authenticating DHIS: The SdA eVM asks the DHIS to provide its identifier. The DHIS provides
its identifier to SdA. The SdA eVM checks theses identifier. If the identifier is insufficient, then:
(i) the SdA eVM send audit data to DaA in AN, (ii) the eVM apoptosizes the entire SdA in DHIS
using the doDelete ( ) method, (iii) the EnA VM apoptosizes entire EnA in AN using the doDelete()
method, and (iv) the DaA moves from AN to HHIS using the doMove() method to deliver audit
data.
Otherwise, the SdA eVM authenticates DHIS. Then, the SdA eVM computes the hash value for its
application data using the standard Java hash function in (java.lang.object) library. Then SdA eVM
provides the hash value along with Ids (SdA-Id, EnA-Id, and DHIS-Id) to the DHIS;
2) Authorizing DHIS: The DHIS includes the hash value in a request and sends it to EnA asking for
Enabling Record (ER).
The EnA receives the request and compares the saved hash value (i.e., the second hash value during
SdA creation) with the received hash value from SdA. If both hash values are identical, the EnA
VM prepares the Positive ER (includes a hash value and decryption keys). Otherwise, the EnA VM
prepares the negative ER (includes confirmation to invalidate the DHIS). Then EnA VM sends
audit data to DaA in AN. Next, EnA VM sends ER (either Positive or negative) to DHIS. Then, the
VM terminates entire EnA by apoptosis in AN using the doDelete() method. The DHIS receives
ER and forwards it to SdA. The SdA receives and checks ER. If the ER is negative, then: (i) the
SdA eVM sends audit data to DaA (in AN), (ii) the VM apoptosizes the entire SdA using the
doDelete() method, and (iii) the DaA moves from AN to HHIS to deliver audit data.
Otherwise, the SdA VM authorizes DHIS and decrypts its application data using the second private
decryption key (included in ER) and the Java Cryptography (javax.crypto) package. Note that
application data are still protected by another encryption (the one using the first asymmetric
encryption key, cf. Step 2 in Subsection 6.3.2.5.4).
3) Integrity Verification: The SdA iVM starts the integrity.
3a) Computing Hash Value: The SdA iVM computes the hash value for its encrypted application
data using the standard Java hash function in (java.lang.object) library;
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3b) Comparing Hash Values: The iVM compares the computed hash with the hash value included
in ER (i.e., the first hash value). If the hash values are identical, the integrity check is a failure,
then: (i) SdA iVM sends audit data message to DaA, (ii) the iVM apoptosizes the entire SdA
in DHIS using the doDelete() method, and (iii) the DaA moves from AN to HHIS using the
doMove() method to deliver audit data. Otherwise (the integrity check is a success), the SdA
iVM decrypts application data using the first private decryption key and the Java Cryptography
(javax.crypto) package.
4) Enforcing Data Disclosure PP (SdA-PP): The SdA iVM enforces Data Disclosure PP.
4a) The SdA iVM reads SdA-PPs, retrieves data disclosure rules, and applies them to the patient
H-EHR (a simulated XML file). We use SAX (Simple API for XML) to parse and read the
ADBPP. The data disclosure procedure includes full SdA data, partial SdA data, and null SdA
data (cf. Subsection 5.4.7.4);
4b) The SdA iVM discloses the remaining H-EHRs to the DHIS in the DP. The SdA send audit
data to the DaA in AN.

6.3.3.5.9. SdA Termination
The SdA iVM terminates (by apoptosis) the entire SdA using the doDelete() method.

6.3.3.5.10. Delivering Audit Data
1) The DaA moves from AN to the HHIS using the doMove() method to deliver audit data,
2) The DaA reaches the HHIS and delivers audit data. The audit data included in a DaA-Audit File.
The DaA creates and maintains DaA-Audit File.

6.3.3.5.11. DaA Termination
The DaA iVM terminates (by apoptosis) the entire DaA using the doDelete() method.

6.3.4. The Experimental Results and Discussion
The ADB-MAS testbed follows the scenario shown in Figure 6.1 at the beginning of this chapter.
As we can be seen in Subsection 6.2.3 (when all obtained results were presented) sam of the results are
utterly predictable and have not very interesting findings. Therefore, in this subsection we present the most
interesting results.
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We assume the trust value (SdA-TVT or DHIS-TV) is an integer in the range of [0-99]. Also, we assume
that any DHIS-TV value < 50 consider low trust value, and any value >=50 consider high or acceptable
value. Therefore, we produce results according to the following categories:
Case A) When SdA-TVT = 50, i.e., SdA-TVT has a fixed value.
Case B) When 50 < SdA-TVT ≤ 99, i.e., we simulate SdA-TVT values using uniform distribution
within the range [51-99].
In this testbed, we exclude all cases when DHIS < 50 because we considered them low trusted platforms
or hosts. That is, we would like to exam SdA within trust values that exceed or equal the minimum value
(i.e., 50) assigned by us.

6.3.4.1. AC/SdA Data Reduction and SdA Data Disclosure
In ADB-MAS, the HHIS performs data reduction in HP according to the data reduction policy
expressed in PPs by deleting from the patient’s EHR (H-EHR) all attributes with the required trust value
above DHIS-TV. Data disclosure means that SdA delivers to the DHIS all, part, or none of the H-EHR data
according to the SdA-PPs.

1) Rate for AC/SdA Data Reduction Types and SdA Data Disclosure Types
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Figure 6.29. Rates of AC/SdA data reduction types and SdA
data disclosure types for all testbed iterations.
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Figure 6.29 shows rates of data reduction types and data disclosure types for Case A. The total
noop rate is equal to 15.58% (6,458) of actual iterations of the total of 10,000 iterations. The actual
iterations refer to the iterations with accepted DHIS-TV values provided by TvAs. The noop rate
includes 11.09% partial data disclosure and 4.49% full data disclosure. That means 11.09% from
the actual iterations results in partially disclosed H-EHR to the DHIS in DP, and (4.52% of total
actual iterations results in fully disclosed H-EHR to the DHIS. Also, we can see that the total
evaporation rate (11.09%) includes 9.32% of partial H-EHR disclosures and 1.77% of full H-EHR
disclosures.
Note that the noop and evaporation are done even before creating SdA in HHIS. The HHIS
compares the generated SdA-TVT and DHIS-TV to evaluate if the DHIS is trusted host or not.
37.91% refers to all apoptoses performed by SdA during SdA enabling in the DHIS.
As we expected, the larger rate of apoptosis occurs due to the use of different verifications
(authentication, authorization, and data integrity check) performed by SdA that may lead to
apoptosis (cf. Figure 40). Because we use the uniform distribution in the range [0, 99] for the DHISTV values and SdA-TVT = 50, many DHIS-TV values (for the 3,542 iterations that do not produce
noop) are below the SdA-TVT value which increases the null SdA data rate.
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Figure 6.30. Rates of AC/SdA data reduction types and data
disclosure types for all testbed iterations.

Figure 6.30 shows rates for data reduction types and data disclosure types for Case B. We can see
that when SdA-TVT values increase (in Figure 6.30 vs. Figure 6.29) the noop rate (Full SdA Data)
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and the evaporation rate (Partial SdA Data) decrease while the null rate (Apoptosis by SdA)
increases. That means that the DHIS cannot pass SdA verifications mechanisms during SdA
enabling (cf. Figure 6.32); so the null SdA data rate increases.

2) Rate of SdA Apoptosis for Different Verification Mechanisms
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Figure 6.31. Rates of SdA apoptosis for different verification
mechanisms.

Figure 6.31 shows rates for different verifications mechanisms (authentication, authorization, SdA
integrity, and data integrity) for Case A. These verifications lead to apoptosis of the entire SdA.
We can see that the apoptosis rates for the authentication and authorization are higher than for SdA
integrity and data integrity.
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Figure 6.32. Rates of SdA apoptosis for different verification
mechanisms.

Figure 6.32 shows the same verifications mechanisms for the Case B. As expected, the
apoptosis rates for authentication (40.24%) and authorization (39.25%) increased due to the
increment of SdA-TVT values; however, the apoptosis rates for the SdA data integrity (19.28%)
and Data Integrity (1.23%) shows unexpected decrement that we have no explanation for it.

3) Average of AC/SdA Data Reduction Ratio, Average of SdA Data Disclosure Ratio, Average of
DHIS-TV, and Average of SdA-TV versus PP Number.
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Avg. of AC/SdA Data Reduction, Avg. of SdA Data Disclosure,
Avg. of DHIS-TV, and Avg. ADB-TVT vs. PP Number
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Figure 6.33. Averages of AC/SdA data reduction ratio, SdA data disclosure
ratio, DHIS-TV, and SdA-TVT vs. PP number.

Figure 6.33 shows the average of data reduction ratio, the average of data disclosure ratio, the
average of DHIS-TV, and the average of SdA-TVT versus the selected privacy policies (PPs) for
the Case A. As expected, the average of data reduction ratio decreases when the PP number
increases93 (as shown on the X-axis while the average of data disclosure ratio increases when the
PP number increases.

93

Recall that PPs used in the testbed are arranged from the most restricted (i.e., PP1) to the least restricted (i.e., PP 9).
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Avg. of AC/SdA Data Reduction Ratio, Avg. of SdA Data
Disclosure Ratio, and Avg. of DHIS-TV vs. PP Number
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Figure 6.34. Averages of AC/SdA data reduction, SdA data disclosure,
DHIS-TV, and SdA-TVT vs. PP number.

Figure 6.34 shows the average data reduction ratio, the average data disclosure ratio, the average
DHIS-TV, and the average SdA-TVT versus the selected PP for Case B. As expected, the average
data reduction ratio decreases and the average data disclosure ratio increases when the PP number
increases.
6.3.4.2. AC/SdA Data Reduction
This subsection shows AC/SdA data disclosure result of the testbed.
1) Numbers of AC/SdA Data Reduction Types vs. Group Number
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Figure 6.35. Number of AC/SdA reduction types vs. group
number.
Figure 6.35 shows number of data reduction types versus group number for the Case A. As
expected, the apoptoses shows high number compared with noops and evaporations due to the use
of different verifications mechanisms that may lead to apoptosize the entire SdA as shown in Figure
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Figure 6.36. Number of data reduction types versus group
number.
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Figure 6.36 shows number of data reduction types versus group number for the Case B. As
expected, the apoptosis number increases while both noop and evaporation decrease (compared
with Figure 6.35) due to the increment of SdA-TVT values.

6.3.4.3. SdA Data Disclosure
This subsection shows SdA data disclosure result of the testbed

INumber of teration

1) Numbers of SdA Data Disclosure Types vs. Group Number
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Figure 6.37. Number of data disclosure types vs. group number.

Figure 6.37 shows number of data disclosure types versus group number for the Case A. Due to the
higher apoptosis number, the number of null SdA data shows high values compared with full SdA
data and partials SdA data. We can see the number of partial SdA data is greater than number of
partial SdA data. As expected, full SdA data and partials SdA data number show small values due
to the use of different PPs.
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Figure 6.38. Number of data disclosure types vs. group number.

Figure 6.38 shows number of data disclosure types versus group number for the Case B. We can
see the number of null SdA data increases due to the increment of SdA-TVT values. The number
of Full SdA data number does not show decrement while the number of partial SdA data shows
obvious decrement compared with same values in Figure 6.37. That due to the increment of SdATVT values and the use of different PPs.

2) Number of Successful/Unsuccessful SdA Data Deliveries vs. Group Number
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Figure 6.39. Number of successful/unsuccessful SdA data deliveries
vs. group number.
Figure 6.39 shows the number of successful94 and unsuccessful95 data delivery versus group number
for the Case A. As expected, the number of the unsuccessful data delivery is greater than the count
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of successful data delivery due to the different verifications mechanisms performed by SdA.
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Figure 6.40. Number of successful/unsuccessful SdA data deliveries
vs. group number.

94
95

.Recall that the successful delivery means that SdA disclosed its H-EHR to the DHIS fully or partially (i.e., either full SdA or partial SdA Data)
Recall that the unsuccessful delivery means that SdA disclosed no data to the DHIS (i.e., null SdA data).
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Figure 6.40 shows the number of successful and unsuccessful data delivery versus group number
for the Case B. We can see the numbers of successful data delivery increases while the unsuccessful
data delivery decreases due to the increment of SdA-TVT values.

6.4. Comparison of Performance Results for ADB-TTP and ADB-MAS
This Section compares ADB-TTP with ADB-MAS in terms of their testbed performance results. Both
testbeds following common setups, variables and measures, but we would like to show some differences
between both testbeds and their performance results.
Recall that we have considered two cases for the threshold values ADB-TVT (for ADB-TTP) and SdATVT (for ADB-MAS), which we consider in turn.

6.4.1. Fixed ADB/SdA Trust Value Threshold
In following we discuss different comparisons between ADB-TTP and ADB-MAS results. Each
compassion refers to specific figures.
A) Comparison of data reduction and data disclosure rates
Case A requires comparing results for ADB-TTP shown in Figure 6.14 with results for ADB-MAS
shown in Figure 6.29.
A1) Data reduction types.

Let us first compare data reduction types for ADB (ADB noop, ADB

evaporation, and ADB apoptosis) with data reduction types for AC/SdA (AC noop, evaporation by AC,
and apoptosis by SdA).
Total data reduction rates for ADB-TTP are smaller than total data reduction rates for ADB-MAS, in
case of noop (10.66% vs. 15.58%, resp.); and in case of evaporation (5.07% vs. 11.09%, resp.).
However, total data reduction rates for ADB-TTP are larger than total data reduction rates for ADBMAS in case of apoptosis (84.27% vs. 37.91%, resp.). The rationale is that the rates for ADB-TTP are
computed over 10,000 iterations while the rates for ADB-MAS are computed over only 6,458 of 10,000
iterations—for the following reason. As we mentioned before, HHIS will not send SdA (with EHR) to
DHIS if DHIS has the trust value below the trust value threshold SdA-TVT = 50. If we had not checked
the DHIS-TV trust value before creating/sending SdA to DHIS and sent SdA to DHIS regardless of its
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DHIS-TV trust value, SdA would have been apoptosized at DHIS; with our approach SdA is not
created/sent in 3,542 iterations out of the 10,000 (35.42% of iterations).
So, the high apoptosis rate for ADB-TTP (84.27%) is due to apoptosis caused by low CES-TV values
(CES-TV is called DHIS-TV in ADB-MAS). plus the apoptosis caused by other ADB verifications
(ADB authentication, ADB authorization, ADB integrity, and ADB data integrity) during ADB
enabling at CES (CES is called DHIS in ADB-MAS). In contrast, for ADB-MAS the apoptosis rate
(37.91%) is due only to apoptosis caused by SdA during SdA enabling at DHIS (CES). There are no
apoptoses caused by low DHIS-TV (CES-TV) values.
This only partially explains the larger apoptosis ratio for ADB-TTP, as will be shown now. We can
calculate the number of iterations for which no data are delivered to DHIS in ADB-MAS (due to either
not being sent or due to SdA apoptosis) as follows:
10,000 * 35.42% + 6,458 * 37.91% = 5,990.22 = 5,990
This means that the ratio of iterations with no delivered data for ADB-MAS is 59.99% (5,990/10,000).
59.99% is still smaller than the ratio of iterations with no delivered data in ADB-TTP (84.27%). We
have no explanation for this.
A2) Data disclosure types.

Let us compare now data disclosure types for ADB (full ADB data

disclosure, partial ADB data disclosure) with data disclosure types for SdA (full SdA data disclosure,
partial SdA data disclosure).96
The partial data disclosure rates for noop and evaporation in ADB-TTP (6.14% and 4.54%, resp.) are
smaller than the corresponding partial data disclosure rates for noop and evaporation in ADB-MAS
(11.09% and 9.32 %, resp.).
The full data disclosure rates for noop in ADB-TTP (4.52%) almost identical as (slightly larger than)
the corresponding full data disclosure rates for noop in ADB-MAS (4.49%). The full data disclosure
rates for evaporation in ADB-TTP (0.53%, resp.) are smaller than the corresponding full data disclosure
rates for evaporation in ADB-MAS (1.77 %, resp.). As we expected, these rates are changed due to the
variety of privacy policies used in both testbeds.

96

Null ADB/SdA data disclosure [%] = 100% – (full ADB/SdA data disclosure [%] + partial ADB/SdA data disclosure [%]).
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B) Comparison of apoptosis rates for different verification mechanisms
Case B requires comparing results for ADB-TTP shown in Figure 6.16 with results for ADB-MAS
shown in Figure 6.31.
Let us compare rates of apoptosis for different verification mechanisms for ADB (ADB authentication,
ADB authorization, ADB integrity, and ADB data integrity) with rates of apoptosis for different
verification mechanisms for AC/SdA authentication, AC/SdA authorization, SdA integrity, and SdA
data integrity.
Apoptosis rates for different verification mechanisms for ADB-TTP are smaller than apoptosis rates
for different verification mechanisms for ADB-MAS: in case of ADB vs. AC/SdA authentication
(33.53% vs. 38.33%); in case of ADB vs. AC/SdA authorization (33.26% vs. 36.11 %); in case of
ADB/SdA integrity (16.43% vs. 23.4 %); and in case of ADB/SdA data integrity (1.05% vs. 2.16 %).
We have no explanation for this phenomenon.

C) Comparison of the averages of data reduction ratio, data disclosure ratio, CES-TV/DHIS-TV,
and ADB-TVT/SdA-TVT versus the ADB PP number
Case C requires comparing results for ADB-TTP shown in Figure 6.18 with results for ADB-MAS
shown in Figure 6.33.
The averages of ADB vs. AC/SdA data reduction ratios, ADB vs. SdA data disclosure ratios, CES-TV
vs. DHIS-TV, and ADB-TVT vs. SdA-TVT as a function of the ADBPP/SdAPP Number for both
ADB-TTP and ADB-MAS show quite similar results because both testbeds use the same privacy
policies. That is, the more restrictive is the privacy policy used by ADB/SdA, the lower is the data
disclosure ratio (and the higher is the data reduction ratio) for ADB/SdA.

D) Comparison of data reduction types versus group number
Case D requires comparing results for ADB-TTP shown in Figure 6.20 with results for ADB-MAS
shown in Figure 6.35.
The curves for three different data reduction types for ADB (ADB noop, evaporation, and apoptosis by
ADB) are quite similar to the curves for three different data reduction types for AC/SdA (AC noop,
evaporation by AC, and apoptosis by SdA). We have no explanation for this phenomenon.
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E) Comparison of data disclosure types versus group number
Case E requires comparing results for ADB-TTP shown in Figure 6.22 with results for ADB-MAS
shown in Figure 6.37.
The curves for three different data disclosure types for ADB (full ADB data, partial ADB data, and null
ADB data) are quite similar to the curves for three different data disclosure types for SdA (full SdA
data, partial SdA data, and null SdA data). We have no explanation for this phenomenon.

F) Comparison of the number of successful/unsuccessful data deliveries
Case F requires comparing results for ADB-TTP shown in Figure 6.24 with results for ADB-MAS
shown in Figure 6.39.
The curves for successful/unsuccessful data deliveries for ADB-TTP and for ADB-MAS are quite
similar, ranging from 60 to 90 for successful data deliveries and from 410-440 for unsuccessful data
deliveries. We have no explanation for this phenomenon.

6.4.2 Uniformly Distributed ADB/SdA Trust Value Threshold
A) Comparison of data reduction and data disclosure rates
Case A requires comparing results for ADB-TTP shown in Figure 6.15 with results for ADB-MAS
shown in Figure 6.30.
A1) Data reduction types.

Let us first compare data reduction types for ADB (ADB noop, ADB

evaporation, and ADB apoptosis) with data reduction types for AC/SdA (AC noop, evaporation by AC,
and apoptosis by SdA).
Total data reduction rates for ADB-TTP are greater than total data reduction rates for ADB-MAS in
case of noop (8.27% vs. 7.79%) and in case of apoptosis (91.83% vs. 41.6%). However, in case of
evaporation (1.46% vs. 4.21%,) total data reduction rates for ADB-TTP are smaller than total data
reduction rates for ADB-MAS. In an explanation we need to consider the fact that the rates for ADBTTP are computed over 10,000 iterations while rates for ADB-MAS are computed over only 5,360 of
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10,000 iterations—for the following reason. HHIS will not send SdA (with EHR) to DHIS if DHIS
has the trust value below the trust value threshold SdA-TVT =50. If we had not checked the DHIS-TV
trust value before creating/sending SdA to DHIS and sent SdA to DHIS regardless of its DHIS-TV trust
value, SdA would have been apoptosized at DHIS; with our approach SdA is not created/sent in 4,640
iterations out of the 10,000 (46.4% of iterations).
So, the high apoptosis rate for ADB-TTP (91.83%) is due to apoptosis caused by low CES-TV values
(CES-TV is called DHIS-TV in ADB-MAS) plus the apoptosis caused by other ADB verifications
(ADB authentication, ADB authorization, ADB integrity, and ADB data integrity) during ADB
enabling at CES (CES is called DHIS in ADB-MAS). In contrast, for ADB-MAS the apoptosis rate
(41.6%) is due only to apoptosis caused by SdA during SdA enabling at DHIS (CES). There are no
apoptoses caused by low DHIS-TV (CES-TV) values.
This only partially explains the larger apoptosis ratio for ADB-TTP, as will be shown now. We can
calculate the number of iterations for which no data are delivered to DHIS in ADB-MAS (due to either
not being sent or due to SdA apoptosis) as follows:
10,000 * 46.4% + 5,360 * 41.6.91% = 6,874.5 = 6,874
This means that the ratio of iterations with no delivered data for ADB-MAS is 68.74% (6,874/10,000).
68.74% is still smaller than the ratio of iterations with no delivered data in ADB-TTP (91.83%). We
have no explanation for this phenomenon.

A2) Data disclosure types.

Let us compare now data disclosure types for ADB (full ADB data

disclosure, partial ADB data disclosure) with data disclosure types for SdA (full SdA data disclosure,
partial SdA data disclosure).97
The partial data disclosure rates for noop and evaporation in ADB-TTP (4.31% and 3.86%, resp.) are
greater than the ADB-MAS data disclosure rates (4.22% and 3.58 %, resp.).
The full data disclosure rates for noop in ADB-TTP (3.86%) are larger than the full data disclosure
rates for noop in ADB-MAS (3.58%). The full data disclosure rates for evaporation in ADB-TTP

97

As before, null ADB/SdA data disclosure [%] = 100% – (full ADB/SdA data disclosure [%] + partial ADB/SdA data disclosure [%]).

205

(0.09%, resp.) are smaller than the corresponding full data disclosure rates for evaporation in ADBMAS (0.42 %, resp.). These rates are changed due to the variety of privacy policies used in both testbeds

B) Comparison of apoptosis rates for different verification mechanisms
Case B requires comparing results for ADB-TTP shown in Figure 6.17 with results for ADB-MAS
shown in Figure 6.32.
Let us compare rates of apoptosis for different verification mechanisms for ADB (ADB authentication,
ADB authorization, ADB integrity, and ADB data integrity) with rates of apoptosis for different
verification mechanisms for AC/SdA authentication, AC/SdA authorization, SdA integrity, and SdA
data integrity.
Apoptosis rates for different verification mechanisms for ADB-TTP are smaller than apoptosis rates
for different verification mechanisms for ADB-MAS, in case of ADB vs. AC/SdA authentication
(33.92% vs. 40.24%); in case of ADB vs. AC/SdA authorization (38.82% vs. 39.25 %); and in case of
ADB/SdA integrity (17.64 % vs. 19.28%). However, in case of ADB/SdA data integrity, the apoptosis
rate for ADB-TTP is greater than the apoptosis rate for ADB-MAS (1.45% vs. 1.23 %,.). We have no
explanation for this phenomenon.

C) Comparison of the averages of data reduction ratio, data disclosure ratio, CES-TV/DHIS-TV,
and ADB-TVT/SdA-TVT versus the ADB PP number
Case C requires comparing results for ADB-TTP shown in Figure 6.19 with results for ADB-MAS
shown in Figure 6.34.
The averages of ADB vs. AC/SdA data reduction ratios, ADB vs. SdA data disclosure ratios, CES-TV
vs. DHIS-TV, and ADB-TVT vs. SdA-TVT as a function of the ADBPP/SdAPP Number for both
ADB-TTP and ADB-MAS show quite similar results because both testbeds use the same privacy
policies. That is, the more restrictive is the privacy policy used by ADB/SdA, the lower is the data
disclosure ratio (and the higher is the data reduction ratio) for ADB/SdA.
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D) Comparison of data reduction types versus group number
Case D requires comparing results for ADB-TTP shown in Figure 6.21 with results for ADB-MAS
shown in Figure 6.36.
The curves for three different data reduction types for ADB (ADB noop, ADB evaporation, and ADB
apoptosis) are quite similar to the curves for three different data reduction types for AC/SdA (AC noop,
evaporation by AC, and apoptosis by SdA). We have no explanation for this phenomenon.

E) Comparison of data disclosure types versus group number
Case E requires comparing results for ADB-TTP shown in Figure 6.23 with results for ADB-MAS
shown in Figure 6.38.
The curves for three different data disclosure types for ADB (full ADB data, partial ADB data, and null
ADB data) are quite similar to the curves for three different data disclosure types for SdA (full SdA
data, partial SdA data, and null SdA data). We have no explanation for this phenomenon.

F) Comparison of the number of successful/unsuccessful data deliveries
Case F requires comparing results for ADB-TTP shown in Figure 6.25 with results for ADB-MAS
shown in Figure 6.40.
The curves for successful/unsuccessful data deliveries for ADB-TTP and for ADB-MAS are quite
similar, ranging from 30-50 for successful data deliveries and from 450-480 for unsuccessful data
deliveries. We have no explanation for this phenomenon.

6.5. Chapter Conclusions
This chapter describes testbed scenarios for two designs: for the active data bundles with trusted third
parties (ADB-TTP), and for the active data bundles with multi-agent system (ADB-MAS). It then discusses
the design of the testbed program for these two testbeds, and results obtained by running experiments on
them. Also, it compares the performance of the ADB-TTP with and ADB-MAS.
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Our quantitative results show that under different circumstances either ADB-TTP or ADB-MAS
evaporates or apoptosizes more data. For fixed and uniformly distributed values for the ADB/SdA trust
threshold, the ratio of iterations with no delivered data in ADB-TTP is higher than the ratio of iterations
with no delivered data in ADB-MAS.
Our qualitative conclusions are that the use of ADB-MAS will reduce the risk of a patient healthcare
data (EHRs) because it performs a priori trust verification for the destination platform (DP). That is, we
collect the trust values of the DHIS, and enforcing privacy policies before sending patient health data to the
DHIS.
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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUDING REMARKS

“People do not like to think. If one thinks, one must reach
conclusions. Conclusions are not always pleasant.”
~Helen Keller

7.1. Introduction
The goal of this proposed research is protecting privacy and integrity of patients’ Electronic
Health/Medical Records (EHRs/EMRs) in healthcare information systems (HISes); HISes may include
patients and healthcare providers.
This chapter concludes the Dissertation, discusses the significance of our research, its expected impacts
on healthcare and broader areas as well as future work.

7.2. Conclusions
We propose a solution that protects patients’ EHRs/EMRs during their dissemination among different
locations. The solution relies on the use of active data bundles (ADBs) and two diverse implementations of
the Active Data Bundle (ADB) scheme: the modified Active Data Bundles with Trusted Third Party (ADBTTP) and the entirely new Active Data Bundles with Multi-Agents System (ADB-MAS).
Both ADB scheme implementations can be used to protect the EHRs/EMRs during their entire
lifecycle, and control the dissemination of EHRs/EMRs or their portions to diverse parties including
healthcare providers, patients, health insurance companies, and government agencies.
The features that distinguish our solution from previous ADB work are: (i) using nested VMs in ADBTTP instead of using a “flat” VM in ABTTP, (ii) adding new phases to the ADB lifecycle, including ADB
auditing and ADB termination; and (iii) using the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
for specifying and enforcing privacy policies.
We built two testbeds (emulation/simulation environments) for experiments with ADB-TTP and ADBMAS. We believe that the use of ADB-MAS increases privacy protection for patient healthcare data
(EHRs/EMRs) because it uses the trust value of the destination host and enforces privacy policies for an
EHR/EMR (which most likely reduces the contents of the EHR/EMR records) before sending the
EHR/EMR to the destination host.
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7.3. Significance and Expected Impacts
The ADB-MAS can provide privacy and integrity protection; verifications including authentication,
authorization, integrity checks; and policy enforcement depending on intelligent agent capabilities provided
by a secure mobile ADB agent. An ADB agent implements capabilities offered by ADBs, including trust
evaluation of the visited host and enforcing privacy policies. Most importantly, the ADB-MAS replaces a
designated TTP (used in the ADB-TTP) with ADB agents.
We hope that benefits of the ADB-MAS platform will result in its widespread use in healthcare
applications. We also expect that the proposed implementations of the ADB scheme will have numerous
positive impacts not only on healthcare but on many diverse areas of computing, technology, and society.

7.3.1. Impact on Healthcare
Expansion of healthcare information system (HISes) will improve the privacy of healthcare data
processing—even though this will not come for free.
We believe that the ADB scheme will help to assure that HISes provide the benefits expected of them.
In our future investigation, we expect to apply the ADB scheme and its implementations (ADB-TTP
and ADB-MAS) to protect privacy in diverse healthcare applications including the following:
1) Smart healthcare environments.
2) Pervasive healthcare environments.
3) Internet of Things (IoT) for healthcare
4) Healthcare privacy policy enforcement in HISes.
5) Healthcare information migration and integration in cloud computing.
In terms of community impact, the Borgess and Bronson healthcare providers in Kalamazoo, MI, have
shown interest in using the ADB scheme for healthcare applications [PeCo11].

7.3.2. Broader Area Impacts
In the broader area of computing technology, the proposed solution can be used to prevent privacy
violations, stealing and leaking of sensitive data in many areas, including IoT, cloud computing,
Opportunistic Resource Utilization Networks (Oppnets), and distributed database systems. In IoT and cloud
computing, the ADBs can protect privacy of data exchanged among IoT or cloud components. In Oppnets,
we can distribute control and application data among Oppnet nodes using ADBs. In distributed database
systems, ADBs can not only protect data exchanged among multiple database locations, but can also hold
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and execute machine learning/data analysis procedures; ADBs can bring such procedures to remote visited
hosts, which do not possess them.
We plan to pursue technology transfer to companies we work with, and via publications to the general
public. We believe that the ADB scheme can become an important component of the Next Generation
Internet, available to any application that needs to satisfy demanding privacy protection requirements.
In term of community impact, the following educational and research organizations have already shown
interest in the proposed research and its preliminary results:
1) The research team of Prof. Bharat Bhargava from Purdue University has shown interest in using
the ADB scheme for cloud computing [RBBL10, ABRS10].
2) Researchers, including prominent ones, from the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL), Rome, NY, and
the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), Washington, DC, have shown interest in using the ADB
scheme for cloud computing [RBBL10, ABRS10].
To broaden such impacts, we plan to pursue opportunities for collaborative research with the following
ongoing projects:
1) Informal task force on the biomedical engineering program in the College of Engineering and
Applied Sciences at WMU.
2) The Center for Health Information Technology Advancement (CHITA) at WMU.
3) The Strategic Health IT Advanced Research Projects on Security (SHARPS), led by University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, funded by the Office of the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology.
4) The Health Information Privacy Laboratory, School of Medicine, Vanderbilt University.

7.4. Future Work
Our future work may include the following:
1) Designing and implementing the ADB scheme for multi-destination dissemination model, with
multiple hops, in which ADBs/ADB agents are sent from a single provider (e.g., a hospital) to
multiple destinations (patients or all kinds of healthcare providers).
2) Investigating the use of ADB-MAS in IoT healthcare applications.
3) Designing and implementing blockchained ADBs in distributed systems.
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APPENDIX A
Tables of XACML Elements/Subelements and Attributes for Request, Policyset, and Response used in
Testbeds [ExAc13]
The XACML Request
Main Element
<Request>

Attributes
Required
ReturnPolicyIdList
CombinedDecision

Subelement
<Attributes>

Level 2
Subelements
<Attribute>

Level 2
Subelement
<AttributeVa
lue>

Required
Category

Required
AttributeId

Subelements
Optional

Required

N/A

N/A

The XACML Request (request.attributes)
Attributes
Optional
Required
xml:id
<Attribute>

Optional
<RequestDefaults>
<Attributes>
<MultiRequests>
Level 2 Subelements
Optional
<Content>

The XACML Request (request.attributes.attribute)
Attributes
Level 3 Subelements
Optional
Required
Optional
Issuer
<AttributeValue> N/A
IncludeInResult

The XACML Request (request.attributes.attribute.attributevalue)
Attributes
Level 3 Subelements
Required
Optional
Required
Optional
N/A
N/A
N/A
DataType
The XACML Response

Main Element

Attributes
Required

<Response>

N/A

N/A

Level 2 Subelement
<Decision>

Required
<Result>

N/A

Subelement
<Result>

Subelements
Optional

N/A

Optional
N/A

The XACML Response (response.result)
Attributes
Level 2 Subelements
Required
Optional
Required
Optional
N/A
<Decision>
<Status>
<Obligations>
<AssociatedAdvice>
<Attributes>
<PolicyIdentifierList>
Response (response.result.decision)
Attributes
Level 3 Subelements
Required
Optional
Required
Optional
N/A
N/A
N/A
Decision types

229

Value
“Permit”
“Deny”

Description
the requested access is permitted.
the requested access is denied.

“Indeterminate”

the PDP is unable to evaluate the requested access. Reasons for such inability include: missing attributes,
network errors while retrieving policies, division by zero during policy evaluation, syntax errors in the decision
request or in the policy, etc

“NotApplicable”

the PDP does not have any policy that applies to this decision request

The XACML Policy
Main Element
<PolicySet>

Attributes
Required
Optional
PolicySetId
MaxDelegationDepth
Version
PolicyCombiningA
lgId

The XACML Policy (policyset.policy)
Attributes
Optional
Required
MaxDelegationDepth <Target>

Subelement
<Policy>

Required
PolicyId
Version
RuleCombiningAlg
Id

Level 2 Subelement
<Rule>

Subelement
<Target>

Required
<Target>

Required
RuleId
Effect

The XACML Policy (policyset.policy.rule)
Attributes
Optional
Required
N/A
N/A

Subelements
Optional
<Description>
<PolicyIssuer>
<PolicySetDefaults>
<PolicySet>
<Policy>
<PolicySetIdReference>
<PolicyIdReference>
<ObligationExpressions>
<AdviceExpressions>
<CombinerParameters>
<PolicyCombinerParameters>
<PolicySetCombinerParamete
rs>
Level 2 Subelements
Optional
<Description>
<PolicyIssuer>
<PolicyDefaults>
<CombinerParameters>
<RuleCombinerParameters>
<VariableDefinition>
<Rule>
<ObligationExpressions>
<AdviceExpressions>
Sub-Elements
Optional
<Description>
<Target>
<Condition>
<ObligationExpressions>
<AdviceExpressions>

The XACML Policy (policyset.policy.rule.target)
Attributes
Level 2 Subelements
Required
Optional
Required
Optional
N/A
N/A
N/A
<AnyOf>
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Level 2 Subelement
<AnyOf>
Level 3 Subelement
<AllOf>
Level 4 Subelement
<Match>

Level 5 Subelement
<AttributeValue>

The XACML Policy (policyset.policy.rule.target.anyof)
Attributes
Level 3 Subelements
Required
Optional
Required
Optional
N/A
N/A
N/A
<AllOf>
The XACML Policy (policyset.policy.rule.target.anyof.allof)
Attributes
Level 4 Subelements
Required
Optional
Required
Optional
N/A
N/A
N/A
<Match>
The XACML Policy (policyset.policy.rule.target.anyof.allof.match)
Attributes
Level 5 Subelements
Required
Optional
Required
Optional
MatchId
N/A
<AttributeValue>
N/A
<AttributeDesignator>
<AttributeSelector>
The XACML Policy (policyset.policy.rule.target.anyof.allof.match.attributevalue)
Attributes
Level 6 Subelements
Required
Optional
Required
Optional
N/A
N/A
N/A
DataType

The XACML Policy (policyset.policy.rule.target.anyof.allof.match.attributedesignator)
Attributes
Level 6 Subelements
Required
Optional
Required
Optional
<AttributeDesignator> Category
N/A
N/A
Issuer
AttributeId
DataType
MustBePresent
The XACML Policy (policyset.policy.rule.target.anyof.allof.match.attributeselector)
Level 5 Subelement
Attributes
Level 6 Subelements
Required
Optional
Required
Optional
<AttributeSelector>
Category
ContextSelectorId
N/A
N/A
Path
DataType
MustBePresent
The XACML Policy (policyset.policy.rule.target.condtion)
Subelement
Attributes
Level 2 Subelements
Required
Optional
Required
Optional
<Condition>
N/A
N/A
<Expression>
N/A
Level 5 Subelement

Expression element can be substituted by the following elements (expression element substitution group):
<Apply>, <AttributeSelector>, <AttributeValue>, <Function>, <VariableReference>,
and <AttributeDesignator>. We chose <Apply> in this simulation
The XACML Policy (policyset.policy.rule.target.condtion.apply)
Attributes
Level 3 Subelements
Required
Optional
Required
Optional
<Apply>
FunctionId
N/A
N/A
<Description>
<AttributeValue>
The <Apply> element can be applied to any combination of the members of expression element substitution group.
Level 2 Subelement

231

APPENDIX B
Source Code Information
The source code for ADB-TTP testbed and ADB-MAS testbed can be found at:
https://github.com/RaedSalih/ADBSchem
In particular:
 Simulation/emulation code for ADB-TTP (the testbed for Active Data Bundles with Trusted Third
Parties, cf. Chapter 4) can be downloaded from the following link:
https://github.com/RaedSalih/ADBSchem/tree/master/ADB-TTP
 Simulation/emulation code for ADB-TTP (the testbed for Active Data Bundles with, cf. Chapter 5)
can be downloaded from the following link:
https://github.com/RaedSalih/ADBSchem/tree/master/ADB-MAS
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